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Executive summary 
 
Introduction 
 
NICE uses cost-effectiveness analysis to compare the health benefits expected to be gained by using 
a technology with the health that is likely to be forgone due to additional costs falling on the health 
care budget and displacing other activities that improve health.  This approach to informing decisions 
will be appropriate if the social objective is to improve health, the measure of health is adequate and 
the budget for health care can reasonably be regarded as fixed.  If NICE were to recommend a 
EURDGHU µVRFLHWDO SHUVSHFWLYH¶ ZLGHU HIIHFWV LPSDFWLQJ on other areas of the public sector and the 
wider economy would be formally incorporated into analyses and decisions.   The problem for policy 
is that, in the face of budgets legitimately set by government, it is not clear how or whether a societal 
perspective can be implemented, particularly if transfers between sectors are not possible.  It poses 
the question of how the trade-offs between health, consumption and other social arguments, as well 
as the valuation of market and non market activities, ought to be undertaken.   
 
Aims and objectives 
 
The overall aim of the project is to develop a conceptual framework to assess the implications of 
alternative perspectives, and to undertake a series of case studies to inform the decisions about the 
appropriate perspective for NICE Technology Appraisal. The project has the following objectives: 
 
(i) To undertake a review of UK policy and of policies adopted elsewhere and to summarise 
key literature relating to the choice of perspective. 
(ii) To develop a formal conceptual framework to distinguish questions of value and fact and 
assess the performance and likely implications of alternative policies.  
(iii) To undertake a series of selected case studies to quantify important non-NHS costs and to 
illuminate different ways of incorporating these into economic analysis to inform NICE 
decisions. 
(iv) To identify the key issues to be borne in mind when considering the possible policy 
responses to the problem of appropriate perspective. 
 
Focussed literature review 
 
A review of current UK policy and of policies adopted elsewhere reveals considerable variation in the 
type of perspective claimed, a lack of clarity on what constitutes a broad societal perspective and little 
or no consideration of the impact of fixed budgets.  The justification for the type of policies adopted is 
also somewhat limited, commonly resting on literature which ignores the implications of fixed budget 
constraints.  This lack of clarity and ambiguous terminology is also reflected in the published cost-
effectiveness literature, with many studies claiming to take a societal perspective when in fact their 
analysis is restricted to the health care system. 
 
A conceptual framework 
 
There is a spectrum of current policies ranging from ignoring the fact of fixed budgets to 
acknowledging budget constraints but ignoring the effects external to the health care system.  Three 
alternative policies are characterised and examined: 
 
A. Ignore the wider costs outside the health sector.  This represents NICE technology appraisal 
policy following revision of its methods guide in 2008. 
B. Treat any wider costs as if they fall on the budget constraint.  This represents a rather naive 
view that all costs should be included but decisions should still be based on comparing the 
resulting incremental cost-effectiveness ratio (ICER) with a cost-effectiveness threshold 
reflecting opportunity costs to that budget. 
C. Ignore the budget constraint.  This represents the greater part of the literature on evaluation 
outside health (cost-benefit analysis), where the fact of fixed budget constraints and the 
implications for opportunity costs are rarely acknowledged and even less commonly dealt 
with analytically.   
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General framework 
 
A general framework would allow a comparison of the net health gained in the health sector with the 
health equivalent of the net consumption costs or benefits falling on the wider economy.  This is 
equivalent to giving some weight, between zero and one (based on the ratio of the cost-effectiveness 
threshold to the consumption value of health), to any net consumption costs or benefits, and 
effectively places policy between the two extremes of policies A and C above.  This could be 
FRQVLGHUHGHTXLYDOHQWWR1,&(¶VSUH-SRVLWLRQRIWDNLQJH[WHUQDOFRVWVµLQWRDFFRXQW¶+RZdo the 
three policies outlined above compare against this general approach to reflecting non-NHS costs? 
 
Marginal changes 
 
We distinguish two situations regarding the impact of new technologies on the NHS: marginal and non 
marginal changes.  When changes are marginal, the impact on the NHS budget is small and only the 
least valuable existing health care is displaced (the cost-effectiveness threshold does not change).  In 
this situation, each of the three simple decision rules creates biases in different directions depending 
on particular circumstances.  No single rule is unequivocally superior and, in each case, the bias 
could lead to false positive decisions, where a technology that should be rejected is wrongly 
approved, or false negative decisions where a technology that should be approved is wrongly rejected 
(see Table III, Section 2.2).   
 
Non marginal changes 
 
Since the additional health care costs of new technologies tend to be positive, the repeated 
application of the decision rules to a sequence of decisions will ultimately have non marginal effects:  
increasingly valuable health care will tend to be displaced (the cost-effectiveness threshold will tend to 
fall).  This poses a number of problems: 
 
 A failure to account for non marginal effects will lead to biased assessments of cost-
effectiveness.  This will favour new technologies resulting in unambiguous increases in false 
positive decisions. 
 Even if these effects could be accounted for and bias avoided, unless transfers are made to 
compensate the NHS then the implied reallocation of resource between sectors may not be 
socially desirable. 
 The informational requirements to fully account for non marginal effects cannot generally be 
achieved so this cannot represent a realistic or feasible policy option.   
 In these circumstances one policy option is to give some weight to net consumption costs or 
benefits but to ignore possible non marginal effects.  This will always have a positive basis 
in favour of new technologies which will be greater when non marginal effects are believed 
to be large relative to the external effects.  When non marginal effects are believed to be 
significant a combination of  ignoring any net consumption benefits (Policy A) but treating 
any net consumption costs as if they fall on the NHS budget (Policy B), might mitigate this 
problem; the negative bias in each case tending to offset the positive.  
 
Transfers between sectors 
 
Without the possibility of transfers between sectors, which would internalise costs and benefits 
external to the health system, a technology which is not cost-effective from the perspective of the 
health care system may be rejected despite offering significant benefits to other public and private 
sectors.  In principle, the transfers or compensation required between budget-constrained sectors 
(e.g. between the NHS and criminal justice) can be identified.  However, such transfers might not be 
regarded as a feasible policy option because they may be costly to implement and also might be 
considered undesirable, as responsibility for public expenditure and its allocation would be partly 
transferred to those bodies which make decisions about health technologies.   
 
Illustrative examples 
 
Four case studies based on past NICE appraisals demonstrate that whether a technology tends to 
offer external benefits or impose costs will depend on the nature of the technology (e.g. whether it 
primarily affects mortality or quality of life), the type of disease (e.g. acute or chronic) and the type of 
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patient population (e.g. age, gender and employment status).  In general, the case studies suggest 
that there tend to be net consumption benefits to the wider economy associated with effective health 
care.  It also indicates that this depends critically on the age of the populations, with reduced mortality 
in older populations associated with net consumption costs. The sources of evidence available to 
estimate net consumption effects retrospectively were limited in a number of important respects, so 
the results can only be regarded as indicative and illustrative. The analysis indicates that some key 
questions of how to value productivity and the financial consequences for patients would need to be 
resolved.  Robust estimates would require additional analyses as an integral part of the NICE 
appraisal process.  Clear guidance on how this ought to be done would be required to allow a 
consistent approach across economic evaluations. Any guidance would need to be sufficiently robust 
to make inappropriate estimates detectable and the process of evidence review would be need to be 
sufficiently rigorous to detect false or biased claims. 
 
Implications for policy 
 
The question of what is the appropriate perspective for decisions made by NICE is not simply a 
technical one.  It also poses fundamental questions about social value and the role that economic 
analysis ought to play in social choice.  
 
Questions of value 
 
Taking account of effects outside the health care sector requires some means of valuing health 
gained and forgone within the health sector relative to costs and benefits falling on the wider 
economy.  The rate at which society is willing to trade social arguments including health and 
FRQVXPSWLRQ LV FRPPRQO\ GHVFULEHG DV D µVRFLDO ZHOIDUH IXQFWLRQ¶  $ NH\ TXHVWLRQ LV ZKHWKHU LW LV
possible or desirable to specify such a description of all possible social states which will have 
implications for decision across all sectors, not just health.  If a complete specification of all social 
arguments is not possible or if any particular welfare function does not carry a broad consensus or 
obvious legitimacy, then attempts to formalise and codify these trade-offs might be undesirable 
because the prescriptions may well conflict with other objectives of social policy and lead to 
undesirable and socially divisive changes to the health care system.  For example, this may be 
particularly acute when wider considerations inevitably lead some technologies, which NICE 
considers cost-effective from a NHS perspective, to be rejected.  These will tend to be technologies in 
older populations or which offer life extension in chronic diseases where a return to productive activity 
is not possible.  Nevertheless, the trade-offs still need to be made but a more deliberative rather than 
prescriptive approach might be regarded as more appropriate. 
 
Questions of fact 
 
Extending the NICE perspective beyond the NHS poses a series of empirical questions which would 
need to be resolved: 
 
 An estimate of the cost-effectiveness threshold is required as well as some assessment of 
the possible impact of non marginal impacts on the NHS.   
 An agreed estimate of the consumption value of health (the amount of consumption 
individuals are willing to give up to improve their own health) is needed.  
 If transfers between sectors are to be considered then some assessment of relevant 
thresholds in other budget-constrained sectors would be required.  
 Robust estimates of the cost of care not borne by the NHS, and the external effects on the 
wider economy would be needed.  There are further difficulties in establishing how these 
elements should be measured and valued.   
 
Displaced consumption effects 
 
The additional health care costs of new technologies will displace other health care activities, not only 
UHVXOWLQJ LQ IRUJRQH KHDOWK HOVHZKHUH EXW DOVR IRUJRQH EHQHILWV WR SDWLHQWV¶ carers and the wider 
economy.  Therefore, it is not sufficient to observe net consumption benefits associated with a new 
technology but that these exceed the consumption benefits which maybe forgone elsewhere as other 
NHS activities are displaced.  Extending the current NICE perspective is likely to provide an incentive 
for manufactures to search assiduously for evidence of external benefits associated with new 
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technologies, but offer little incentive to identify those external benefits which may be forgone.  This 
could result in a bias in favour of new technologies and a danger that more consumption benefit will 
be forgone than gained.   
 
5HWDLQLQJ1,&(¶V1+6SHUVSHFWLYHPD\PRUHDSSURSULDWHO\UHVSHFWWKHRYHUDOOFRQVXPSWLRQHIIHFWVRI
new and displaced technologies.  Those technologies which generate a net health improvement can 
also be expected to result in an overall net consumption benefits (e.g. early return to usual activities, 
less carer burden), because improvements in health are in general associated with wider economic 
benefits.  Therefore, those technologies which would already be regarded as cost-effective from an 
NHS perspective by offering net health benefits to the NHS are likely also to provide overall net 
consumption benefits as well.  Equally, those technologies not currently regarded as cost-effective 
from an NHS perspective would, if approved, reduce health benefits across the NHS and tend to 
impose overall consumption costs.  Nevertheless, there will be exceptions, where the net 
consumption benefits associated with the health gained is expected to be substantially greater or less 
then other displaced NHS activities.  Therefore, some assessment of the net consumption benefits 
likely to be displaced is necessary even if there is more selective consideration of wider effects.  
However, such assessment remains a considerable challenge even if investments which include 
external effects are compared to the specific disinvestments required.   
 
Dynamic effects  
 
Current NICE technology appraisal process, in common with other policies based on cost-
effectiveness analysis, offers manufacturers the opportunity to price their technology to the point 
where the net health benefits to the NHS are zero (i.e. where the ICER equals the cost-effectiveness 
threshold).  Extending the NICE perspective to take more formal account of any net consumption 
benefits will provide an incentive to price technologies to the point at which the overall net benefits, 
including any benefits to the wider economy, will be zero. Therefore, any benefits to the wider 
economy will tend to be appropriated by the manufacturer through higher prices, at least during the 
period of patent protection, turning what were external benefits into higher internal NHS costs.  
Without transfers from beneficiaries in the wider economy or a compensating increase in the budget 
for health care through general taxation, an increasing proportion of the NHS budget will be devoted 
to payment of rent for benefits which fall outside health, and a smaller proportion will be available to 
offer health care which improves health outcomes.  In the longer run, these incentives will tend to 
influence investment and development decisions so that the type of technologies available will be 
licensed in diseases and patient groups which are more likely to demonstrate external benefits and 
command higher prices.  
 
Considerations 
 
The following key considerations need to be borne in mind when assessing the possible policy 
responses to the problem of appropriate perspective. 
 
 Whether a formalisation and prescription of the necessary trade-offs, based on a particular 
social welfare function, is desirable and sustainable.  
 The importance of accounting for the likely non marginal effects of individual decisions or a 
series of decisions. 
 Whether transfers between sectors are regarded a feasible policy option.   
 The importance of making a proper assessment of any wider consumption benefits which 
may be forgone. 
 The likely dynamic effects of more formally taking account of external consumption benefits.  
 Potential conflicts with other objectives of social policy and widely accepted social value 
judgements. 
 The difficulty of resolving questions about how best to measure and value external effects. 
 The additional costs that the assessments required would place on NICE appraisal process.    
 
Conclusions 
 
It is possible simply to ignore the NHS budget constraint in NICE decision-making.  However, this fails 
to acknowledge or deal analytically with the salient feature of a collectively funded health care system:  
resources are allocated by government so that the budget must properly be regarded as fixed by a 
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body like NICE. There are good reasons why the cost-effectiveness threshold for the NHS will differ 
from how much of their own consumption individuals are willing to give up to improve their own health. 
Therefore, even for marginal changes, ignoring the fact of fixed NHS budgets has little to commend it. 
 
After 2008, NICE policy restricted perspective to that of the health care system in most 
circumstances.  Initially this policy appears difficult to justify.  However, in the light of further 
examination of the other considerations including the difficulty of robust measurement and the 
additional costs of appraisal, the potential biases associated with other feasible policies as well as 
their likely dynamic effects and the challenge of accounting for any wider benefits which may be 
displaced by positive NICE guidance it may well be a reasonable and sustainable response to this 
policy problem. Although, in general the health care system perspective is likely to be sufficient, there 
will be exceptions: where the external benefits associated with the health gains are likely to be 
substantially greater or substantially less than the external benefits associated with health forgone 
elsewhere in the NHS. Current policy does allow consideration of limited external effects in 
exceptional circumstances, identified by the Department of Health before referral of the topic to NICE.  
If the criteria for exceptional circumstances were based on an assessment of whether the external 
benefits are likely to be substantially greater or substantially less than existing NHS activities this 
would signal to NICE when they might be considered as part of the Appraisal &RPPLWWHH¶V
deliberations.  It should be noted, however, that as well as identifying exceptions which are likely to 
offer overall net external benefits it will also be necessary to identify exceptions which are likely to 
impose overall net consumption costs.   
 
Between 2004 and 2008, NICE methods guidance suggested that a non-reference case analysis 
ZKLFK LQFOXGHG ZLGHU FRVWV ZRXOG EH WDNHQ LQWR DFFRXQW LQ WKH $SSUDLVDO &RPPLWWHH¶V GHOLEHUDWLYH
process. This policy could be interpreted as an implicit recognition of the more general approach to 
marginal changes where wider effects are given some but not full weight.  Any return to this previous 
NICE policy would need to make the basis of any deliberation more explicit, including guidance on 
measurement and valuation of wider effects, an indication of the weight that might be attached, and 
how this assessment might be modified by consideration of non marginal effects and potential 
conflicts with other objectives of social policy.  If these deliberations are made more transparent and 
predictable then the type of dynamic effects on prices and NHS costs discussed above may be 
expected to emerge.    
 
The critical question, however, of what wider benefits are likely to be forgone as a consequence of 
positive NICE guidance would remain unresolved.  It should be recognised that extending the 
perspective for all technologies appraised by NICE would impose additional costs on the appraisal 
process and introduce the possibility of a biased assessment if the consumption benefits which might 
be forgone are more difficult to identify. The problem may be more manageable if the consideration of 
wider effects was restricted to those exceptional cases where a health care system perspective is 
more likely to be inadequate, i.e., where the external benefits are likely to be substantially greater or 
less than current NHS activities which may be displaced and where the impact of approval is likely to 
be marginal. This more focused deliberative approach would require explicit criteria for when an 
exceptional case could be made, possibly based on the nature of the technology, the type of disease 
and the patient population. Nevertheless, the repeated application of this policy will lead to non 
marginal changes and a positive bias in favour of new technologies.  In combination with more 
restrictive policies (i.e. to ignore external benefits but treat any wider costs as if they fall on the NHS 
budget), the effect of non marginal impacts might be mitigated.  However, without some empirically 
based assessment of non marginal impact, such a combination of policies may be open to challenge.   
 
 
Keywords:  
Perspective. Cost-effectiveness analysis. Economic evaluation. 
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1. Introduction  
 
Decisions based on cost-effectiveness analysis compare the health benefits expected to be gained by 
using a technology with the health that is likely to be forgone due to additional costs falling on the 
health care budget and displacing other activities that improve health.  This approach to making 
decisions in health care will be complete and reasonable if the objective of collectively funded health 
care is to improve health across the health care system; that the measure of health gained and 
forgone captures enough aspects of health and other aspects of social value to be useful; and that the 
budget for health care ought to be regarded as fixed by the decision making body.   
 
However, this approach also relies on the assumption that there are no effects outside the health care 
sector, or any effects are small or not socially valuable compared to the effects within the health 
sector.  These effects fall into two broad types:  i) direct costs of care that do not fall on the health 
care budget and ii) the indirect external effects on the rest of the economy.   
 
Some of the direct costs of care are borne by patients, such as out of pocket costs as well as their 
time in accessing care. It may also include the direct financial consequences of ill health (and earlier 
recovery) for patients and families if these are not fully captured in measures of health related quality 
of life. It will also include the time and resources devoted to caring for patients outside the health care 
system.  These costs may be direct costs to the patient if formal (marketed) care is purchased.  More 
often informal (non marketed) care is provided but the opportunity cost of this activity (what society 
loses) still needs to be valued.  Although, direct costs may fall on marketed and non marketed 
activities (e.g., time and informal care) they can in principle be valued in terms of the equivalent 
consumption forgone, i.e., expressed as a consumption cost for the wider economy.  An effective 
health technology may reduce these costs (e.g., a quicker recovery) or increase them (e.g., prolong 
survival in a chronic state). 
 
The indirect external effect on the wider economy also needs to be valued.  These are effects external 
to the patients, their family or informal carers but are valued by the rest of society. For example, 
returning a patient to active participation in the labour market will in many circumstances add to 
production in the economy.  This will be a net benefit to society if the value of the additional 
production exceeds the LQGLYLGXDO¶V additional consumption over their remaining life expectancy. 
There has been much debate about whether changes in production are maintained in the long run or 
only have short term effects.1  However, which ever view is taken the external effects for the rest of 
society must value any additional production net of consumption.  Therefore, an effective health 
technology may provide external benefits by reducing mortality in economically active groups whose 
production is likely to exceed their consumption.  However, it may also impose external costs on the 
economy if it reduces mortality in populations where remaining life cycle consumption exceeds the 
value of production (e.g., older populations).2   
 
All these direct and indirect external effects can be expressed in a common numeraire of consumption 
gains and losses.  The overall effect can be expressed as a net consumption cost, which if positive 
indicates net consumption losses to the wider economy and if negative indicates net consumption 
benefits.      
 
The problem for policy is that, in the face of budgets set by a socially legitimate higher authority 
(government), it is not clear how or whether a broader social perspective, which would include all 
these effects on all sectors, should be implemented ± particularly if transfers between sectors are not 
regarded as a feasible policy. There is also the fundamental difficulty of specifying how the trade offs 
between health, consumption and other social arguments, as well as the valuation of market and non 
market activities, ought to be done.   This is particularly acute when there is no obvious consensus on 
how to prescribe social choice, each alternate view generating potential conflicts with other agreed 
social objectives.   
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Aims and objectives 
 
The overall aim of the project is to develop a conceptual framework to assess the implications of 
alternative perspectives, and to undertake a series of case studies to inform the decisions about the 
appropriate perspective for NICE Technology Appraisal. The project has the following objectives: 
 
(i) To undertake a review of UK policy and of policies adopted elsewhere and to summarise 
key literature relating to the choice of perspective. 
(ii) To develop a formal conceptual framework to distinguish questions of value and fact and 
assess the performance and likely implications of alternative policies.  
(iii) To undertake a series of selected case studies to quantify important non-NHS costs and to 
illuminate different ways of incorporating these into economic analysis to inform NICE 
decisions. 
(iv) To identify the key issues to be borne in mind when considering the possible policy 
responses to the problem of appropriate perspective 
 
Structure of the report 
 
The remainder of section 1 provides a review of current UK policy and of policies adopted elsewhere, 
followed by a focussed review of the key literature relating to the choice of perspective.  A conceptual 
framework is developed in section 2, which allows formal characterisation of three alternative partial 
policy responses to the problem of perspective.  This formulation of the policy problem in section 2.1 
allows a more general approach to be developed which can take account of effects external to the 
health care system while acknowledging fixed budget constraints.   The performance of each of these 
policies are evaluated in Section 2 when changes are marginal, by considering the potential bias they 
impose compared to the more general case.  How the potential for bias changes when the impact on 
the health care budget is non marginal is explored in Section 2.3.  This conceptual framework is also 
used to explore when transfers between sectors would be useful in Section 2.4, including the 
implications of non marginal changes and transfers between other budget constrained sectors. The 
implications of the analysis developed in Section 2 for policy considerations are outlined in section 3.  
The questions of social value and the choice between a formalised or more deliberative approach are 
discussed in Section 3.1. These are clearly distinguished from the questions of fact that need to be 
addressed that are outlined in 3.2.  The other critical considerations are explored in Section 3.3.  They 
include consideration of external consumption benefits which may be displaced, the likely dynamic 
effects on pricing and incentives of research and development, and consideration of effects on other 
social objectives.  Four case studies are presented in Section 4 to illustrate how costs and benefits 
external to the health care system could be measured and valued and how they might be 
incorporated into the type of appraisal decisions made by NICE. Each is based on a reanalysis of 
previous cost-effectiveness evaluations original conducted for the NICE appraisal process.  Section 5 
provides a summary of potential policy options and the key issues which need to be borne in mind 
when considering the possible policy responses to the problem of perspective.  
 
 
1.1. Cost perspective in policy 
 
A review of current UK policy and of policies adopted elsewhere may be instructive.  It is also 
important to ask whether these policies can claim theoretical support in the academic and 
methodological literature.  The purpose of the review of policy and academic literature is to ask 
whether there is sufficient guidance for policy makers once the reality of fixed budget constraints and 
the fundamental difficulty of prescribing social choice across all sectors is acknowledged. 
 
Policy in the UK  
 
As economic evaluation methods have become more routinely used to support policy decisions in the 
UK, documents guiding methodology in this area have become more widespread.  However, a clear 
distinction is evidenced between the methods advocated to inform policy in general, across sectors, 
and those ZKLFKKDYHGHYHORSHG LQWKHDUHDRIKHDOWK +07UHDVXU\¶V µ*UHHQ%RRN¶PRVWUHFHQWO\
SXEOLVKHG LQ  DLPHG WR µpromote efficient policy development and resource allocation across 
JRYHUQPHQW¶E\GHILQLQJIRUHFRQRPLFDSSUDLVDODµEHVWSUDFWLFHJXLGHIRUDOOFHQWUDOGHSDUWPHQWVDQG
H[HFXWLYHDJHQFLHV¶3  The emphasis of the report is on the measurement and valuation of all resource 
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and non-resource consequences no matter where they fall.  This societal perspective is consistent 
with the recommendation of the general methods of cost-benefit analysis as the framework for 
appraisal ± that is, the use of market prices to value the consequences of alternative policy options 
DQG ZKHUH QR FRPSHWLWLYH PDUNHW H[LVWV WKH XVH RI DGMXVWHG µVKDGRZ¶ SULFHV RU YDULRXV IRUPV RI
willingness to pay methods.   
 
The Green Book has little to say about whether the existence of budget constraints in the public 
sector has any implications for appraisal methods in general or the choice of perspective in particular.  
There is an acceptance that budget constraints may exist: 
 
µ,IWKHUHLVDEXGJHWFHLOLQJWKHQWKHFRPELQDWLRQRISURSRVDOVVKRuld be chosen that maximises 
the value of benefits. The ratio of the net present value to the expenditure falling within the 
constraint can be a useful guide to GHYHORSLQJWKHEHVWFRPELQDWLRQRISURSRVDOV¶3 (p. 37) 
 
There is not, however, any detailed consideration of what signals budget constraints might represent 
for policy makers or how projects with resource consequences spilling across budget-constrained 
public sectors should be analysed and interpreted.  Although this is the latest of several similar 
guidance documents to guide economic appraisal in government and public agencies, there seems to 
have been no major change in position regarding cost perspective and response to budget constraints 
from earlier documents.4 
 
To some extent, methods guidance to inform economic appraisal in health has taken a consistent line 
with that in the Green Book.  The document Policy Appraisal and Health was first published in 19955 
and updated in 2004.6  It saw itself as providing more specific guidance to the field of health than the 
Green Book but continued to recommend a broad perspective on costs: 
 
(FRQRPLF DSSUDLVDO DLPV WR LGHQWLI\ WKH EHVW XVH IRU VRFLHW\¶V UHVRXUFHV &RQVHTXHQWO\ LW
should take account of all the resource costs and savings due to implementation of a policy. In 
the case of health, this would include resource costs incurred by other support services 
(including voluntary services), by patients, by their relatives and friends, as well as the costs 
borne by the NHS. It is often helpful to identify the costs borne by each group separately as 
well as quantifying the overall resource costs.6 (p. 32). 
 
Policy Appraisal and Health devoted considerable attention to the quantification of health effects using 
methods such as QALYs.  Again consistent with the Green Book, however, the Department of Health 
focused on the use of willingness to pay methods of various types as a means of valuing QALYs in 
terms of consumption.  Furthermore, they did this without any consideration of the implications for its 
selected methods on the budget constraints operating in the NHS or other public sectors.    
 
1,&(¶V PHWKRGV JXLGDQFH SURYLGHV D \HW PRUH VSHFLILF VHW RI UHFRPPHQGDWLRQV DERXW HFRQRPLF
appraisal, with a focus on informing its 7HFKQRORJ\ $SSUDLVDO &RPPLWWHHV¶ GHFLVLRQV UHJDUGLQJ
whether to support the use of particular (mainly new) medical technologies in the NHS.  Although 
presumably covered by the guidance in the Green Book and Policy Appraisal and Health, NICE has 
advocated rather a different approach to economic evaluation than have those documents.  In 
general, throughout the three sets of methods guidance documents in 20017, 20048 and 2008,9 NICE 
has supported the use of cost-effectiveness analysis, with health expressed in terms of QALYs 
without valuation of these outcomes in terms of consumption based on external estimates of 
willingness to pay.    
 
With respect to cost perspective, these documents have consistently indicated that it required 
resource costs falling on the NHS budget to be the focus of economic evaluations undertaken to 
support its decisions.  Between the 2004 and 2008 documents, however, the position on which costs 
to consider altered in a subtle but important way.  The 2004 document developed the concept of the 
Reference Case ± the combination of preferred methods which should be presented to the Appraisal 
Committee in at least one part of any submission together with variants of those methods if 
appropriate.  However, the 2004 guidance permitted those submitting evidence to present a wider 
array of costs if these differed between the options under evaluation, on the basis that they could be 
µWDNHQLQWRDFFRXQW¶E\WKH$SSUDLVDO&RPPLWWHHDOWKRXJKLWZDVLQGLFDWHGWKDWWKHVHFosts would not 
QRUPDOO\LQFOXGHSURGXFWLYLW\FRVWV,QFRQWUDVW1,&(¶VPHWKRGVJXLGDQFHGRFXPHQWHIIHFWLYHO\
downgraded the role of costs falling outside the NHS budget by supporting their inclusion in economic 
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evaluations submitted to the InstitutH RQO\ µLQ H[FHSWLRQDO FLUFXPVWDQFHV¶ DQG µif this has been 
VSHFLILFDOO\DJUHHGZLWKWKH'HSDUWPHQWRI+HDOWKXVXDOO\EHIRUHUHIHUUDORIWKHWRSLF¶ 
 
In justifying its preferred cost perspective, NICE has consistently made reference the importance of 
the 1+6 EXGJHW FRQVWUDLQW WR LWV GHFLVLRQV µWKH DSSURSULDWH REMHFWLYH RI WKH ,QVWLWXWH¶V WHFKQRORJ\
appraisal programme is to offer guidance that represents an efficient use of available NHS and PSS 
UHVRXUFHV¶ S9  The budget constraint is also central to how NICE conceptualises the range of 
cost-effectiveness thresholds it uses to make decisions.   Here lies the major difference between 
1,&(¶VUHFRPPHQGHGFRVWSHUVSHFWLYHDQGWKRVHDGYRFDWHGE\WKH7UHDVXU\LQWKHGreen Book and 
the Department of Health in Policy Appraisal and Health: given its defined responsibilities, NICE views 
the NHS budget as a constraint which needs to be respected in its decisions; whereas the other 
documents see budgets as largely incidental to establishing efficiency from a broader social 
perspective. 
 
It should be noted that none of the methods documents reviewed above seeks to justify its position on 
cost perspective with reference to any underlying principles of how social decisions ought to be made.  
The Green Book (and the Policy Appraisal and Health documents which it influences) take it as 
axiomatic that resource allocation decisions should look at the broad array of social costs, that these 
should be valued using market prices where possible and shadow prices where they are not. Sector-
specific budgets are essentially regarded as an administrative nuisance rather than signalling 
anything important about social choice.  In contrast, NICE is able to justify its narrow views of relevant 
costs on the basis of its NHS responsibilities. 
 
Policy outside the UK 
 
A large number of jurisdictions have now published guidelines for the use of economic evaluation to 
support decision making regarding new technologies, mainly pharmaceuticals.  Table I summarises 
what these guidelines require regarding perspective.  Of the 26 sets of guidelines reviewed, half 
require a health system perspective, six require a broader societal perspective, six recommend both a 
health and societal perspectives as separate analyses, and one indicates no preference.   The table 
also summarises how each guideline seeks to justify its choice of perspective.  Where any justification 
is offered, those adopting a health system perspective typically make reference to the responsibilities 
of the decision making organisation, and none refers explicitly to a general normative theory.  Several 
of those recommending a societal perspective reference text books and refer to a perceived 
methodological superiority for that choice.   
 
The table shows that a number of organisations wish to see information on all costs, although their 
decisions are mainly driven by health system costs.  This was 1,&(¶V SRVLWLRQ SULRU WR  DQG
implies that non-KHDOWK VHFWRU FRVWV PD\ EH µWDNHQ LQWR DFFRXQW¶ LQ VRPH ZD\ LQ GHFLVLRQ PDNLQJ
Few of the guidelines explicitly discuss budget constraints in their systems and how they impact on 
the methods recommended including cost perspective.  Where budget constraints are mentioned, 
only quite general comment are offered.  However, a large proportion of organisations require budget 
impact analyses to support their decision making suggesting that, although there may not be hard 
constraints, issues of opportunity cost are influencing their choice of preferred methods. 
Appropriate perspectives for health care decisions  5 
 
Table I.   Recommended perspective in methods guidelines for economic evaluation to support decision making internationally 
Jurisdiction/guideline Perspective recommended Reasons for perspective 
chosen 
Other details on 
perspective 
Acknowledgment of 
budget constraint 
Budget impact and decision 
making 
Australia Both a societal perspective and 
the perspective of the payer are 
recommended. 
Not stated Not stated Not stated Budget impact analyses (BIAs) are 
relevant to both PBAC and the 
Australian Government. In the event 
of a positive recommendation by 
PBAC, the Australian Government 
needs utilisation and financial 
estimates to help provide the 
necessary funds. 
Austria Apart from the societal 
perspective, which represents 
the most comprehensive 
approach, other perspectives 
are possible (e.g. the health 
system, social insurance, 
hospitals etc). 
Not stated The choice of perspective 
must be derived logically 
from the research question. 
Not stated  Not stated 
Baltic (Latvia, 
Lithuania, Estonia) 
Health care perspective. 
Societal perspective may be 
presented only in addition if 
considered relevant by the 
applicant. 
Not stated Not stated Not stated Not stated 
Belgium (KCE) In the reference case, the 
perspective of the health care 
payer (government plus 
patients) should be used.  
Although it is acknowledged 
that the societal perspective is 
methodologically more 
appropriate, the perspective of 
the health care payer is 
recommended given the target 
audience of the guideline, 
namely, the decision maker. 
Broader consequences of 
a treatment can be taken 
into account in resource 
allocation decisions. Other 
considerations, such as 
reduction in absence from 
work, may be important 
factors in determining the 
value of a therapy, but this 
should not be included in 
the reference case. 
It is stated that the cost-
effectiveness threshold 
is very context 
dependent. It depends, 
for instance, on the 
available health care 
budget and the 
interventions already 
financed in a country. 
 
Budget impact of a treatment can be 
considered by the decision maker, 
but no specific budget impact 
analysis is required. 
Brazil The preferred perspective is 
that of the National Health 
service, but also the societal 
perspective is possible. 
Not stated Details on the category of 
costs that should be 
included for each 
perspective are given. 
It is stated that any 
budget constraint 
associated with the 
introduction of a 
technology should be 
identified and details 
given. 
 
 
A BIA should be taken and help 
making decision on a technology. 
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Canada (CADTH) The perspective adopted in the 
Reference Case should be that 
of the publicly funded health 
care system. In some 
jurisdictions, this perspective 
may include costs that are 
incurred by long-term care, 
social services, or community-
based services.  
The perspective chosen should 
fit the needs of the target 
audience. 
The costs associated with 
adopting a wider 
perspective should be 
reported separately where 
it is likely that they have an 
impact on the results of 
the analysis. A very 
detailed list of category of 
costs associated with each 
perspective is provided. 
Not stated A clear distinction between 
information provided by a BIA and a 
cost-effectiveness analysis to 
decision-makers is given. 
Cuba Societal perspective is 
recommended. Other 
perspective can be included, 
but that of the society is 
mandatory. 
The societal perspective is 
recommended since the 
decision maker needs to take 
decisions based on the interest 
of the whole society. 
No other details provided. In the study discussion, 
the feasibility of the 
introduction of a new 
technology should be 
stated according to 
budget constraints. 
Study conclusions should take 
account of the budget impact of a 
technology. 
England & Wales 
(NICE) 
The perspective on outcomes 
should be all direct health 
effects, whether for patients or, 
when relevant, other people 
(principally carers). The 
perspective adopted on costs 
should be that of the NHS and 
PSS. 
The reference-case perspective 
on outcomes is consistent with 
an objective of maximising 
health gain from available 
healthcare resources. The 
REMHFWLYHRIWKH1,&(¶V
technology appraisal 
programme is to offer guidance 
that represents an efficient use 
of available NHS and PSS 
resources. For these reasons, 
the reference-case perspective 
on costs is that of the NHS and 
PSS. 
Technologies for which a 
substantial proportion of 
the costs (or cost savings) 
are expected to be incurred 
outside of the NHS and 
PSS, or which are 
associated with significant 
non-resource effects other 
than health, should be 
identified and their 
inclusion approved by the 
Department of Health 
during the scoping stage of 
an appraisal, and these 
data can be reported 
separately from the 
reference case. 
Cost perspective justified 
in terms of the NHS 
budget constraint. 
The potential budget impact of the 
adoption of a new technology does 
not determine the Appraisal 
&RPPLWWHH¶VGHFLVLRQ+RZHYHULWLV
important that costs are 
disaggregated by appropriate 
generic organization (NHS, PSS, 
hospital, primary care) and 
budgetary categories (drugs, 
staffing, consumables, capital). 
Finland Societal perspective 
recommended. 
Not stated Not stated Not stated Not stated 
France The widest possible perspective 
is recommended in order to 
include all relevant outcomes of 
each programme studied. Thus, 
the societal perspective is 
preferred, although other 
narrower perspective can also 
be considered. 
Since the overall aim of 
economic evaluation studies is 
to provide decision aids in the 
field of public health policy, it 
would be preferable if a 
"societal" perspective was 
adopted in any event.  
(Ref: Drummond MF., O'Brien 
The concept of "societal" 
perspective as yet has no 
precise definition in 
France. Depending on 
circumstances, it may 
relate to a concept of 
collective interest arising 
out of the economic theory 
Not stated Estimating the short and medium 
term (2 to 3 years) budgetary 
consequences for the different 
agents in the health care system of 
the implementation of a new 
treatment is an important secondary 
objective of economic evaluations. 
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B, Stoddart GL  et al. Methods 
for the Economic evaluation of 
Health care Programmes. 2nd 
ed. Oxford : Oxford University 
Press, 1997, p. 17-25) 
of well-being, to a general 
perspective of public health 
or to the inclusion of 
concepts of equity between 
groups and between 
generations. 
Germany  The perspective of the Statutory 
Health Insurance (SHI) is 
recommended. If there are 
substantial costs borne 
privately by insured citizens and 
their families, these should also 
be included. Any departure 
from these perspectives should 
be justified. 
Refers to the target audience of 
the guideline. 
Details on costs categories 
for the SHI are given. 
Any technology to 
receive a positive 
evaluation must be 
affordable to the German 
payers. 
Budget impact is fundamental in 
decision-making. There may be 
circumstances where a technology 
is efficient but a BIA suggest that 
affordability can be a problem. 
Hungary If the objective of the study is to 
influence public financing of 
healthcare interventions, the 
study perspective should be 
that of the financer or purchaser 
organisation. However, it is also 
desirable to provide results 
from a broader societal 
perspective. 
The choice of healthcare 
perspective is related to the 
target audience. However, 
optimal resource allocation at 
the societal level is a desired 
objective and the additional 
analysis from societal 
perspective minimises the risk 
of excluding aspects that may 
be of significance to decision 
makers. 
Details on cost categories 
for each chosen 
perspective are given. 
Rationing is necessary to 
avoid a rapid increase in 
healthcare expenditure. 
Details should be provided on the 
impact of the intervention on the 
different healthcare budgets. This 
allows decision makers to make 
better informed decisions and to 
plan healthcare budgets taking into 
consideration the full consequences 
of including new cost-effective 
treatments. The budget impact 
analysis should cover 3 to 5 years. 
Ireland No specific perspective 
recommended. It is only 
UHFRPPHQGHGWKDW³The 
perspective adopted for the 
analysis (health care system, 
society) should be clearly 
VWDWHGDQGH[SODLQHG´. 
Not stated Not stated  Not stated Not stated 
Israel The perspective of the Sick 
Funds of the National Health 
Insurance is recommended. 
Not stated Not stated Not stated The budget impact of a new 
treatment (over three years) for the 
Sick Funds of the National Health 
Insurance should be determined 
and can help taking decisions. 
Italy Societal and NHS perspectives 
are recommended. Other 
perspectives could be useful as 
sub-analysis. 
Not stated Not stated Not stated A budget impact analysis for the first 
two years after the introduction of a 
technology is recommended but no 
details are given on the impact of 
this analysis of decision making. 
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Mexico Mexican health system. If 
relevant, the analysis can 
include results from some 
perspective in particular (one 
particular institution or the 
social perspective), in addition 
of the public health perspective.   
,IWKHVWXG\¶VREMHFWLYHLVWR
have an influence in obtaining 
public financing for health 
LQWHUYHQWLRQVWKHVWXG\¶V
perspective should be that of 
the public health sector. 
Not stated Not stated Not stated 
The Netherlands The evaluation should be 
performed and reported from a 
societal perspective. 
There is broad consensus 
nationally and internationally 
that the societal perspective is 
the most appropriate choice 
(ref. Gold MR, Siegel JE, 
Russell LB et al. Cost-
effectiveness in health and 
medicine. Oxford University 
Press, 1996). In addition, the 
reimbursement question 
involves the allocation of 
financial means and 
consequences for public health. 
Not stated Not stated Not stated 
New Zealand The perspective of the payer is 
recommended (with respect to 
PHARMAC decisions). 
3+$50$&¶VREMHFWLYHLVWR
maximise health gains from 
health sector funds. If societal 
costs were included in 
analyses, this could result in 
PHARMAC considering issues 
it has no control over. 
PHARMAC has a separate 
budget from other 
government sectors; hence 
any patient benefits and/or 
costs that accrue beyond 
individual health outcomes 
are outside the scope of 
3+$50$&¶VFRQWURO 
Not stated A budget impact analysis over 5 
years is recommended, but no 
details on its impact on decision-
making are given. 
Norway Both the perspective of the 
society and that of the payer 
(National Insurance 
Administration) are accepted. 
Not stated Not stated Not stated Not stated 
Poland It is recommended to use the 
perspective of the financing 
health care service (public 
payer, patients, other payers). 
In addition, a separate analysis 
using the societal perspective is 
suggested. 
The societal perspective has 
the advantage to minimise the 
risk of failing to include aspects 
that might have an impact on 
decision making. 
Not stated Not stated A very detailed description of the 
budget impact analysis is given that 
it is mandatory (at least 2 years time 
horizon). The BIA provides 
information on the possible impact 
of adopting a decision of 
reimbursing a new technology. 
Portugal The perspective of the societal 
is recommended. 
All the relevant costs and 
consequences should be 
analysed before listing 
alternatives in order of 
6RFLHW\¶VSHUVSHFWLYH 
should be broken down 
into other relevant points of 
view, with special attention 
Not stated Since almost all studies are 
conducted to help public financers 
reach their decisions, it is 
recommended that, if appropriate, 
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importance, regardless of who 
ordered the study.  
to the third payers if they 
are the users of the study. 
an estimate should be made on the 
effects on their budgets. 
Russian Federation Several perspectives are 
allowed including societal, 
federal health care system, 
institutional, private practice, 
patients and family, medical 
insurers. 
The perspective should be in 
line with the objective of the 
analysis. 
Not stated Not stated  Not stated 
Scotland It is recommended to use the 
perspective of the Scottish 
health care system, patients 
and their families. 
Not stated An indication of the nature 
and likely magnitude of 
any excluded benefits and 
costs that would arise from 
adopting a wider societal 
perspective and the effect 
of including these in the 
cost-effectiveness analysis 
should also be provided. 
Not stated Not stated 
Spain It is recommended to adopt 
both a societal perspective and 
the perspective of the third 
party payer (healthcare 
system). 
The societal perspective 
includes all costs and benefits 
to the whole society, thus it 
minimises the risk of excluding 
relevant factors. The 
perspective of the healthcare 
system is necessary since it is 
the payer of health services in 
Spain. 
If only the third-party payer 
perspective is adopted, this 
should be justified by the 
authors (e.g. societal costs 
are irrelevant). 
Not stated BIAs (recommended over 3 or 5 
years) can help taking decisions on 
the suitability of a new technology in 
addition to its cost-effectiveness. 
Sweden The societal perspective is 
recommended. 
Not stated Not stated Not stated Not stated 
US (AMCP) The payer perspective is 
recommended for the primary 
analysis. A societal perspective 
analysis as a secondary 
evaluation is also suggested. 
Not stated Not stated The goal of the formulary 
review process is to 
provide a quality 
pharmaceutical 
benefit, determined 
through an evidence-
based decision-making 
process, taking into 
account the reality of 
constrained health care 
budgets. 
It is fundamental to distinguish 
between cost-effectiveness models 
and BI models which provide 
different information to the decision-
maker. In practice the selection of 
the most efficient mix of 
programmes, given a budget 
constraint depends on whether 
alternative programmes are 
mutually exclusive and whether the 
scale of programmes can be 
changed without changing their 
incremental cost-effectiveness 
ratios. 
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Documents reviewed: 
Australia: PBAC - Pharmaceutical Benefits Advisory Committee.  Guidelines for preparing submissions to the Pharmaceutical Benefits Advisory Committee. 
2006 
Austria: Walter E, Zehetmayr S (members of the Institute for Pharmaeconomic Research). Guidelines on Health Economic Evaluations. Consensus paper, 
2006.  
Baltic countries: Behmane D, Lambot K, Irs A, Steikunas N. Baltic guideline for economic evaluation of pharmaceuticals. 2002 
Belgium: The Center of Expertise (KCE). The Draft Pharmacoeconomic Belgian Guidelines. KCE Reports, Vol 28, 2008  
Brazil: de Miello Vianna CM, Caetano R. Diretrizes Metodológicas para Estudos de Avaliação Econômica de Tecnologias para o Ministério da Saúde. 2007 
Canada: CADTH- Guidelines for the economic evaluation of health technologies: Canada [3rd Edition]. Ottawa: Canadian Agency for Drugs and Technologies 
in Health; 2006. 
Cuba: González A.M.G. Guía metodológica para la evaluación económica en salud. 2003. 
England and Wales: NICE ² National Institute for Clinical Excellence. Guide to the Methods of Technology Appraisals. 2008 
Finland: Finnish Ministry of Social Affairs and Health. Guidelines for Preparation of an Account of Health Economic Aspects. Helsinki. 1999 
France: CES - French Guidelines for the Economic Evaluation of Health Care Technologies. Paris: Collège des Économistes de la Santé. 2004. 
Germany. *IQWiG - Institute for Quality and Efficiency in Health Care. Methods for Assessment of the Relation of Benefits to Costs in the German Statutory 
Health Care System. 2008 
Hungary: Szende A, Mogyorosy Z, Muszbek M et al. Methodological guidelines for conducting economic valuation of healthcare interventions in Hungary: a 
Hungarian proposal for methodology standards. Eur J Health Econom 2002; 3: 196-206 
Ireland: National Centre for Pharmacoeconomics - Irish Healthcare Technology Assessment Guidelines  1999  
Israel:Pharmacoepidemiology and Pharmacoeconomics Department (Ministry of Health) - Guidelines for the submission of a request to include a 
pharmaceutical product in the national list of health services. 2002 
Italy: Capri S, Ceci A, Terranova L et al. Guidelines for economic evaluations in Italy: recommendations from the Italian group of pharmacoeconomic studies.  
Drug Information Journal 2001; 35: 189-201 
Mexico: National Institute of Public Health Center for Health Systems Research Health Economics and Evaluation Division. Development of guidelines for 
conducting economic evaluations of health interventions in Mexico 
The Netherlands: CVZ- The Health Care Insurance Board. Guidelines for Pharmacoeconomic Research in the Netherlands. Updated Version. 2006 
New Zealand: PHARMAC ² Pharmaceutical Management Agency. A prescription for pharmacoeconomic analysis. Version 2, 2006 
Norway: The Norwegian Medicines Agency: Norwegian guidelines for pharmacoeconomic analysis in connection with applications for reimbursement. 2004 
Poland: Agency for Health Technology Assessment in Poland. Guidelines for Conducting Health Technology Assessment. Version March 27 
Portugal: INFARMED ² Instituto Nacional da Farmácia e do Medicamento. Guidelines for economic drug evaluation studies. 1998 
Russian Federation: Branch Standard. The standardization system in the Russian federation health care system. Clinico-economic studies. Prepared for the 
Ministry of Health 2002.  
Scotland: SMC ± Scottish Medicines Consortium - Scottish Medicines Consortium Economic Guidance. 2002 
Spain: López Bastida J, Oliva J, Antoñanzas F et al. Propuesta de guía para la evaluación económica aplicada a las tecnologías sanitarias. Madrid: Plan 
Nacional para el SNS del MSC. Servicio de Evaluación del Servicio Canario de la Salud; 2008 
Sweden: The Pharmaceutical Benefits Board - General guidelines for economic evaluations from the Pharmaceutical Benefits Board. 2003.  (Now renamed 
the Dental and Pharmaceutical Benefits Authority (TLV) 
United States 
*AMCP - The Academy of Managed Care Pharmacy. The AMCP Format for Formulary Submissions. Vesion 2.1., 2005 
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1.2. Economic evaluation methods literature 
 
The methods guidelines of most of those organizations making decisions about health care resource 
use reviewed in the previous section indicate a preference for cost-effectiveness methods.10  For 
example, those organizations which have required formal economic evaluation for the longest include 
the provinces of Canada, the Pharmaceutical Benefits Advisory Committee (PBAC) in Australia and 
NICE in the UK.  Each of these organisations either formally requires (NICE) or prefers (PBAC and 
Canada) cost-effectiveness analysis with QALYs as the measure of health effect.9,11,12  This contrasts 
with the methods of economic evaluation used to inform resource allocation in other public sectors in 
the UK.  In the UK, the Department of Transport, for example, generally applies cost-benefit analysis 
(CBA) to guide decision making, as described and advocated in the Green Book.   
 
It has been argued that an advantage of CBA is that it is more consistent with the normative principles 
of welfare economics.13  ,W ZRXOG EH PRUH DFFXUDWH WR VD\ WKDW &%$ LV DQ µDSSOLHG DUP¶ RI QHR-
classical welfare economics which is founded on four key tenets:14 that individuals maximize utility 
rationally on the basis of their preferences; that individuals are the best judge of their utility; that utility 
is derived only from outcomes rather than processes; and that the social desirability of alternative 
µVWDWHVRI WKHZRUOG¶VKRXOGEH IRXQGHG only on their impact on the utility (welfare) of individuals as 
revealed by their preferences. Importantly, these principles mean that individual preference alone 
reveals social welfare.  Since it is impossible to directly compare individual utility without violating key 
tenants above, the guidance offered to social choice is limited to situations in which one or more 
individuals regard themselves as better off but none regards himself/herself as worse off.   For applied 
policy guidance, a compensation principle is adopted where a state is more desirable (social welfare 
improves) if those that gain could in principle compensate those that lose.  If markets are complete, 
competitive and undistorted then market prices reveal preference and social value.  They represent 
the compensation individuals require so a simple comparison of the benefits and costs valued at 
markets prices is all that is required, i.e. market prices reveal individual preferences and therefore 
social value. If markets are distorted, shadow prices which adjust for distortions can be derived. 
Where a market does not exist (e.g. for health) shadow prices can be derived from preferences 
revealed in other markets and activities or expressed directly in hypothetical situations.  The main 
tenets and WKHLUYDULDQWVKDYHEHHQUHIHUUHGWRDVµ:HOIDULVW¶.14,15   
 
Given the widespread use of CEA in economic evaluation in health, there have been a number of 
papers which have sought to locate these methods in neo-classical welfare economics and to 
establish the conditions under which CBA and CEA would generate the same conclusions.2,16-19  In 
general terms this has required some strong assumptions, perhaps most notably that the QALY can 
be formally considered a utility which implies that individuals are risk neutral with respect to life-years 
for all health states and that additive utility independence applies with respect to time periods.20    
 
Some of these papers have explicitly considered the appropriate cost perspective for cost-
effectiveness analysis within this Welfarist paradigm.  Garber and Phelps concluded that the inclusion 
of the full social cost of extending life (in terms of health care and productivity costs) would make no 
difference to the relative ranking of health care interventions under appraisal.18  Using a similar 
framework but relaxing some key assumptions, Meltzer reached the opposite conclusion: that cost-
effectiveness analysis will only reach conclusions consistent with the tenets of Welfarism if all costs 
are considered, including the effects on all future (related and unrelated) medical expenditures, 
consumption and productivity.2    
 
From the same general normative viewpoint, JohannessRQDQG2¶&RQRU19 considered the arguments 
for a societal perspective when decisions are based on comparing the incremental cost per QALY 
gained of an intervention with a fixed cost-effectiveness threshold determined on the basis of societal 
willingness to pay.  The authors argued that, for this approach to CEA to be consistent with the 
maximization of societal welfare, all costs need to be factored into the analysis, no matter where they 
fall.  Again, a number of strong assumptions were required in order for this approach to CEA to be 
consistent with societal welfare maximization including the need for the marginal utility of income 
relating to the costs of funding health care to be the same for all health care financing programmes.  
-RKDQQHVVRQDQG2¶&RQRUDOVRSUHsent some more general arguments against a cost perspective of 
a specific health care budget.  These include the fact that few health care systems are financed from 
a single budget (e.g. the plurality of funding arrangements in the US) and that budgets are typically 
annual which requires a highly truncated time horizon for economic evaluation. 
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A common feature of those studies assessing whether decisions based on CEA with QALYs can be 
consistent with a Welfarist normative framework is that they offer no consideration of the role for 
health sector budgets.  In effect, budget constraints are viewed as an administrative nuisance rather 
than expressing an indication of social value. Critically, there is little acknowledgment of the 
importance of the opportunity costs that they induce.  Jonsson offers ten reasons why a societal cost 
perspective should be adopted for economic evaluation.  Many of these relate to the importance of 
decision making from a societal perspective ± that public systems should consider all costs and 
effects.13   
 
The key tenets of neo-classical welfare economics as a basis for social choice have been questioned 
and a range of alternative normative principles suggested.   This alternative framework has been 
WHUPHGµ([WUD-:HOIDULVP¶14,21  Although a number of variants can be identified, the general features of 
WKLVIUDPHZRUNDUHWKDWDQXPEHURIPHDVXUHVRIµZHOOEHLQJ¶DQGµRXWFRPH¶ can guide social choice as 
well as (or instead of) individual preference, that various constituencies might be used to value these 
measures rather than just the affected individuals and that interpersonal comparison is explicitly 
permitted.14  In the field of health, this is consistent with the use of health gain as an important 
outFRPH LQ DSSOLHG HFRQRPLF HYDOXDWLRQ  2QH RI WKH VWUDQGV RI ([WUD :HOIDULVP LV WKH µGHFLVLRQ
PDNLQJ¶DSSURDFKGHVFULEHGE\6XJGHQDQG:LOOLDPV22  This identified a legitimate role for economic 
analysis to explicitly consider the objectives and constraints of the decision maker in guiding the 
choice between policy options.  To some extent, this view of economic appraisal is consistent with the 
practice of much cost-effectiveness analysis in health: although the valuation of health outcomes is 
typically based on the preferences of a sample of patients or the public, distributional issues and 
broader equity arguments invariably remain in the domain of the decision maker within some form of 
deliberative process.23 
 
One important constraint facing many decision making bodies relates to the budget for which they are 
directly or indirectly responsible.  Hence a budget-specific focus in a piece of economic analysis 
would be entirely consistent with Sugden and Williams decision making approach.   However, some 
have advocated a broad societal cost perspective despite eschewing some Welfarist prescriptions.  
The US Panel on Cost-Effectiveness in Health and Medicine, for example, defined a Reference Case 
in which QALYs took the role of the main outcome and willingness to pay methods were explicitly 
rejected because of their distributional implications.24  The US Panel does, however, strongly 
advocate a societal perspective on costs, although this is not justified with reference to the tenets of 
neo-classical welfare economics.  Rather, they justify this recommendation in terms of the Rawlsian 
veil of ignorance: uncertainty about which individual in a society one will be, provides a moral case for 
considering all costs, no matter on whom they fall.  The decision making approach appears to have 
SOD\HG OLWWOH UROH LQ VXSSRUWLQJ WKH863DQHO¶VGHOLEHUDWLRQVSHUKDSVEHFDXVHRID wish to abstract 
itself from the complexity of multiple health care systems in the US and to develop a set of general 
principles. 
 
The decision making approach as a justification for a budget-specific cost perspective is further 
developed by Claxton et al.25   They argue that budgets can be seen as more than administrative 
mechanisms.  At least within liberal democracies with universal health care systems such as the UK 
NHS, the setting of the health care budget can be seen as a legitimate expression of social values 
albeit a complex and imperfect one.  The use of cost-effectiveness analysis to support decision 
PDNHUV¶DWWHPSWV WRPD[LPL]HKHDOWKVXEMHFW WR WKLVEXGJHWFRQVWUDLQW LV seen, therefore, as entirely 
appropriate.  This explicitly uses the shadow price of the budget constraint, in the form of a cost-
effectiveness threshold, to permit a comparison of health gain from new interventions and 
programmes with the health decrements associated with any displaced activity in the system which is 
necessary to fund it.  7KH DXWKRUV GR FRQVLGHU KRZHYHU KRZ µVSLOORYHUV¶ LQ WKH FRsts and 
consequences of health system interventions to other sectors (public and private) may be handled 
within the decision making approach.  Rather than ignoring the budget constraints set for health and 
other sectors, a compensation test is suggested.  For example, if a health care intervention generates 
a net health decrement because of the opportunity costs it imposes on the health care budget but 
produces resource savings to the education sector, could the latter compensate health to provide the 
intervention such that both sectors experience no decrement in their respective objective function?  
The implementation of an approach would, of course, require periodic transfers between public 
sectors and indeed between public sectors and the private sector. 
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1.3. Summary 
 
The review of current UK policy and of policies adopted elsewhere reveals considerable variation in 
the type of perspective claimed, a lack of clarity on what constitutes a broad societal perspective and 
little or no consideration of the impact of fixed budgets.  The justification for type of policies adopted is 
also somewhat limited, commonly resting on literature which ignores the implications of fixed budget 
constraints.  This lack of clarity and ambiguous terminology is also reflected in the results of a recent 
extensive review of the cost perspective adopted in published cost-effectiveness literature, with many 
studies claiming to take a societal perspective when in fact their analysis is restricted to the health 
care system.26  
 
There has been a long tradition of neo-FODVVLFDOZHOIDUHµ:HOIDULVW¶HFRQRPLFVJXLGLQg social choice.  
In terms of applied economic appraisal, there have been many movements away from its main tenets.  
In UK guidelines, this tradition was reflected in the recommendations of the Green Book and, in turn, 
LQ WKH 'HSDUWPHQW RI +HDOWK¶V Policy Appraisal in Health.  However, the practice of economic 
evaluation in health has generally taken a markedly different approach, and there has been a 
corresponding development in normative principles to accompany this.  Although it has many 
variants, this Extra Welfarist normative framework can be used to justify an approach to economic 
appraisal which focuses on the needs to decision making and, in particular, a budget-specific cost 
perspective.  It would be wrong, therefore, to conclude that the use of cost-effectiveness analysis with 
a narrow cost perspective is bereft of any grounding in normative theory.   However, for decision 
making by pubic agencies where interventions and programmes have multiple consequences, some 
of which fall outside the budget of interest, there remains a need to consider how best to reflect these 
external effects whist still respecting sector-specific budgets.  
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2. A conceptual framework 
 
Decisions based on cost-effectiveness analysis are most commonly characterised as comparing the 
benefits expected to be gained in the health sector, often measured using QALYs, to the health that is 
likely to be forgone due to additional cost falling on the health care budget.  This type of decision rule 
is reasonable and complete if: i) the social objective is to improve health; ii) the measure of health 
JDLQHGDQGIRUJRQHFDSWXUHVµHQRXJK¶DVSHFWVRIVRFLDOYDOXHLLLWKHEXGJHWIRUKHDOWKFDUHLVIL[HGRU
at least it is not within the remit of the decision making body to increase or reduce overall expenditure 
on health care.  However, it also relies on two more assumptions which are unlikely to hold: i) that all 
the additional costs of using the technology fall on the budget constraint so that all costs are actually 
health forgone; and ii) all the benefits are in the form of health and there are no external effects on 
other sectors including productivity and consumption in the private sector.  For ease of terminology 
we refer to all external effects falling on the wider economy as (net) consumption costs which will be 
made up of costs imposed on the private sector (valued in terms of consumption forgone) and 
benefits accruing to the private sector (valued in terms of consumption gained).    
 
However, in the face of budgets set by a socially legitimate higher authority it is not clear how or 
whether a broader social perspective which would include all effects on all sectors should be 
implemented ± particularly if transfers between sectors are not possible.  The review of current 
polices (in the UK and elsewhere) shows that there is limited theoretical support for the type of 
approaches adopted in the academic and methodological literature.  Indeed, the review of this 
literature shows that there is limited guidance for policy makers once the reality of fixed budget 
constraints and the fundamental difficulty of specifying an explicit social welfare function to describe 
social choice across all sectors are acknowledged. 
 
In the face of these difficulties current policies can be regarded as lying on a spectrum ranging from 
ignoring the fact of fixed constraints to acknowledging the constraints but ignoring the effects external 
to the health care system.  There are three alternative partial responses to this difficult allocation 
problem that can be usefully characterised and which are examined and evaluated in more detail 
below: 
 
A   Ignore the wider costs outside the health sector 
 In essence this is the NICE approach after the revision of its methods guide in 2008.  Prior 
to 2008 the methods guide was more permissive. Although wider costs were not part of the 
reference case in the 2004 guidance, it was suggested that a non reference case analysis 
which included them would be taken into account in the deliberative process. 
 
B  Treat any wider costs as if they fall on the budget constraint 
This represents a rather naive view that all costs should be included but decisions should 
still be based on comparing the resulting incremental cost-effectiveness ratio (ICER) with 
the current threshold, where the threshold represents what health is likely to be forgone (the 
reciprocal of the shadow price of the constraint).  This is a characterisation of the position of 
some consultees and appellants during a number of NICE Technology Appraisals including 
the applicants during Judicial review in 2007.  
  
C Ignore the budget constraint 
This represents the greater part of literature on evaluation outside health (cost-benefit 
analysis), where the fact of exogenous budget constraints and the implication for opportunity 
costs are rarely acknowledged and even less commonly dealt with analytically.  It also 
represents the implicit view of those who argue that the cost-effectiveness threshold should 
reflect some social consumption value of health rather than what is forgone in a budget 
constrained system.  
 
To examine the different approaches in more detail and to evaluate them by establishing the 
FRQGLWLRQVXQGHU ZKLFKHDFKP\ OHDG WR µSRRU¶ GHFLVLRQVE\1,&( ZHGHYHORS DVLPSOHEXW IRUPDO
conceptual framework.  In doing so, we make a number of simplifications to improve intuition and 
clarity without loss of generality.   
 
i)  Initially we consider only two sectors: health care and the wider economy; where all external 
effects use the common numeraire of consumption.  Later in Section 2.4 this is relaxed to 
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consider two budget constrained public sectors (health and education), and to explore the 
impact of transfers within the public sectors and between the public and private sectors.   
ii) Throughout we consider costs and health benefits falling in a single period.  The 
generalisation to multiple periods and accounting for rates of time preference, growth in 
consumption value of health and growth in the threshold is has been dealt with elsewhere.27    
iii) It becomes apparent in Section 2.1 that when there are external effects, some notion of a 
µFRQVXPSWLRQ YDOXH RI KHDOWK¶ LV UHTXLUHG  $OWKRXJK ZH GR QRW IRUPDOO\ VSHFLI\ D ZHOIDUH
function, it is at least initially assumed to be separable in health and consumption, primarily 
to simplify the notation and ease exposition.  This could be interpreted as welfarist or extra 
welfarist depending on how v is derived and some simplifying assumption about how health 
and consumption enter individuals utility functions.  Other specific and more complex 
welfare functions could be substituted but they would not change the fundamental insights 
or considerations. We discuss the difficulty of a more complex and latent welfare function 
later in this chapter and in the next.   
iv) Throughout subsequent sections we assume that the cost-effectiveness threshold ( k ) will 
be less than some social consumption value of health ( v ).  This reflects the current debate, 
including current estimates of the threshold28 and the type of values and estimates proposed 
for v .29  Aside from empirical observations there are good reasons why the threshold, which 
could be taken to represent how much society wishes to pay for improvements in health 
delivered by collectively funded health care, might differ from how much of their own 
consumption individuals are willing to give up to improve their own health. There are also a 
number of reasons why a social democratic process may not be expected to deliver budget 
allocations which precisely match individual preferences (see Section 3.1 for a more 
detailed discussion).  
v) To simplify the notion and exposition in Section 2 we focus on the net consumption costs or 
benefits offered by a new technology and initially assume that the health care activities 
which are displaced will have no net consumption costs or benefits associated with them, 
i.e., it is assumed cc =0 for displaced health care. The fact that the costs of a new 
technology will displace other health care activities which may be associated with net 
consumption benefits or costs as well as health gains is a critical consideration which is 
discussed in Section 3.3. 
    
Initially, in Section 2.1, the allocation problem is formulated within the health sector using three 
equivalent decision rules for cost-effectiveness.  These decision rules are generalised to two sectors 
and we demonstrate the circumstances under which current NICE policy would be correct.  In doing 
so, we outline two very different approaches to economic evaluation which turn on normative 
questions of social value.  In Section 2.2 the three possible approaches to multi-sector effects are 
then evaluated when the project being considered can be regarded as a marginal change: that is, 
when the health care or consumption costs are so small relative to the budget or the wider economy, 
respectively, that acceptance would not change the cost-effectiveness threshold or the consumption 
value of health.  However, repeatedly making decisions, each of which might be regarded as 
marginal, will lead to non marginal changes, i.e., all repeated changes in a similar direction will be non 
marginal in the long run.  Therefore, Section 2.3 re-evaluates each approach when changes are non 
marginal. Section 2.4 examines the possibilities of making transfers, in the two sector and multi sector 
case, between budget constrained public sectors and between the public and private sector.  In each 
case we identify the additional value of transfers and how to identify the value of the transfers that 
would be needed.  The conceptual framework and basic analytics of this chapter provide the basis of 
the discussion of policy implications in Chapter 3 where the critical assumption of being able to 
specify an explicit social welfare function to describe social choice across sectors as well as 
assessment of displaced consumption and dynamic effects are examined. 
 
The notation used is defined in the text as it appears.  However, all the notation used in this chapter is 
also summarised in Table II for quick reference. 
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Table II Notation used throughout 
Symbol Definition 
k  Cost-effectiveness threshold (the additional costs that would displace 1 unit of health 
elsewhere in the health care system)  
v  The consumption value of health (the amount consumption regarded as equivalent to 
1 unit of health) 
h  Incremental health benefits 
hc  Incremental costs required to achieve h  which fall on the budget for health care 
cc  
The net effects which do not fall on the budget expressed as a net consumption cost 
to the wider economy  
*k  Cost-effectiveness threshold for a non marginal change  
 
 
 
2.1 Formulation of the problem 
 
There are quite profoundly different, but quite reasonably held, views about the role that economic 
analysis ought to play in social choice,30,31 particularly in health.14  These views partly explain the 
different positions that can be taken and expose the key questions of fact and of social value at the 
heart of this policy question. Therefore, we draw attention to these at the outset but discuss their 
implications more fully in Chapter 3. 
 
Cost-effectiveness analysis is commonly seen as a means of maximising an exogenous (explicit and 
agreed) objective, commonly health itself, subject to an exogenous budget constraint.24,32 Decisions 
can be based on either net health or monetary benefit 33,34 or by comparing the ICER to a cost-
effectiveness threshold which represents the cost-effectiveness of the health care which will be 
displaced.35  Assuming divisibility and constant returns,36,37 this is equivalent to a mathematical 
programming approach where the cost-effectiveness threshold is the reciprocal of the shadow price(s) 
of a single budget constraint 38 or a series of budget constraints over multiple periods.39  
 
In these circumstances CEA cannot be used to make claims about social welfare or the optimality or 
otherwise of the budget for health care.  Its role is more modest, claiming to inform social decisions in 
health rather than prescribing social choice.  It is this role that CEA has tended to play in policy. 
Furthermore, it fits well with the view25 that bodies such as NICE in the UK can be appropriately 
treated as the agent of a socially legitimate higher authority which is unable to express an explicit and 
coherent social welfare functiona. In these circumstances agents (such as NICE) can be regarded as 
delegated authorities but ones that cannot be asked to improve social welfare, since it cannot be 
specified. Rather, budgets are allocated by the higher authority and are accompanied by a set of 
explicit and specific objectives (e.g., to improve health in the case of NICE) for the agents to employ. 
The implications of this process (i.e., the shadow prices of the constraints imposed by the higher 
authority) are a partial social expression of some unknown underlying latent welfare function.   
 
Current NICE policy  
 
The implications for policy and decision rules can be illustrated using a simple allocation problem 
where a new technology is compared to a single alternative (e.g., current clinical practice). A social 
decision maker such as NICE has estimates of both the technRORJ\¶V H[SHFWHG LQFUHPHQWDO KHDOWK
benefits, h , and the incremental costs falling on the health care budget, hc . The social decision 
maker faces an exogenous budget and has an estimate of the cost-effectiveness threshold, k , 
reflecting the  reciprocal of the shadow price of the budget constraint.40,41 Assuming that all costs fall 
on the budget constraint, the expected health forgone in each period due to the additional costs of 
adopting the technology is h
c
k
. Since all costs fall on the health care sector (no costs fall on private 
consumption in the wider economy) all costs are health forgone. 
                                                 
a
 Legitimate higher authority can be thought to rest with the process rather than individuals within it.  For example, in a social 
democracy it does not rest with an individual (e.g., a Minister), or particular Departments (e.g., Treasury), or even Government, 
but with the whole process, including Government, the various processes of parliamentary scrutiny and the wider context of civil 
society (the judiciary, professional civil service etc). 
Appropriate perspectives for health care decisions  17 
 
Allocation decisions made by a body such as NICE can be described as comparing the health 
expected to be gained and forgone, and accepting those technologies where the former exceeds the 
latter, i.e., accept the technology if the net health benefit is positive: 
0hch
k
    (1) 
 
Alternatively and equivalently, these decisions can be expressed as a more familiar comparison of the 
ICER with the threshold, k . The net health benefits in (1) can be rearranged to provide an ICER 
which should be less than k  if the technology is to be accepted: 
hc k
h
    (2) 
 
Both (1) and (2) are also equivalent to asking whether the monetary value of the health gained 
( h rescaled to money terms using k )  exceeds the costs i.e., the threshold is used as an expression 
of what society wishes to pay for health delivered through collectively funded health care. Now the 
technology should be accepted if the net monetary benefit is positive: 
 
. 0hk h c     (3) 
 
These three (equivalent) decision rules are complete and will be appropriate if the social objective is 
to maximise health, if all costs fall on the health care sector and if all benefits of social value are in the 
form of health.  However, if there are effects (costs and benefits) which fall outside the health sector, 
e.g., on the wider economy then this characterisation is inadequate and needs to be generalised 
 
The more general case  
 
In most circumstances there are effects outside the health sector. For example, there may be direct 
costs of care which do not fall on the NHS budget such as the cost of caring for a patient with chronic 
disease. There are also the external effects on the wider economy which might include the net 
contribution of returning a patient to activity in the labour market (value of their future productivity net 
of future consumption). To take these into account formally when making decisions within the health 
sector some means to value heath gained and forgone within the health sector relative to costs and 
benefits falling on the wider economy is necessarily required.  The rates at which society is willing to 
trade social arguments including health and consumption is commonly described as a social welfare 
function. 
 
As described in Section 1.2, economic analysis has traditionally taken a wider view of social 
objectives than simple sector-specific outcomes.15,42  Such a role for economic analysis is more 
ambitious; providing a means of making statements about social welfare but also requiring the 
specification of an explicit social welfare function which will have more than health as its 
arguments.  This view is well represented in the CEA and CBA literature.  The definition of social 
ZHOIDUHFDQEHEDVHGRQLQGLYLGXDOSUHIHUHQFHVH[SUHVVHGRUUHYHDOHGDµ:HOIDULVW¶view) or modified 
by othHU VRFLDO DUJXPHQWV DQ µExtra WHOIDULVW¶ YLHZ. 2,43  Importantly, it prescribes social choice 
rather than simply informing social decision makers (agents) within the confines of the health care 
system (or other sectors).  Most commonly it has been used while making the (often implicit) 
assumption that either budgets are necessarily set to be optimal with respect to the presupposed 
welfare function  or are not actually fixed, with the decision making body effectively having a remit to 
increase or reduce expenditure on health care.  It is this view of the role of economic analysis that 
underpins the reasoning and recommendations in the Treasury Green book and other Department of 
Health policy documents as discussed in Section 1.2. 3,5,6 It should be noted that the Green book does 
recommend that the opportunity costs associated with budget constraints should be accounted for but 
it provides little detailed guidance on how this ought to be done, especially when there are impacts on 
multiple sectors. 
 
This more traditional approach is less well represented in decisions about health technologies, partly 
due to the difficulty of identifying any welfare function carrying some broad consensus or social 
legitimacy, 31,44 particularly when considering decisions with direct health impacts.  Nevertheless, 
health must inevitably be traded-off against other aspects of social value, most notably consumption, 
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by social decision makers: whether this is done implicitly by a higher authority setting the budget 
constraints or more explicitly using some specified social welfare function.  This trade-off becomes 
particularly apparent once effects outside the health sector are acknowledged. 
 
The implications for policy and decision rules can be illustrated using the simple allocation problem 
above, but now accounting for the possibility of costs and benefits outside the health sector 
expressed as a net consumption cost, cc . Now the allocation decision described in (3) can be 
generalised to comparing the consumption value of the health expected to be gained to the 
consumption value of health forgone and other net effects on consumption. The social consumption 
value of health, v , represents the amount of consumption that is equivalent to 1 unit of health.  Within 
this framework, the technology should be accepted if the net consumption value is positive: 
 
. 0h c
c
v h c
k
    (4) 
 
The health expected to be gained is valued at v  rather than k . But since all costs that fall on the 
health care budget are also health forgone these must also be valued at v (the first term).  Therefore, 
if there are no external effects ( 0cc ) a decision based on (3) or (4) will be the same irrespective 
of the value of v .  When there are no external effects, maximising health or maximising the 
consumption value of health leads to the same decision: the value of v  and whether or not v k  is 
irrelevant, what matters for the decision is the value of k (there are, however, some implications for 
discounting which are discussed elsewhere).27,45  
 
When there are external effects ( 0cc ) the decision can be described as a comparison of the 
consumption value of the net health gained in the health sector (the first term) with the net 
consumption costs falling on the wider economy (the second term).  If the former exceeds the latter 
then the technology should be adopted.  This will be complete and appropriate if a number of 
assumptions hold: i) if transfers between sectors are not possible, then hc must be marginal with 
respect to the budget, i.e., incurring these additional costs will not change the cost-effectiveness 
threshold; ii) more credibly, cc must be marginal with respect to total consumption in the wider 
economy so that incurring cc will not change v ; and iii) the value of v  must be a complete and 
socially legitimate value of health. Among other things this last assumption requires that either health 
and consumption are the only arguments of social value; or that they are separable from all other 
potential arguments in some more complex and complete welfare function.  All of these assumptions 
will be examined in more detail in subsequent sections. 
 
Consumption is not the only numeraire that can be used.  Alternatively and equivalently the allocation 
decision in (4) can be expressed in terms of health:   
 
0h cc ch
k v
    (5) 
 
Now the decision can be described as a comparison of the net health gained in the health sector (1st 
term) with the health equivalent of the net consumption costs falling on the wider economy (2nd term).  
If the former exceed the latter then the technology should be adopted.   
 
This formulation may help to understand NICE policy prior to 2008 and other jurisdictions, where 
wider costs are µWDNHQ LQWRDFFRXQW¶ LQDQ LPSOLFLWGHOLEHUDWLYHZD\)RUH[DPSOH LI £20,000k but 
£60,000v  then costs which fall outside the health sector get one third of the weight k
v
 of costs 
that fall directly on the NHS budget. This can be clearly seen when (5) is rearranged to express the 
decision as a comparison of an ICER, which includes both hc and cc , with the threshold: 
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h c
k
c c
v k
h
    (6) 
 
Therefore, NICE policy prior to the 2008 Methods Guide could be interpreted as an implicit response 
WR WKHVH LVVXHV ZKHUH ZLGHUHIIHFWVZKHUH µWDNHQ LQWRDFFRXQW¶ DVDQDGGLWLRQDO FRQVLGHUDWLRQ LH
they where not given the same weight as costs falling on the NHS budget (see discussion of B in 
section 3.2 below), but neither were they given zero weight and ignored (see discussion of A in 
section 2.2 below).  The approach could be thought of as placing policy between the two extremes of 
attaching weights of zero or one to cc . 
 
A more deliberative approach to this problem rather than adopting formal and explicit analytical rules 
might reflect the fact that that the cost impact on the NHS of these considerations will ultimately be 
non marginal.  Although, this will unambiguously reduce the threshold (all other things equal), the 
magnitude of the reduction will be unknown or at least very uncertain.  It might also reflect the fact 
that there is generally no broad consensus or obvious social legitimacy for any particular welfare 
function and the consumption value of health derived from it.  Finally, even if a consumption value of 
health was regarded as acceptable, the welfare function it presupposed is unlikely to capture 
everything of social value.  Again this general difficulty is reflected in the way NICE attempts to deal 
with a range of other social arguments described in its social value judgements document - that is, 
through deliberation. 
 
The current policy of assigning zero weight to cc , however, appears, at first, to be more difficult to 
justify since it would only be appropriate if either there were no measureable external effects or if the 
consumption value of heath was so much greater than the cost-effectiveness threshold that any 
external effects would carry negligible weight.  Nevertheless, the other alternatives which have been 
SURSRVHGWR1,&(¶VFXUUHQWSRVWSRVLWLRQPD\QRWQHFHVVDULO\RIIHUDQ\LPSURYHPHQW  Indeed 
the discussion of implications and considerations in Sections 3 and 5 suggests there may be potential 
dangers  Each of these alternatives are examined when changes are regarded as marginal in the next 
section, before the effect of non marginal changes is examined in more detail in Section 2.3.   
 
 
2.2   Marginal changes 
 
In the face of these difficulties current policies can be characterised as three alternative partial 
responses or decision rules: i)  ignore the wider costs outside the health sector; ii) treat any wider 
costs as if they fall on the budget constraint; and iii) ignore the budget constraint.  Each are evaluated 
in turn, considering the direction and potential size of any bias in terms of net health benefit by 
comparison with the more general and complete decision rule expressed in (5) above.   
 
Importantly in this section it is assumed that transfers between sectors are not possible but that all 
changes are marginal.  That is, hc must be marginal with respect to the budget, i.e., incurring these 
additional costs will not change k; and ii), cc must be marginal with respect to total consumption in 
the wider economy, i.e., incurring cc will not change v .  In addition, we assume that k v  to reflect 
current debate, proposed values and the reasoning outlined in Section 3.3. 
 
For each of the three alternative decision rules their potential bias is illustrated when the technology is 
expected to offer positive health benefits ( 0h ), and when there are either net consumption costs 
( 0cc ) or net consumption benefits ( 0cc ) on the wider economy.  In each case the additional 
health care costs may be positive or negative, i.e., when 0hc the technology expected to save 
NHS resources. The other possibilities when 0h are reported in Table III. The implications of 
taking a wider perspective in these circumstances are briefly discussed. Simple numerical examples 
are used throughout to illustrate the decision rules and potential bias using common values of 
1h , £20,000k and £60,000v . 
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A Ignore effects outside the health sector 
 
In essence this characterises the NICE approach after the revision of its methods guide in 2008.  
When expressed in net health benefit this decision rule was given in (1) above. The difference 
between equation (1) and the general and more complete decision rule in (5) is equal to a bias of, 
cc
v
    (7) 
 
This represents the extent to which cost-effectiveness will be overestimated when using the simple 
and incomplete decision rule, i.e., when it is positive the bias favours the technology, there is a 
danger that it will be approved when it should be rejected. When the bias is negative it will 
disadvantage the technology and there will be a danger of rejection when it should be approved.   
 
Net consumption costs ( 0cc ) 
When there are net costs falling on the wider economy ( 0cc ) there is an unambiguously positive 
bias in favour of the technology.  The use of simple decision rule in (1) neglects the positive costs 
falling on the wider economy and there is a danger that the technology will be approved when it 
should be rejected. For example, if £10,000hc and £60,000cc then the true net health 
benefit would be: 
 
£10,000 £60,0001 0.5
£20,000 £60,000
h cc ch
k v
, 
 
and it should be rejected. However, the net health benefit will be overestimated if cc is ignored, 
 
£10,0001 0.5
£20,000
hch
k
 
 
and a technology that should be rejected would be wrongly accepted.  Clearly, the size of this bias 
and the danger of a wrong decision will greater when the consumption costs are larger and when the 
consumption value of health is lower. 
 
If the technology saves NHS resources ( 0hc ) there remains an unambiguously positive bias in 
favour of the technology which could lead to a technology being accepted when it should be rejected. 
For example, if £10,000hc but £120,000cc then the true net health benefit would be 
 
£10,000 £120,0001 0.5
£20,000 £60,000
h cc ch
k v
 
 
and it should be rejected.  The net health benefit would be overestimated using the simple decision 
rule: 
 
£10,0001 1.5
£20,000
hch
k
 
 
Using the simple decision rule the technology would appear to dominate - it is more effective and less 
costly to the NHS, but it should be rejected nevertheless due to wider consumption costs.  For 
example, net consumption costs may be substantial due to the future health and non health care 
costs of a life saving intervention in populations where the remaining life cycle consumption exceeds 
the value of production, e.g., in older populations.2 
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Net consumption benefits ( 0cc ) 
 
When there are net consumption benefits for the wider economy there is an unambiguously negative 
bias against the technology.  The simple decision rule neglects the benefits falling on the wider 
economy and there is a danger that the technology will be rejected when it should be approved. For 
example, if £30,000hc and £60,000cc then the true net health benefit would be: 
 
£30,000 £60,0001 0.5
£20,000 £60,000
h cc ch
k v
 
 
and it should be approved.  The net health benefit would be underestimated using (1), 
 
£30,0001 0.5
£20,000
hch
k
 
 
and the technology would be  wrongly rejected.  Again, the size of the bias will be greater when the 
net consumption benefit is larger and when the consumption value of health is lower. 
 
If the technology also saves NHS resources there will still be a bias against the technology but this 
bias will not effect the decision as the technology would dominate and be approved anyway using the 
simple decision rule in (1).  However, it should be noted that even when the bias does not or cannot 
effect the decision to approve or reject a technology any bias in the estimate of net health benefit will 
affect estimates of uncertainty and the potential value of additional evidence.  
 
When the technology is less effective ( 0h ) 
It should also be recognised that once a wider perspective is adopted then any net consumption 
benefits must necessarily be traded with net health benefit within the health care sector. This means 
that a technology which is less effective 1h and more costly to the NHS £10,000hc , which 
would normally be dismissed as not cost-effective, may become worthwhile and should be approved if 
the net consumption benefits are sufficiently large ( £120,000cc ).  In this case, 
 
£10,000 £120,0001 0.5
£20,000 £60,000
h cc ch
k v
 
 
and the technology should be approved despite being less effective and more costly.  For example, 
as above, a less effective treatment (in terms of survival) in older populations where remaining life 
cycle consumption exceeds the value of production may be approved even if it is more costly to the 
NHS.  The potential implications of adopting a coherent wider perspective for the social consensus 
which underpins NICE the objectives of the Department of Health and the NHS itself are discussed in 
Section 3.3. 
 
B Treat net consumption costs as if they fall on the budget constraint 
 
This is a characterisation of the position of some consultees and appellants during a number of NICE 
Technology Appraisals including the applicants during Judicial review in 2007. It represents a rather 
naive view that all costs should be included but decisions should still be based on comparing the 
resulting ICER with the current threshold, i.e.,  
 
h cc c k
h
 
 
which can be expressed in terms of net health benefit:   
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0h cc ch
k
    (8) 
 
The difference between (8) and (5) is equal to a bias of, 
 
c cc c
v k
     (9) 
 
This bias depends on the value of cc and the relative values of vand k .  It should be apparent that 
when v k , so WKH EXGJHW IRU KHDOWK FDUH LV µRSWLPDO¶ ZLWK respect to the social welfare function 
implied by v , there will be no bias - all costs could be regarded as if they fall on the constraint (recall 
in this section we assume that all costs are marginal to the budget so no transfers are required).   
However, there is no reason to believe that budgets are set optimally with respect to the type of 
welfare functions which are used to derive or are implied by currently proposed values for v .  In 
addition, the evidence for estimates of k  and the estimates of v  proposed, suggest that as assumed 
here, v k  (see Section 3.1). 
 
Net consumption costs ( 0cc ) 
 
Given that v k  there is an unambiguous negative bias against the technology when there are net 
costs imposed on the wider economy.  The use of simple decision rule in (8) wrongly assumes that 
wider costs displace health (at a rate of k ) when in fact they only displace consumption (valued at 
1
v
), i.e., it overestimates the importance of net consumption costs. For example, if 1h , 
£5,000hc and £30,000cc then the true net health benefit would be: 
 
 
£5,000 £30,0001 0.25
£20,000 £60,000
h cc ch
k v
, 
and it should be approved. However, the net health benefit would be underestimated using the 
decision rule in (8), 
 
£5,000 £30,0001 0.75
£20,000
h cc ch
k
 
 
and a technology would be wrongly rejected.  Clearly, the size of this bias and the danger of a wrong 
decision will be greater when the consumption costs are larger and when the difference between 
vand k is greater.  If a technology saves NHS resources ( 0hc ) the negative bias still remains.  
The true opportunity costs will be overestimated and net health benefit underestimated using the 
decision rule in (8).  Again a technology could be wrongly rejected. 
 
Net consumption benefits ( 0cc ) 
 
When there are net consumption benefits for the wider economy ( 0cc ) there is an unambiguously 
positive bias in favour of the technology. The simple decision rule in (8) treats the wider cost savings 
as if they accrue to the NHS which can be used to generate health at rate k . The importance of 
consumption benefits are overestimated and there is a danger that the technology will be approved 
when it should be rejected. For example, if £40,000hc and £30,000cc then the true net 
health benefit would be: 
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£40,000 £30,0001 0.5
£20,000 £60,000
h cc ch
k v
, 
 
and it should be rejected. However, the net health benefit would be overestimated using the decision 
rule in (8), 
 
£40,000 £30,0001 0.5
£20,000
h cc ch
k
 
 
and a technology would be wrongly approved.  If the technology also saves NHS resources it would 
dominate and be approved using the simple decision rule in (8), but there will still be a bias in favour 
of the technology but this bias will not effect the decision.  As previously, it should be noted that even 
when the bias does not effect the decision, any bias in the estimate of net health benefit will affect 
estimates of uncertainty and the potential value of additional evidence.  
 
C  Ignore the budget constraint   
 
This represents the greater part of literature on evaluation outside health (cost-benefit analysis), 
where the fact of exogenous constraints and the implications for opportunity costs are rarely 
acknowledged and even less commonly dealt with analytically.  It also represents the implicit view of 
those who argue that the cost-effectiveness threshold should reflect some social consumption value 
of health ( v) rather than what is forgone in a budget constrained system ( k ). This can be described 
as comparing the ICER which includes all costs falling on all sectors with a social consumption value 
of health, i.e.,  
 
h cc c v
h
    
 
This can be expressed in terms of net health benefit:   
 
0h cc ch
v
    (10) 
 
The difference between (10) and (5) is equal to a bias of, 
 
h hc c
k v
     (11) 
 
Unlike the two other simple decision rules this bias depends on the value of hc , not cc .  
Therefore, it is whether the additional NHS costs are positive or negative that matters rather then 
whether there are net costs or net benefit to the wider economy.   The bias also depends on relative 
values of vand k but in a different way than previously.  If, as assumed throughout, v k ,  the bias 
will always be positive for technologies with positive incremental NHS costs ( 0hc ) and negative 
for those that are cost saving to the NHS ( 0hc ).  The reason, is that any additional health care 
costs are assumed to fall on consumption rather than lead to health forgone (at rate k ).  Therefore, 
the true value of health care costs (the health forgone) is underestimated and there will be a bias in 
favour of the technology. For example, if £60,000hc and £30,000cc  then the true net 
health benefit would be: 
 
£60,000 £30,0001 1.5
£20,000 £60,000
h cc ch
k v
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and the technology should be rejected. However, the net health benefit will be overestimated if the 
simple decision rule in (10) is used, 
 
£60,000 £30,0001 0.5
£60,000
h vc ch
v
 
 
and a technology which should be rejected would be approved.  Where the technology saves NHS 
resources there will be a bias against the technology because the value of the resource saving should 
be the health that can be gained from them rather than consumption saved.   If there are also wider 
benefits ( 0cc ) then this bias will not effect the decision.  However, if there are wider consumption 
costs ( 0cc ) then it is possible that a technology that should be accepted would be rejected using 
the simple decision rule in (10). 
 
Summary of potential biases 
 
It seems clear that, even when changes are marginal, all the simple decision rules which characterise 
a number of policy options create biases in different directions. In many common circumstances these 
biases could lead to false positive decisions, where a technology that should be rejected is wrongly 
approved, or false negative decisions where a technology that should be approved is wrongly 
rejected.  The direction of bias and the potential for false positive (FP) of false negative (FN) decisions 
is summarised in Table III. 
 
It should be emphasised that even when the potential bias cannot lead to an FP or FN decision, 
because the technology will always dominate or be dominated (D), the bias in the estimates of net 
health benefit will also lead to bias any assessment of uncertainty and the value of evidence. It should 
also be noted that accounting for wider effects outside the health care budget necessarily requires a 
trade-off to be made between health benefits in the health sector and net consumption costs in the 
wider economy.  One implication is that a technology which is less effective and more costly to the 
NHS would be approved if there are sufficiently large net consumption benefits.  Similarly a 
technology which is more effective and less costly to the NHS may be rejected due to net 
consumption costs.  For example, technologies which have an effect on mortality in older populations 
where the remaining life cycle consumption exceeds the value of production may generate large 
external net costs if it was effective but large external net benefits if it was less effective than other 
therapies.  Of course, the relative value of interventions which improve quality of life rather than life 
expectancy would be improved in these populations.2 
 
 
Table III Bias and potential for decision error (marginal changes) 
  
 
Type of Technology 
A. Ignore wider costs B. Costs on budget C. Ignore constraint  
Bias Decision Bias Decision Bias Decision 
More effective 
      
Net consumption costs  
      
Positive costs (NHS) + FP - FN + FP 
Cost saving (NHS) + FP - FN - FN 
 
      
Net consumption  benefits  
      
Positive costs (NHS) - FN + FP + FP 
Cost saving (NHS) - D + D - D 
 
      
Less effective 
      
Net consumption costs  
      
Positive costs (NHS) + D - D + D 
Cost saving (NHS) + FP - FN - FN 
 
      
Net consumption  benefits  
      
Positive costs (NHS) - FN + FP + FP 
Cost saving (NHS) - FN + FP - FN 
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The potential bias associated with these three polices can also be illustrated graphically.  The bias 
associated with each is illustrated in Figure 1 for net consumption costs ( cc ) ranging from -
£100,000 to £100,000.  
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Figure 1. Potential bias for different values of cc  
( £20,000, £60,000, 1, £30,000hk v h c ) 
 
Figure 1 illustrates that the bias associated with either ignoring cc  or treating it as if it falls in the 
budget for health care are always opposite, i.e., when one overestimates the other underestimates.  
The only point at which neither is biased is when 0cc .  It also illustrates that the bias introduced 
by ignoring the constraint is independent of cc .  In this case there is a positive bias because hc is 
positive in this example. 
 
Figure 2 illustrates the biases for different net health care costs which fall on the budget ( hc ) 
ranging from -£100,000 to £100,000.  It illustrates that the bias of ignoring the constraint depends on 
whether hc is positive or negative, with the size of the positive (negative) bias increasing 
(decreasing) with hc .  The bias associated with the other two simple decision rules is independent 
of hc .  In this example ignoring the wider net consumption costs introduces a positive bias as cc is 
positive in this example. 
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Figure 2.  Potential bias for different values of hc  
( hc £20,000, £60,000, 1, £40,000ck v h c ) 
 
The relationship between the potential bias and an estimate of the consumption value of health is 
illustrated in Figure 3 where the cost-effectiveness threshold is £20,000 per unit of health gained.  It 
illustrates that ignoring the constraint or treating wider costs as if they fall on the budget will not lead 
to any bias if the budget is set optimally with respect to the value of v  and the welfare function it 
presupposes ( v k ). Recall, we are still assuming that changes are marginal, i.e., are small relative 
to the budget so that vand k do not change.  However, there is little reason to suppose that budgets 
are set in this way and good reasons to believe that ( v k ).  As v  becomes much greater than k , 
the bias associated with ignoring wider consumption costs falls because the weight that should be 
attached to them falls.  However, the bias associated with either ignoring the constraint or treating 
wider costs as if they fall on the budget increases.  Therefore, in assessing the potential biases of 
alternative policies an important consideration is the relative values of v  and k  assuming one is 
willing to specify an explicit value of v  for these purposes.  
 
Understanding the bias introduced by incomplete decision rules which characterise some of the policy 
options is instructive, but it poses the question of why consider adopting simple but incomplete 
policies when the appropriate decision rule in (5) is available?  There are broadly two reasons why the 
decision rule described in (5) may not be appropriate or feasible and when the other simple but 
incomplete rules might lead to better outcomes.  Firstly, it has been assumed that all changes are 
marginal.  But even if individual decisions might be considered marginal in isolation, the repeated 
application of the decision rule will lead to non marginal changes.  If transfers are not possible then 
the implied reallocation of resource between sectors may not be socially desirable, particularly if an 
explicit welfare function cannot be completely specified.   The implications of non marginal changes 
are dealt with in Section 2.3.  Secondly, adopting a particular value of v  as used in (5) implies a 
particular and simple welfare function which is unlikely to capture all arguments of social value and 
may conflict with other agreed social objectives.  Indeed any particular welfare function is unlikely to 
carry consensus or social legitimacy. The difficulty and implications of being unable to specify an 
explicit welfare function is dealt with later in Section 3.1.   
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Figure 3.  Potential bias for different values of v  
( £20,000, 1, £40,000, £40,000h ck h c c ) 
 
 
2.3 Non marginal changes 
 
It has been assumed in previous sections that each decision, when considered in isolation, can be 
regarded as having a marginal impact on either the budget of the health care system or on the value 
of economic activity in the wider economy.   However, even if the effect of individual decisions might 
be considered marginal, the repeated application of the decision rules described above to a sequence 
of decisions will ultimately lead to non marginal changes LH D VXIILFLHQW QXPEHU RI µPDUJLQDO¶ 
changes tending in the same direction will have non marginal effects.  This poses a number of 
problems: i) a failure to account for non marginal effects will lead to a biased assessment of cost-
effectiveness and an unambiguous increase in the possibility of false positive decisions; ii) even when 
non marginal effects are accounted for and bias is avoided, unless transfers are made to compensate 
for non marginal effects then the implied reallocation of resource between sectors may not be socially 
desirable, particularly if an explicit welfare function cannot be completely specified; and iii) the 
informational requirements to fully account for non marginal effects are generally not achievable so 
this cannot represent a realistic or feasible policy option.  However, it does provide the appropriate 
bench mark against which to judge the potential biases of those policies which are possible.   
 
The effect of a non marginal impact on the health care budget means that the additional total health 
care costs displace not just the marginal NHS activities but other more productive activities. The 
health forgone is not given by k  but by some lower threshold *k k  that represents the greater 
health forgone as both marginal and then less marginal activities are displaced.  Even if a health 
technology saves health care resources ( 0hc ), and this saving is non marginal with respect to 
the budget, the health that is gained by using saved resources to engage in other activities will be 
overestimated unless account is taken of the diminishing productivity of additional activities which can 
be funded, i.e., less health is produced from the resources saved and *k k . 
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Total health care costs will depend on the per patient incremental cost ( hc ) and the size of the 
eligible patient population.  Whether these costs should be regarded as marginal or not depends on 
their size relative to the budget for health care (or at least that part of the budget devoted to 
discretionary activities which could be displaced to accommodate the additional costs) and how fast 
the marginal productivity of the health care system is falling, i.e. whether health care is more or less 
productive of health.  For example, a total cost representing the same proportion of the available 
budget could be regarded as marginal if tKHKHDOWKFDUHV\VWHPLV OHVVSURGXFWLYHµIODWRI WKHFXUYH
PHGLFLQH¶EXWQRQPDUJLQDOLI the health care system is more productive.  Recent empirical evidence 
suggests that NHS is remarkably productive of health and very far from µIODWRIWKHFXUYHPHGLFLQH¶.28  
Therefore, the non marginal effects of a single decision or a series of decisions is likely to be more 
significant to the NHS. 
 
In general non marginal effects of costs falling on the health care budget are likely to be more 
significant than consumption costs or benefits falling on the wider economy.  The health care budget 
is only a fraction of the total value of economic activity so health care costs will tend to constitute a 
greater proportion of the budget compared to consumption costs and benefits which are likely to 
represent a relatively small proportion of the total value of economic activity.  Also, there are currently 
no strong incentives or other reasons to suppose that new technologies will generally offer mainly 
consumption costs or mainly consumptions benefits as this will depend on the characteristics of the 
disease (e.g., chronic or acute), the effect of the technology (e.g., mortality or quality of life effect) and 
the patient population (e.g., older or younger). Therefore, even when changes are repeated there is 
no particular reason to believe they will tend to be in the same direction.  However, the health care 
costs of new technologies will tend to be positive because there is an incentive for manufacturers to 
price products to be just cost-effective and, in doing so, they appropriate any other NHS resource 
savings offered by an effective technology in higher prices.  Of course, the entry of generics tends to 
reduce prices and open the possibility of cost savings.  However, there is also an incentive to launch 
new branded products before patent expiry and price them such that 0hc .  Although there may 
be exceptions, across the technologies offered to the NHS the health care costs will generally be 
positive.  This expectation is borne out over the last 10 years of NICE Technology Appraisals.   
Therefore, a series of apparently marginal changes in health care costs will tend to be in the same 
direction so will ultimately have non marginal effects. 
 
It seems reasonable then to assume that effects on the wider economy will be marginal (i.e., that any 
net consumption costs imposed on the economy will not reduce the consumption value of health and 
that net consumption benefits will not increase it), or at least µPRUHPDUJinDO¶ than the costs which fall 
on the health care budget.  Throughout the following section it is assumed for ease of exposition that 
consumption costs and benefits will be marginal with respect to the economy ( v  is constant) but that 
health care costs or savings may have non marginal effects ( *k k  if 0hc  and *k k  if 
0hc ).  As well as being a reasonable simplifying assumption the insights are generalisable as 
long as the effects on the wider economy tend to be µmore marginal¶ than those on the health care 
system. 
 
The general case with full information ( *k is known) 
 
The allocation decision can be expressed in terms of net health benefit in a very similar way to the 
marginal changes described in (5) above:   
 
*
0h cc ch
k v
    (12) 
 
As previously, the decision can be described as a comparison of the net health gained in the health 
sector (1st term) with the health equivalent of the net consumption costs falling on the wider economy 
(2nd term).  If the former exceed the latter then the technology should be adopted.  The difference is 
that the additional costs falling on the budget ( 0hc ) displace not just the marginal NHS activities 
but other more productive activities so that the heath forgone is not given by k  but by *k k . 
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For example, an effective ( 1h ) but more costly ( £19,000hc ) health technology, would, if 
approved, be made available to 10,000 patients.  Therefore, the total costs of approval would be £190 
million falling on the budget constraint.  These additional costs may displace many other productive 
activities so the health forgone will not be given by the original threshold £20,000k but will be 
greater, i.e., a lower threshold of * £18,500k .  Initially assuming that there are no net consumption 
costs or benefits ( 0cc ), then:  
 
*
£19,0001 0.027
£18,500
h cc ch
k v
 
 
The technology should be rejected even though the £19,000ICER  is less than the initial threshold 
of £20,000 because the costs imposed on the budget are non marginal and displace more health ± 
the threshold falls to *k .  Using the decision rule for marginal changes described in (5) above would 
overestimate cost-effectiveness: 
 
£19,0001 0.05
£20,000
h cc ch
k v
 
 
and a technology which should be rejected would be wrongly accepted.   
 
The general case with partial information ( *k is unknown) 
 
The extent to which cost-effectiveness will be overestimated by assuming a change is marginal when 
in fact it is not can be expressed in health terms as the difference between (5) and (12), 
 
*
h hc c
k k
    (13) 
 
This represents the potential bias of basing decisions on an estimate of k  when in fact the change is 
non marginal and requires an estimate of *k .  This bias will always be positive, i.e., cost±
effectiveness will be unambiguously over estimated.  The size of this bias will depend on the total 
health care costs ( hc and the eligible patient population) and how µnon PDUJLQDO¶ WKHVH total costs 
are (the difference between k  and *k ).  Of course, the latter is also related to the former: if hc  
and/or the eligible population is larger, more non marginal activities will be displaced and the 
difference between k  and *k  will tend to be greater.   In circumstances when the technology saves 
health care resources ( 0hc ), and these savings are non marginal with respect to the budget, the 
health that is gained by using saved resources to engage in other activities is not given by k  but by 
*k k .  The bias will also be positive and the cost-effectiveness will be overestimated using the 
marginal decision rule that fails to account for the diminishing productivity of additional activities which 
can be funded, i.e., less health is produced from the resources saved and cost saving treatments will 
appear more desirable than they really are. 
 
This problem of non marginal impacts of hc on the budget arises whether or not there are external 
effects on the wider economy. However, it is important to recognise that when there are external net 
consumption benefits then greater non marginal impacts on the budget are likely (see discussion of 
dynamic effects in Section 3.3), and any particular impact more likely to be wrongly approved if the 
decision rule for marginal changes is used.  This means the consequences of making the wrong 
decision will tend to be greater. For example, if there were net consumption benefits of 
£66,000cc  associated with the technology in the previous example then even if the technology 
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had much greater costs falling on the health care budget ( £40,000hc ) it would still be regarded 
as cost-effective if it was wrongly assumed that these costs are marginal and the original threshold of 
£20,000k was appropriate. 
  
£40,000 £66,0001 0.1
£20,000 £60,000
h cc ch
k v
 
 
However, if this technology was approved and made available to the 10,000 patients the total costs 
falling on the budget would more than double to £400 million, displacing even more productive 
activities.  The appropriate threshold for this significantly greater change will be even lower than 
previously (for example, * £16,000k  rather than £18,500). 
 
*
£40,000 £66,0001 0.4
£16,000 £60,000
h cc ch
k v
 
 
This technology, which appeared cost-effective when the impact was assumed to be marginal, should 
in fact be rejected.  Importantly, taking account of the net consumption benefits while assuming that 
the greater health care costs are marginal leads to a much larger bias (0.5 compared to 0.077) and an 
even worse decision.  In both examples the wrong decision is made but, in this case, the 
consequences of making the wrong decision are greater for the public health ± a loss of 0.4 QALYs 
per patient treated compared to 0.027, or 4,000 QALYs lost for the patient population compared to 
270 previously. 
 
The problem arises from basing decisions on an estimate of k  when in fact the change is non 
marginal and requires an estimate of *k .  The difficulty is that even when the impact on the budget of 
a single decision or a sequence of decisions is known to be non marginal, establishing an appropriate 
estimate of *k  for each decision is not going to be possible.  In principle, establishing an appropriate 
estimate of k  at a particular historic point in time is possible28 and the direction of the change due to 
non marginal impacts is also predictable ( * 0hk k if c ).   However, establishing the magnitude 
of this effect is much more difficult for two reasons: i) the information requirements about the 
performance of the health care system to establish *k  for each hc  and for each decision in a 
sequence is currently not achievableb; and ii) it would require a different cost-effectiveness threshold 
for every decision which would also change over time - it would depend not only on hc  and the 
eligible population but also on where in the sequence the decision happened to fall.  This would offer 
an uncertain, unpredictable and ever-changing target for investment decisions in health technologies.  
Therefore, in the face of the fundamental difficulty posed by the informational requirements, current 
NICE policy can be viewed as establishing a value for k  which is periodically reviewed and revised if 
necessary in the knowledge that it will be an increasingly poor approximation, and where significant 
EXGJHWLPSDFWLVµWDNHQLQWRDFFRXQW¶LQDGHOLEHUDWLYHZD\.  Therefore, although improved estimates of 
k
 and a better understanding of the effect of non marginal budget impacts will be possible, fully 
accounting for every non marginal impact using the decision rule in (12) will remain elusive so it can 
not represent a realistic or feasible policy option.  However, it does provide the appropriate 
benchmark against which to judge the potential biases of those policies which are possible.   
 
This is a familiar and general problem in economics where second best rules (in this case fully 
accounting for non marginal changes in (12)) in a second best world (one of non marginal changes) 
are impossible to formulate due to the informational requirements, but the application of first best 
rules (assuming there are only marginal changes (5)) in a second best world may make matters 
worse.  The task is to find feasible third best rules (approximations) which may perform better in a 
                                                 
b
 Recently commissioned research which exploits national data to estimate the threshold may also provide an indication of the 
effect of non marginal budget impacts.  However, even if such estimates prove to be possible and robust they will necessarily 
be historic the second best decision rule in (12) will remain elusive. 
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second best world.   Therefore, it is worth re-examining the three simple but incomplete decision rules 
considered previously in the context of non marginal changes.  
 
A Ignore effects outside the health sector 
 
This characterisation of current NICE policy can be expressed as a decision rule based on net health 
benefit, given in (1) above and repeated here, 
 
0hch
k
 
 
Any net consumption costs or benefits are ignored and the difference between (1) and (12) is equal to 
the bias of, 
  
*
h h cc c c
k k v
   (14) 
 
Notice that the second term is the same as previously when only marginal changes where considered 
(see (7) above) and reflects that any net consumption effects falling on the wider economy are 
neglected, i.e., if there are net consumption costs ( 0cc ) there will be a positive bias and cost-
effectiveness will be overestimated, but if there are net consumption benefits ( 0cc ), which are not 
accounted for, cost-effectiveness will be underestimated (the bias is negative).  The first term is the 
same as (13) and represents the effect of failing to account for the non marginal effect of health care 
costs, i.e., there will be an unambiguous positive bias in favour of the technology as the decision fails 
to take account of the additional forgone health as more productive non marginal activities are 
displaced.  Therefore, there are two sources of bias which work in the same direction (positive bias) 
when there are net consumption costs, but tend to offset each other when there are net consumption 
benefits. 
 
Net consumption costs ( 0cc ) 
 
When there are net consumption costs falling on the wider economy and also positive costs falling on 
the health care system, both sources of bias work in the same direction leading to an unambiguous 
positive bias.  For example, if 1h , £60,000cc and the additional health care costs of 
£20,000hc  imply a non marginal change so that  a lower threshold of 
* £16,000k
 would be 
appropriate rather than the original threshold £20,000k , then, 
 
*
£20,000 £60,0001 1.25
£16,000 £60,000
h cc ch
k v
 
 
The technology should be rejected when the additional wider costs and the lower threshold due to 
non marginal effects have been taken into account. The simple decision rule which ignores both will 
overestimate cost-effectiveness, 
  
£20,0001 0
£20,000
hch
k
 
 
In this case the technology may be wrongly accepted (the ICER k  and it wrongly appears just 
acceptable).  
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Net consumption benefits ( 0cc ) 
 
When there are net consumption benefits accruing to the wider economy both sources of bias work in 
the opposite direction and tend to off set each other.  For example if £15,000cc  rather than 
£60,000 above, 
 
 
*
£20,000 £15,0001 0
£16,000 £60,000
h cc ch
k v
 
 
 
The technology would be just acceptable: the health and the health equivalent of consumption 
expected to be gained is just offset by the health forgone.  The simple decision rule leads to the same 
assessment of cost-effectiveness, 
 
£20,0001 0
£20,000
hch
k
 
 
So, in this example, there is no net bias.  The negative bias from ignoring wider benefits c
c
v
 is 
just offset by the positive bias of failing to account for displacing more productive non marginal 
activities
*
h hc c
k k
.  Therefore, when there are net consumption benefits combined with non 
marginal health care costs, this simple decision rule may under or overestimate cost-effectiveness 
depending on the relative effect of these two sources of bias.  Clearly, it is more likely to overestimate 
cost-effectiveness if total health care costs are greater (a larger population and/or greater hc ) but 
less likely if consumption benefits are greater. 
 
B Treat net consumption costs as if they fall on the budget constraint 
 
This represents the rather naive view that all costs should be included but decisions should still be 
based on comparing the resulting ICER with the current threshold which can be expressed in terms of 
net health benefit given in (8) above and repeated here, 
  
0h cc ch
k
 
 
 
 
The difference between (8) and (12) is equal to a bias of, 
 
*
h h c cc c c c
k k v k
  (15) 
 
Notice again that the second term is the same as previously when only marginal changes where 
considered (see (8) above). Given that v k  there is a negative bias against the technology when 
0cc because it wrongly assumes that wider costs displace health (at a rate of k ) when in fact 
they only displace consumption (valued at 1
v
), i.e.,  the importance of net consumption costs are 
overestimated.  When 0cc  there is a positive bias in favour of the technology because wider cost 
savings are wrongly treated as if they accrue to the NHS and can be used to generate health at 
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rate k , i.e., the importance of consumption benefits are overestimated.  Again, the first term is the 
same as (13) and represents the effect of failing to account for the non marginal effect of health care 
costs, and offers an unambiguous positive bias in favour of the technology if total health care costs or 
cost savings are non marginal.  Therefore, there are two sources of bias which tend to offset each 
other when there are net consumption costs but work in the same direction (a positive bias) when 
there are net consumption benefits. 
 
Net consumption costs ( 0cc ) 
 
When there are net consumption costs falling on the wider economy and also positive costs falling on 
the health care system, both sources of bias work in the opposite direction and tend to offset each 
other.  For example, if 1h , £6,000cc , and the additional health care costs of 
£12,000hc  imply a non marginal change so that  a lower threshold of 
* £16,000k  rather 
than £20,000k would be appropriate, then, 
 
*
£12,000 £6,0001 0.15
£16,000 £60,000
h cc ch
k v
 
 
The technology should be accepted when the net consumption costs and the lower threshold due to 
non marginal effects have been taken into account. The simple decision rule which over values 
cc but under values hc leads to a similar assessment of cost-effectiveness, 
 
£12,000 £6,0001 0.1
£20,000
h cc ch
k
 
 
The same decision to accept the technology would be made because, in this case, the negative bias 
from imagining that cc displaces health offsets the positive bias of failing to account for hc  
displacing more productive non marginal activities.   
 
Net consumption benefits ( 0cc ) 
 
When there are net consumption benefits accruing to the wider economy both sources of bias work in 
the same positive direction.  For example if £6,000cc  and £18,000hc  then, 
 
*
£20,000 £6,0001 0.15
£16,000 £60,000
h cc ch
k v
 
 
and the technology should be rejected.  However, using the simple decision rule in (8) which 
overvalues the consumption benefits and under values health care costs, 
 
£20,000 £6,0001 0.7
£20,000
h cc ch
k
 
 
cost-effectiveness is seriously overestimated and the technology would be wrongly approved.  
 
C  Ignore the budget constraint   
 
This represents the greater part of literature on evaluation outside health where the fact of exogenous 
constraints and the implication for opportunity costs are rarely acknowledged. It can be described as 
comparing the ICER, which includes all costs falling on all sectors, with a social consumption value of 
health which can be expressed in terms of net health benefit given in (10) above and repeated here:  
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0h cc ch
v
 
 
The difference between (10) and (12) is equal to a bias of: 
 
*
h hc c
k v
   (16) 
 
This appears to be very similar to the bias associated with marginal changes (see (11) in 2.2) which 
showed that the bias depends only on the value of hc , not cc .    In fact, the only difference is the 
denominator of the first term which is now *k  rather than k .  Given that v k ,  the bias will always 
be positive for technologies with positive incremental NHS costs ( 0hc ).  However, this bias will 
be greater if total costs are greater (more non marginal) because  *k  will tend to be lower (more 
health is forgone).  Therefore, the effects of failing to recognise both the health opportunity cost of 
0hc  and the non marginal nature of such costs will work in the same direction (a larger positive 
bias).  Using the same example as in Section 2.2, where £30,000cc  but £60,000hc  is 
non marginal so * £16,000k  is needed rather than £20,000k , the true net health benefit would 
be: 
 
£60,000 £30,0001 2.25
£16,000 £60,000
h cc ch
k v
 
 
and the technology should be rejected. However, the net health benefit will be overestimated if the 
simple decision rule in (10) is used, 
 
£60,000 £30,0001 0.5
£60,000
h vc ch
v
 
 
and a technology which should be rejected would be approved.  The positive bias when the change is 
non marginal is greater than when the same change is regarded as marginal in 2.2 (a bias of 2.75 
compared to 2). 
 
If a technology saves NHS resources ( 0hc ), the bias will be negative because (10) fails to 
account for the health that could be generated from the additional NHS activities.  If these cost 
savings are non marginal then *k k  because the productivity of additional activities will tend to 
decline.  Therefore, the effects of failing to recognise the health gained from costs savings will be 
somewhat off set by failing to recognise the effects of a non marginal saving.  The net bias will be 
unambiguously negative but less so than assuming the change was marginal (as in 2.2 above). 
 
Summary of potential biases 
 
The non marginal decision rule in (12) does not represent a realistic or feasible policy option due to 
informational requirements which are very unlikely to be achieved.  However, it does provide the 
appropriate benchmark against which to judge the potential biases of those policies which are 
possible.  The task is to find feasible third best rules (approximations) which may perform better in a 
second best world (where changes are ultimately non marginal). In particular, it is important to ask 
whether the use of a first best rule (assuming changes are marginal (5)) in a second best world may 
make matters worse.     
 
When changes are non marginal and no transfers are possible, all the decision rules which 
characterise a number of possible policy options (third best rules) create biases in different ways to 
when changes were regarded as marginal (see Table III in Section 2.2). The direction of bias and the 
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potential for false positive (FP) of false negative (FN) decisions is summarised in Table IV which also 
includes the bias and potential error associated with using the decision rule for marginal changes (5) 
when they are non marginal. 
 
Table IV Bias and potential for decision error (non marginal changes)   
  
A few things are apparent:   
 
i)  Regarding changes as marginal when they are not, always leads to a positive bias and 
increases the danger of false positive decisions unless the decision is fully dominated (e.g., 
the technology is more effective, cost saving to the NHS and offers net consumption 
benefits).   
ii)  The effect of this additional positive bias (even if budgets are regarded as optimal) is to 
accentuate any positive bias associated with marginal changes (see Table III). It also means 
that ignoring wider effects when these are wider benefits but treating any external costs as if 
they fall on the budget might offset the positive bias associated with non marginal changes 
leading to a less biased assessment of cost-effectiveness in some circumstances.  The 
pattern of bias from ignoring the constraint remains as before but any positive bias will be 
greater and any negative bias will tend to be less.   
iii)  Overall, once the non marginal nature of a single decision or a sequence of decisions is 
acknowledged, it becomes apparent that there is generally an increased risk of making false 
positive decisions ± accepting a technology that should be rejected.  
 
No single policy is necessarily unbiased in any of the possible circumstances described in Table IV 
(even if the budget is regarded as optimal).  However, it maybe that some are less biased than others. 
The bias associated with each is summarised in Table V. 
 
Table V.  Bias associated with decision rules 
 Size of bias 
A. Ignore wider costs 
*
h h cc c c
k k v
 
B. Costs on budget 
*
h h c cc c c c
k k v k
 
C. Ignore constraint 
*
h hc c
k v
 
D. Marginal rule (5) 
*
h hc c
k k
 
 
 
Type of Technology 
A. Ignore wider 
costs 
B. Costs on 
budget 
C. Ignore constraint  D. Marginal rule (5) 
Bias Decision Bias Decision Bias Decision Bias Decision 
 
More effective 
        
Net consumption costs          
Positive costs (NHS) + FP -/+ FN/FP + FP + FP 
Cost saving (NHS) + FP -/+ FN/FP - FN + FP 
Net consumption  benefits          
Positive costs (NHS) -/+ FN/FP + FP + FP + FP 
Cost saving (NHS) -/+ D + D - D + D 
Less effective 
        
Net consumption costs          
Positive costs (NHS) + D -/+ D + D + D 
Cost saving (NHS) + FP -/+ FN/FP - FN + FP 
Net consumption  benefits          
Positive costs (NHS) -/+ FN/FP + FP + FP + FP 
Cost saving (NHS) 
 
-/+ FN/FP + FP - FN + FP 
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Assuming that v k , some general statements can be made about which decision rules are likely to 
be least biased across a range of possible circumstances and which never perform better than others 
and may be disregarded.  The relative ranking of biases are summarised in Table VI. 
 
Table VI.  Extent of bias associated with decision rules 
Type of Technology  Ranking of extent of bias 
   
More effective 0h   
Net consumption costs  0cc   
Positive costs (NHS) 0hc  D A, D B , D C and A B  
Cost saving (NHS) 0hc  D A, D B , D C  and A B  
Net consumption  benefits  0cc   
Positive costs (NHS) 0hc  D A , D B , D C  and A B  
Cost saving (NHS) 0hc  D A , D B , D C  and A B  
Less effective 0h
 
 
Net consumption costs  0cc   
Positive costs (NHS) 0hc  D A, D B , D C and A B  
Cost saving (NHS) 0hc  D A, D B , D C  and A B  
Net consumption  benefits  0cc   
Positive costs (NHS) 0hc  D A , D B , D C  and A C  
Cost saving (NHS) 0hc  D A , D B , D C  and A C  
 
These rankings assume that the difference between v  and k  is not trivial ( 2v k ) and this 
difference is more significant than the impact of non marginal changes, i.e.,  
* *
2 k k
v k
.  The 
ranking in parentheses indicates that they are more likely to hold when consumption cost or benefits 
are relatively large, health care costs relatively small and the non marginal impact on the budget is 
more limited (smaller difference between k  and *k ). If these additional conditions do not hold (the 
non marginal impact is large relative to external effects) the ranking in parentheses will be reversed 
(see Appendix A for details of the conditions).  
 
Although no single decision rule is unbiased or dominates all others it is possible to draw some 
general conclusions from the ranking of bias reported in Table IV:  
i)  Ignoring the budget constraint (policy C) is dominated because the marginal decision rule 
(policy D) always offers less potential bias in each possible circumstance. 
ii)  Whether or not the technology is more or less effective or has positive or negative NHS 
costs does not affect the extent of bias associated with any of the possible decision rules. 
iii)  If net consumption effects are expected to be large relative to health care costs and their 
non marginal impact, then the 1st best marginal rule (policy D) may offer the least bias when 
there are net consumption costs (D<A and (D<B)) and when there are net consumption 
benefits ((D<A) and D<B).  
 iv)  However, if these conditions do not hold, so that health care costs and their non marginal 
impact are large relative to net consumption effects, then a combination of policies would 
minimise the potential bias, i.e., when there are net consumption costs policy B would be 
least biased (D<A but now B<D) but when there are net consumption benefits policy A 
would be least biased (in these circumstances A<D and D<B).  
 
Therefore, a combination of policy options might minimise the potential for bias: i.e.,  a marginal first 
best rule (policy D) when non marginal effects are believed to be relatively small but combination of 
third best rules (policy A and B) when they are not.  
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Interestingly, policy D - applying decision rules as if changes are marginal - can be viewed as a 
formalisation of the previous policy of taking net consumption costs or benefits µLQWRDFFRXQW¶LHWKH\
are not given  the same weight as costs falling on the NHS budget (policy B) but neither were they 
given zero weight and ignored (policy A).  This decision rule (see (5) and (6)) simply formalises this 
process by giving a weight of k
v
 to net consumption costs and benefits.  However, it should be 
noted that the application of this formal decision rule to a sequence of decisions will always 
overestimate cost-effectiveness and will run the increasing risk of false positive decisions, particularly 
for technologies that have large total cost implications relative to the budget, and especially when 
these are being offset by claims of net consumption benefits in the wider economy.   
 
It is possible to recognise the bias associated with non marginal effects by applying other decision 
rules when the impact is believed to be large relative to the external effects.  For example, when a 
technology offers net consumption benefits it might be better to ignore the wider benefits because the 
negative bias from ignoring the benefits will tend to offset the positive bias from the non marginal 
effect.  Equally, if the technology imposes wider costs, then it might be better to treat these costs as if 
they fall on the NHS budget because the negative bias from treating the wider costs as if they fall on 
the NHS will tend to offset the positive bias from the non marginal effects. Such a policy would be 
more stringent than the current NICE policy of ignoring the costs as well as benefits outside the health 
care system.  Nevertheless there would still remain a possibility that cost-effectiveness will be 
overestimated and false positive decisions will be made. However, this combination of policies would 
mitigate the dangers of non marginal impacts on the NHS.  Their implementation by NICE and the 
criteria for when each should be applied would require some knowledge of the likely impact of non 
marginal changes on the NHS, i.e., how the cost-effectiveness threshold changes with budget impact.  
Of course, this combination of polices does not overcome other difficulties, including: the explicit 
specification of a welfare function with potential conflicts with other social objectives; the likely 
dynamic effects; and the difficulty of adequately estimating displaced consumption benefits (see 
Chapter 3). 
 
The difficulties associated with non marginal changes only arise when transfers are not made 
between the wider economy and the health care system.  Although the implementation of transfers 
would effectively hand decisions about public expenditure on health over to a body such as NICE, 
which only has a remit to making decisions about health technologies within existing budget 
constraints, it is important to consider the opportunity costs of failing to allow such transfers to take 
place, how in principle the transfers required could be identified, and how the transfers could be made 
both within the public sector (between budget constrained sectors) and between the public sector and 
the wider economy.  The following section explores these issues before Section 3 draws together the 
implications for policy and the question of value and fact on which alternative policies rest. 
 
 
2.4 Transfers between sectors  
 
A health technology may offer consumption benefits or impose consumption costs on the wider 
economy.  It may also impose costs or offer benefits to other budget constrained public sectors.  
Without the possibility of transfers, which would internalise these external costs and benefits, a 
technology which is not cost-effective from the perspective of the health care systems may be 
rejected despite offering significant benefits to other public and private sectors.   However, transfers 
between public sectors and the wider economy might not be regarded as a feasible policy option for 
two reasons: i) it would, in part at least,  transfer responsibility for public expenditure and its allocation 
to those bodies which make decisions about health technologies; and ii) establishing and 
implementing transfers associated with each technology may have substantial transactions costs.  
Nevertheless, it is instructive to consider how, in principle, the value of transfers could be identified 
and what the opportunity costs of failing to make transfers would be in a range of circumstances.  
These include situations when decisions are regarded as marginal or non marginal, and when 
transfers can be made between a single budget constrained sector and the wider economy or when 
there are a number of budget constrained sectors.   
 
Any transfers between sectors would need to be made in money terms.  Therefore, the net effects of 
a technology can be expressed in money terms as the net consumption value (see (4) in Section 2.1).  
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A technology should be accepted if the net health benefits to the health care system (the term in 
brackets), which are valued at the consumption value of health ( v ), exceed the net consumption 
effects on the wider economy ( cc ): 
 
. 0h c
c
v h c
k
  (4) 
 
Decisions based only on the perspective of the health care system (ignoring any effects outside the 
health care system (see Policy A and (1) in Section 2.1) would be to accept the technology if the net 
health benefits (term in brackets) are positive. 
 
When would transfers be useful? 
 
Decisions based on (4) or (1) would be equivalent and transfers would not be necessary if: i) net 
health benefits are positive and there are also consumption benefits or ii) if net health benefits are 
negative and there are consumption costs. However, transfers might be required if net health benefits 
are negative but the technology offers consumption benefits, or if net health benefits are positive but it 
imposes net consumption costs on the wider economy. In each case we consider i) what transfer 
would be necessary and ii) whether such a transfer would be socially desirable. 
 
Net consumption benefits ( 0cc ) 
 
If net health benefits are negative the technology may be accepted if the consumption benefits 
( 0cc ) to the wider economy are greater than the consumption value of the net health benefits 
forgone.  For example, if 1h , £30,000hc and £60,000cc then: 
 
£30,000
. , £60,000 1 £30,000 £60,000
£20,000
h
c
c
v h c
k
 
   
The consumption benefits exceed the consumption value of net health benefits forgone and the 
technology offers a net consumption value of £30,000 per patient.   However, such a technology 
would be rejected from a health care system perspective (net health benefit = -0.5). The question is 
how much transfer (T) of the consumption benefit from the wider economy would need to be made so 
that the technology would be regarded as just cost-effective from the perspective of the health care 
system, i.e., so the net health benefits, including the transfer, are at least zero: 
 
0hc Th
k k
   (17) 
 
Therefore, the minimum transfer required from the wider economy to the health care system would 
need to be:  
 
£30,000
, £20,000 1 £10,000
£20,000
hcT k h T
k
 
 
The transfer must be at least equal to the resources required within the health care system to 
generate enough health elsewhere to just offset the net health benefits that will be forgone as a 
consequences of adopting the technology.   
 
Therefore, transfers can be regarded as a form of compensation test.    The technology would pass 
the compensation test if the wider economy could compensate the health care system for the loss of 
net health benefit (by making transfer T) but still provide net consumption benefits once the transfer is 
made:   
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, £60,000 £10,000hc
c
c T k h T
k
 
 
In this example the minimum compensation required by the health care system is £10,000 which is 
less than the consumption benefits ( cc ) so the technology should be approved.  The opportunity 
costs of failing to internalise the external effects through transfers is the net consumption value (4) 
forgone by failing to approve the technology, which in this example is £30,000. 
 
Of course implementing transfers is likely to impose additional costs because: i) there will be some 
transaction costs in identifying and making transfers; and ii) there may be efficiency losses in raising 
the resource from the private sector to make the transfer (e.g., through acceptable forms of taxation).  
The wider economy will now need to transfer T to the health care system but, in addition, bear the 
efficiency losses associated with raising the resources and making the transfer.  However, transfers 
even with efficiency losses might be regarded as socially desirable over decisions based only on a 
health care system perspective.  In this example above, substantial transactions costs (up to £30,000 
per patient) could be worth while if the alternative is a decision based only on the health care system 
perspective.   
 
Net consumption costs ( 0cc ) 
 
If net health benefits are positive but the technology imposes consumption costs ( 0cc ) on the 
wider economy, the technology would still be acceptable if the consumption value of the net health 
benefits gained exceed the consumption costs.  For example, if 1h , £10,000hc and 
£5,000cc then: 
 
£10,000
. , £60,000 1 £30,000 £5,000
£20,000
h
c
c
v h c
k
 
   
and the consumption value of the net health benefits exceeds the consumption costs. The overall net 
consumption value (4) is £25,000.   It is possible to ask whether the health care system could make a 
transfer (T) to the wider economy to compensate for the costs imposed ( cT c ) while still regarding 
the technology as cost-effective once the transfer is made., i.e., so the net health benefits including 
the transfer are at least zero; 
 
0hc Th
k k
   (18) 
 
Therefore, the maximum compensation the health care system could offer would be;  
 
. , £20,000 £10,000 £10,000hT k h c T  
and the minimum compensation required by the wider economy would be £5,000cT c ; so, in 
this example, the health care system could in principle compensate the wider economy.  However, it 
is very important to note that actually paying this compensation would reduce overall net consumption 
value because resources devoted to health are more valuable than that same resources devoted to 
consumption ( k v ).  In this example, if the minimum transfer of £5,000 was actually made the net 
consumption value would be: 
 
£10,000 £5,000
. £60,000 1 0 £15,000
£20,000 £20,000
h
c
c T
v h c
k k
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rather than £25,000 by accepting the technology without making transfers.  Therefore, transfers from 
a budget constrained health sector to the wider economy when k v  would not be socially efficient. 
For this reason it is possible that the maximum compensation the health care system could offer may 
be less than the minimum required by the wider economy even when the overall net consumption 
value is positive and the technology should be accepted.  Therefore, it is only transfers from the wider 
economy to the health care system that need to be considered and only when a technology does not 
appear cost-effective from a health care system perspective but also offers consumption benefits.   
 
Non marginal changes 
 
The examples above have considered only marginal changes.  If the compensation was paid for each 
apparently marginal change there would be two advantages: i) the external effects would be 
internalised in decisions made from the perspective of the health care system; and ii) a sequence of 
marginal changes would not have longer run non marginal impacts because the health care system 
would be compensated for accepting technologies which did not appear cost-effective but did offer 
external benefits.  However, transfers can also be used to compensate for the non marginal effect of 
single decisions.  This would require knowledge of *k  (the cost-effectiveness threshold following a 
non marginal change, see Section 2.3). 
 
The transfer required would need to provide sufficient resources to generate enough health elsewhere 
to just offset the net health benefits that will be forgone as a consequence of the non marginal impact 
of the technology, so the net health benefit including the health that can be produced from the transfer 
will be zero: 
   
* '
0hc Th
k k
 
 
The minimum transfer required to compensate the health care system for a non marginal change 
would be:  
 
'
*
hcT k h
k
 
 
Where 'k represents the productivity of any transfer made.  If the technology had no health effects 
( 0h ) then the transfer would need to be sufficient to reinstate all the treatments displaced by the 
technology to achieve the same level of health outcomes ( 'k k ).  If the technology offered some 
health benefits ( 0h ) then the transfer would not need to reinstate all displaced activities but only 
the most productive ones ( 'k k ).  If the technology reduced health outcome ( 0h ) then the 
transfer would have to be sufficient to reinstate all displaced activities and allow other less productive 
ones to be introduced ( 'k k ) to achieve the same overall health outcomes.  The implications are 
that the transfers needed to compensate for a non marginal change will always be greater than a 
similar marginal change (because *k k ) and will tend to be even greater when the  technology 
does not offer health benefits (because 'k k ). 
 
Other budget constrained sectors 
 
The same principles of transfers or compensation can be used to consider the impact of decisions in 
heath care on other budget constrained public sectors.  For example, decisions in the health care 
sector may have an impact on educational outcomes and costs falling on a fixed education budget.  If 
the objectives of collectively funded education can be summarised in a measure of educational 
outcome ( e ) and a threshold for the education sector ( y ) can be specified which represents the 
marginal productivity of the education budget, then the effect on education can be described as net 
educational benefit,  
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0ece
y
     (19) 
 
The overall net consumption value of a technology which has impacts on the health and education 
sectors as well as the wider economy can be represented given a consumption value of educational 
outcome (z).  The technology should be accepted if the impact on overall net consumption value 
across all sectors is positive: 
 
. . 0h e c
c c
v h z e c
k y
 (20) 
   
To simplify matters consider a situation where ( 0cc ) so the effects on the wider economy can be 
disregarded.  Transfers between health and education would not need to be considered if the net 
health and net educational benefits were both negative (the technology should be rejected from both 
perspectives), or where they are both positive (the technology would be accepted from both 
perspectives).  However, if there are negative net health benefits but positive net educational benefits, 
then the health sector will require compensation from education.  The minimum transfer from 
education to health would provide just enough resources to offset the net health benefit forgone, 
 
0,h hc cTh T k h
k k k
 (21) 
 
The maximum compensation that education sector could offer health would be the amount of 
resource that could be transferred without reducing net educational benefit, 
 
0,e ec cTe T y e
y y y
  (22) 
 
Therefore, a transfer which would make the technology acceptable would be, 
 
 
e hc cy e T k h
y k
  (23) 
 
Such a transfer will be possible if the positive net education benefits valued at y  exceed the net 
health benefits valued at k , i.e.,  
 
0e hc cy e k h
y k
  (24) 
 
Therefore, the value of transfers needed between sectors and whether such transfers are possible is 
straightforward ± as long as the net benefit gained in one sector exceeds the net benefit lost in 
another (valued at their respective thresholds) then compensation is possible, transfers can be made 
and the technology should be approved.  If k  and y  are regarded as the socially legitimate 
expression of the value society places on improvements in health and education delivered by 
collectively funded health care and education services, then this assessment of net benefit in each 
sector and the possibility of compensation is all that is required to establish whether the technology 
should be approved.  
 
However, if some social welfare function is used as the basis of social choice then whether or not 
such transfers improve the overall welfare (the consumption value of outcomes across sectors) 
depends on the consumption value of health and educational outcomes (the value of v  and z ) 
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relative to the productivity of the health and education sectors ( k  and y ).  For example, if the 
HGXFDWLRQ VHFWRU ZDV UHJDUGHG DV UHODWLYHO\ PRUH µXQGHUIXQGHG¶ WKDQ KHDOWK  z y v k ) then the 
same resources devoted to education would produce more valuable outcomes (in terms of 
consumption) than transferring those resources to the health sector.  In these circumstances, making 
a transfer from education to health may not be desirable because it would reduce the overall 
consumption value of outcomes across both sectors.  Equally, if health was regarded as relatively 
PRUHµXQGHUIXQGHG¶WKDQHGXFDWLRQ z y v k ) then transfers from health to education should not be 
considered if it is possible to implement the technology without making transfers.   
 
In general, the implications are that transfers between budget constrained sectors need only be 
considered in specific circumstances: i) the sector specific net benefits have different signs; ii) that the 
sum of the net benefits across sectors when valued at the marginal productivity of their budgets (their 
respective thresholds) is positive; and iii) if choice is to be based on some implied or explicit social 
welfare function transfers should only be considered from a sector which is judged to be less 
µXQGHUIXQGHG¶  2I FRXUVH LI PDNLQJ WUDQVIHUV EHWZHHQ VHFWRUV is the only way to implement a 
EHQHILFLDO WHFKQRORJ\ ZLWK FURVV VHFWRUDO HIIHFWV WKHQ WUDQVIHUV IURP D PRUH WR OHVV µXQGHUIXQGHG¶
sector might still be worth while as the alternative of failing to approve the technology might provide 
even less overall net consumption value. It should be noted that if the respective thresholds are 
regarded as a revealed and legitimate expression of the value society places on sector specific 
outcomes (see Section 3), WKHUHLVQRTXHVWLRQRIZKHWKHUHDFKVHFWRULVµXQGHUIXQGHG¶ZLWKUHVSHFWWR
some alternate social welfare function.  All that is required is an assessment of net benefit in each 
sector (valued at the respective threshold) to establish whether compensation could be paid and 
whether the technology should be approved.  If implementing a policy of transfers associated with 
each technology is not regarded as feasible recording the net transfers or compensation required 
between different public sectors and the wider economy during a budgetary period could usefully 
inform subsequent reviews of public expenditure and its allocation.    
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3. Implications for policy 
 
Although previous sections have formally considered in some detail the performance of a range of 
possible policies, it should be clear that the question of what is the appropriate perspective for 
decisions in health care made by a body like NICE is not simply a technical one but also poses 
fundamental questions of social value. These questions determine what wider effects should be 
measured, how they should be valued and whether these can be incorporated into decisions within 
the health sector in a formal and codified way.  What perspective ought to be adopted and how it 
should be implemented turns on both the questions of value and the empirical questions of fact that 
follow.  In considering such policy choices it is important to be aware of some of the possible wider 
and longer run implications.   
 
 
3.1 Questions of value? 
 
To formally take effects outside the health care sector into account when making decisions within the 
health sector some means to value health gained and forgone within the health sector relative to 
costs and benefits falling on the wider economy is necessarily required.  The rates at which society is 
willing to trade social arguments including health and consumption is commonly described as a social 
welfare function.  A key question is whether it is possible or desirable to specify such a description of 
all possible social states which will have implications for decisions across all sectors not just health.  
Even if there is generally no broad consensus or obvious social legitimacy for any particular specified 
or implied welfare function and the consumption value of health derived from it, the trade-offs will still 
need to be made.  However, if a complete and legitimate specification of all social arguments is 
impossible, then attempts to formalise these trade-offs might be undesirable because the 
prescriptions may well conflict with other legitimate arguments and objectives of social policy, which 
may lead to undesirable and socially divisive changes to the health care system.  In these 
circumstances a more deliberative approach might be regarded as more appropriate. 
 
A formal prescription 
 
The formal analysis in previous sections has taken a simple characterisation of social welfare which is 
implied by specifying a consumption value of health (v).  Even if a particular consumption value of 
health could be agreed, the welfare function it presupposes is unlikely to capture everything of social 
value.  Among other things it implies that health and consumption are the only arguments of social 
value, or that they are separable from other arguments (e.g., education, equity, social solidarity, etc) 
in some more complete description of social welfare. 
 
As discussed earlier, welfare economics has traditionally taken a particular view of social welfare that 
rests entirely on individual preferences revealed through choices that individuals make especially in 
markets.30 This has a number of implications for what effects count and should be measured and how 
they should be valued.  In particular, market prices, including returns in the labour market, represent 
social values.  If a market is distorted then observed markets prices can be adjusted (shadow priced) 
as if the market was competitive.  In the absence of a direct market (e.g. health) to observe revealed 
preferences, values can be informed from implicit trade-offs individuals made in other indirect markets 
or preferences expressed in hypothetical choices (e.g., contingent valuation and discrete choice 
experiments).  The implications are that i) the consumption value of health should be based on 
individual willingness to pay, i.e.,  individuals will have a different v  depending on their income and 
other characteristics; ii) that any external effects should be valued at market (or shadow) prices 
including the value of time and labour market participation, i.e., returning patients to low wage labour 
is less socially valuable than to high wage labour; iii) all future related and unrelated costs should be 
accounted for; and iv) that any change in transfers (e.g., benefit payments) that occur simply cancel 
out because they represent no net social cost, except for any welfare loss due to taxation.  It is 
implicitly accepted that the existing distribution of income is, if not µoptimal¶, then at least acceptable, 
possibly because it is viewed as the result of individual choices about investment in human capital 
and participation in the labour market.    
 
This approach and the type of social welfare function it implies has often been modified by other 
social arguments.  Most importantly by assigning some other societal value to some arguments such 
as health, e.g., using average rather than individual consumption values. Similarly average social 
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values of time and participation in the labour market rather than individual returns are also proposed.  
However, these ad hoc modifications imply some alternative µRSWLPDO¶GLVWULEXWLRQRILQFRPHZKLFK, if 
made explicit and applied consistently, would require the adjustment of all values in all markets not 
just for health and other selected arguments.  Also transfers between individuals (e.g., benefits 
payments as well as transfers from consumer to producer surplus) would no longer cancel.46   In fact, 
if other means of achieving the implied optimal distribution of income are not possible then project 
selection itself can be used to move the distribution closer to what is regarded as optimal.  In these 
circumstances additional weights would need to be specified and applied to all valuations.46  
 
Some implications  
The full formalisation of these trade-offs becomes very difficult because it poses fundamental 
questions about social value which have implications for all social choice and public policy, not simply 
health.  The difficulty is identifying a particular welfare function and desired distribution of income 
which captures all social arguments and their interactions, and carries some broad consensus and 
social legitimacy.  Even if such a welfare function could be identified a number of other problems 
remain: 
 
i)  Even if all arguments were separable in social preferences (e.g., the value of a change in 
health is independent of a change in education), these arguments tend not be separable in 
production. There are important relationships and feedbacks in the production of health, 
education and economic growth which means that evaluating policies as if health can be 
smoothly traded with education and consumptions is potentially misleading, i.e., the 
production possibilities surface is not smooth and may not allow simple predicable trade±
offs even at the margin.47 
ii)   The fact that budgets must be regarded as fixed means that the opportunity costs of costs 
falling on the budget constraint must be fully accounted for.  This requires estimates of an 
appropriate threshold ( k ) (see (4) Section 2.1).  Analysis of policy C in Sections 2.2 and 2.3 
demonstrates that it is not appropriate to apply traditional welfarist cost-benefit analysis with 
a broad perspective based in individual preference while ignoring the opportunity costs 
imposed by the budget constraint. 
iii) Adopting a particular welfare function as a basis of social choice implies a particular 
interpretation of vand k .  According to this interpretation, it is valone which expresses 
social value.  The budget constraint is simply a nuisance and the value of k it implies has no 
normative content whatsoever.  Observing k v  is an inefficiency which prevents the 
maximisation of (this particular definition of) social welfare by either allowing transfers or 
expanding the budget to the point where k v .   
iv)  The informational requirements to fully account for marginal changes means that a µVHFRQG
EHVW¶SROLF\VHHLQSection 2.2) which fully accounts for non marginal effects is unlikely 
to be possible.  Therefore, a judgement would be required as to whether the non marginal 
effects are likely to be small relative to the external effects.  If they are then decisions might 
be based on a first best rule (see (5)), where net consumption costs are taken into account 
as if the change was marginal.  If the change (or series of changes) were judged to imply 
large non marginal changes for the health care system relative to the external effects, then 
any consumption benefits could be set aside but any consumption costs regarded as if they 
fall on the budget constraint (see Section 2.3). 
v)  There are other critical considerations, most importantly the net consumption costs or 
benefits which might be displaced by the new technology as well dynamic effects and other 
social considerations which are discussed in Section 3.3.  
 
A deliberative approach 
 
An alternative role for economic analysis is more modest, claiming to inform social decisions in health 
rather than to prescribe them - providing a useful starting point for deliberations, rather than making 
claims about social welfare or the optimality or otherwise of budget constraints. It is this role that CEA 
has tended to play in decisions about health technologies. Bodies such as NICE in the UK can be 
regarded as the agents of a socially legitimate higher authority which is unable to express an explicit 
and coherent social welfare function. In these circumstances the agent (NICE) cannot be asked to 
improve social welfare, since it cannot be specified. Rather, explicit resources are allocated by the 
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authority and are accompanied by a set of explicit and specific objectives (e.g., to improve health) for 
the agent to employ.  
Health is implicitly traded with other aspects of social value, including consumption when a socially 
legitimate higher authority sets the budget for health care. The implications of this process (i.e., the 
shadow prices of the constraints imposed by the higher authority) are a partial social expression of 
some unknown underlying latent welfare function. i.e., an estimate of k  can be taken to represent a 
legitimate but partial expression of how much society wishes to pay for improvements in health 
delivered by collectively funded health care.  
 
If all costs fell on the health care budget and all benefits were in the form of health gains then all the 
agent (NICE) would require would be an estimate of k , h  and hc .  Decisions based only on the 
perspective of the health care system would be complete and appropriate (see (1) in Section 2.1).  
However, once effects outside the health sector are acknowledged then some means to guide 
deliberations about the possible trade-offs is required.  A general principle is to identify where the 
opportunity costs fall and then value them appropriately.  Therefore, insofar as the external effects fall 
on individuals who are free to make choices about their consumption (including whether to invest in 
their health) some knowledge of how individuals value their consumption relative to health is needed   
In this context an estimate of vcan be regarded simply as an expression of how much consumption 
individuals are willing to give up to improve their own health when making individual choices about 
their own consumption, rather than the primary expression of social welfare.  External effects may, in 
part, also fall on other budget constrained sectors (see Section 2.4), or individual preferences may be 
modified by other social arguments.  In which case a range of extra welfarist definitions of v  that 
might not be based on preference at all could be used.   
 
It should be clear that there is no reason to suppose that a social democratic process will deliver 
budget allocations which precisely match individual preferences, i.e., funding the NHS to the point 
where k v .  Aside from empirical observations there are good reasons why k  is likely to be less 
than v , particularly if v  is an average value across a highly skewed distribution of income.  In 
particular: i) social decisions will take into consideration a range of different social arguments many of 
which are not separable from health and consumption and conflict with individual preferences, e.g., 
equity, social solidarity and cohesion; ii) collectively funded health care may be regarded as providing 
a socially acceptable provision while leaving individuals free to make their own consumption choices 
including whether to invest in improving their own health;  iii) the acceptability and inefficiency of 
increasing socially acceptable forms of taxation to expand collectively funded health care to the point 
where k v  may not be desirable even if other social arguments were not in play.  Therefore, 
observing k v  does not imply that budgets are not optimal and the health care system is 
underfunded, but simply that there is a difference between the implied social value of health provided 
by collectively funded health care and the amount of consumption that, on average, individuals are 
willing to give up to improve their own health.  
 
Some implications  
Although this approach is more modest and avoids the problem of specifying a particular welfare 
function, which carries some broad consensus and social legitimacy, the problem of trading net health 
benefits in the health care sector with consumption effects remains. 
i)  Economic analysis no longer provides a prescription for social choice but claims to inform a 
deliberative process by which decisions about health technologies are made. The question 
is what type of analysis and considerations might provide a useful guide to these 
deliberations and add to their transparency and accountability.    
ii)  Some information to inform plausible estimates of a consumption value of health would be 
needed to guide deliberations about the relative weight that might be attached to net 
consumptions costs ( k v ).  Some social value judgments about whether such values 
should be population averages would be required as well as scientific value judgments 
about which methods might provide the most appropriate estimates. 
iii) This approach offers a very different interpretation of v  and k .  Rather than being the only 
expression of social welfare, v is an estimate of how much consumption individuals are 
willing to give up to improve their own health when making individual choices about their 
own consumption.  Rather than being simply a nuisance, k is a partial expression of the 
value society places on health delivered by collectively funded health care.  
46  CHE Research Paper 54 
 
iii)  As above, the informational requirements to fully account for marginal changes means that a 
judgement would be required whether the non marginal effects on the health care system 
are likely to be small relative to the external effects. If they are, then some weight might be 
given to the external effects (see (5) in Section 2.1).   However, if the change (or series of 
changes) were judged to have large non marginal effects on the health care system  relative 
to the external effects, then any consumption benefits could be given less or even zero 
weight but any consumption costs could be given more weight. 
iv)  As previously noted, there are other considerations, most importantly the net consumption 
costs or benefits which might be displaced by the new technology as well dynamic effects 
and other social considerations which are discussed in Section 3.3.  
 
 
3.2 Questions of fact  
 
There are a series of empirical questions posed which ever view is taken of the role of economic 
analysis.  However, the questions of value discussed above do determine what counts and should be 
measured, and who and how they should be valued. Estimating the expected incremental health 
benefits ( h ) and incremental costs ( hc ) of a technology are already provided as part of NICE 
appraisal. However, considering a wider perspective and how that might be implemented poses a 
number of empirical questions and requires additional information which would need to be provided to 
decision makers. 
 
Cost-effectiveness threshold ( k ) 
Which ever view is taken, an estimate of k is required which should represent the health forgone on 
average across the NHS as additional costs displace other NHS activities, i.e., an estimate of the 
marginal productivity of the health care system.  More recent attempts to estimate budgetary 
elasticities tend to support the lower threshold range use by NICE.28  However, more robust estimates 
are possible and importantly some evidence of how k  changes over time as budgets change but also 
as the productively of health care improves.   
 
Is a change non marginal? 
Estimating the impact of non marginal changes by providing precise estimates of *k for each decision 
may not be feasible.  However, some information about the scale of impact on the NHS budget of a 
single decision and information about the cumulative impact of decisions over time would inform 
judgements about whether changes can be safely regarded as marginal or should be treated as 
having non marginal impacts. It is possible that further development of the analysis of national 
Programme Budget data might also provide some guide to the potential impact of non marginal 
changes, i.e. how estimates of k  change with overall budget impact.    
 
Consumption value of health ( )v  
The type of valuation required depends critically on the questions of social value, i.e., individual 
valuations which will be a function of income and other characteristics, or some average valuation or 
valuation at some other µoptimal¶ distribution of income.  In fact a value not based directly on individual 
preference is perfectly possible.  Even if a more deliberative approach is adopted, some information 
to inform plausible estimates of how individuals value their consumption relative to their health would 
be useful.  This would require some social value judgments about whether such values should be 
population averages as well as scientific value judgments about which methods might provide the 
most appropriate estimates. 
 
Net consumption costs ( cc ) 
Net consumption costs can be thought of as having two elements: costs of care not borne by the NHS 
( ccc ) and effects on the wider economy that are external to the patient and their family( ecc ).   The 
discussion of principles in earlier sections makes clear that consistency is required. Therefore, if 
external effects are to be more formally taken into account then both elements are equally important 
and relevant.  It is difficult to conceive of a coherent principle that would allow a pick and mix 
approach to external effects, e.g., consideration of  ccc  but ignoring 
e
cc  would not be sustainable. 
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How estimates of ccc  and 
e
cc might be made are also discussed in Chapter 4.  However, they are 
not provided in current NICE appraisals and the case studies in Chapter 4 show that robust estimates 
would need to be an integral part of the econRPLFPRGHOVVXEPLWWHGWR1,&(UDWKHUWKDQDQµDGGRQ¶
to existing appraisals.  There are further difficulties in establishing how these elements should be 
measured and valued.  For example: i) should valuations be based on individual or population 
averages; ii) should productivity be measured using human capital or friction costs; iii) do measures of 
health related quality of life capture the financial (consumption) impact of ill health to the patient; iv) 
should consumption based on transfer payments (benefits) cancel; and v) what, if any, adjustment 
should be made to net wage rates for informal carer and leisure time? To some extent these and 
other questions of how to value external effects turn on judgements about social value described 
above. In addition, it should be recognised that the current approach taken by NICE of taking into 
account the impact on carer quality of life would need to be amended as it could lead to double 
counting.  Either the costs falling on carers should be valued in terms of consumption (e.g. using 
some adjusted net wage rate) or valued using a QALY measure but not both. 
 
It should also be apparent that taking more formal account of net consumption benefits would require 
additional analysis as part of NICE appraisal process.  This would also require clear guidance on how 
such analysis ought to be done (what should be measured and how to value it).  Of course, there will 
be a strong incentive for manufacturers to emphasise any potential consumption benefits and 
overestimate their value but underestimate or neglect any potential consumption costs.  Therefore, 
any guidance would need to be sufficiently robust to make inappropriate claims detectable and the 
process of reviewing submissions sufficiently rigorous to detect false or biased claims.  Both these 
aspects (additional analysis during appraisal and additional critical review) will necessarily add to the 
costs of appraisal. A judgement of whether the additional costs are likely to exceed any additional 
benefits of a more formal consideration is required. 
 
Transfers between sectors 
Transfers only need to be considered from the wider economy to the health care sector. If transfers 
between budget constrained sectors are regarded as a feasible way of internalising external effects 
then estimates of the net benefits in each sector are required.  If some explicit or implied social 
welfare function is adopted as a basis of social choice then a judgement about the social value of 
sector specific outcomes relative to the marginal productivity of each sector (their relative 
underfunding) would also be required (see Section 2.4). 
 
Although these requirements appear formidable, a number are already required within a health care 
system perspective.  For example, the limited empirical basis for the current cost-effectiveness 
threshold range is widely acknowledged and research has recently been commissioned to provide 
more secure estimates, including, where possible, an assessment of the effects of non marginal 
budget impacts.48  Other questions of measurement and valuation, such as a consumption value of 
health and the elements which make up net consumption costs, have been the subject of an 
extensive literature and (discussed further in Section 4.1).  Although many of these questions have 
been considered in existing policy documents (including the Treasury Green Book49), the underlying 
questions of scientific and social value remain and are no less difficult for it.  In summary, there are 
formidable scientific and social value judgements to be made but these can draw on an existing 
literature which has attempted to address these questions in different ways.   
 
 
3.3 Other critical considerations 
 
There are three other critical areas which require consideration: i) the need to make some 
assessment of net consumption benefits which might be displaced by the new technology; ii) the 
dynamic effects on prices and longer run investment incentives; and iii) potential conflicts with other 
social objectives. 
 
Displaced consumption effects 
 
All the analysis in previous chapters has focused on the additional net health and net consumption 
benefits offered by the technology under consideration by NICE.  The fact that any additional health 
care costs will displace other health care activities resulting in forgone health elsewhere has been 
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discussed at length and represented by k  in the expression for net health benefit (see (1) in Section 
2.1).  To simplify the notation in Chapter 2  it has been assumed that the health care activities which 
are displaced will have no net consumption costs or benefits associated with them, i.e., it is assumed 
cc =0 for displaced health care.  However, this is very unlikely to be true.  The additional health care 
costs of new technologies will displace other health care activities, not only resulting in forgone health 
elsewhere, but also forgone consumption benefits to patients, carers and the wider economy, The 
overall effect on consumption of adopting the new technology would not be the cc  associated with it 
but the difference between the consumption effects of the new technology and those that are 
displaced.  For example, if expansion of health visitor provision is displaced then potentially 
substantial net consumption benefits from improving long term health, educational and criminal justice 
outcomes for vulnerable children will be forgone.  Therefore, it is not sufficient to observe net 
consumption benefits associated with a new technology but that these exceed the consumption 
benefits which may be forgone if the new technology is adopted and other activities are displaced 
elsewhere in the NHS.  This can be represented more formally by amending (5) in Section 2.1: 
 
0h c hc c ch
k v j   (25) 
 
The first term represents the net health benefits falling on the health sector, which accounts for other 
health forgone due to hc  using the cost-effectiveness threshold, k .  The second term represents 
the net consumption effects outside the health care system. It now includes hc j , which represents 
the net consumption costs displaced as hc falls on the NHS budget and displaces other health care 
which also has 0cc .  This formalisation requires some assessment of a threshold j  which 
represents the NHS cost per net consumption cost forgone.   
 
Any consideration of external effects can only reallocate existing NHS resources within a fixed 
budget. Therefore, any technology which is adopted as a consequence of considering external 
benefits must necessarily be at the expense of other NHS activities, i.e., extending the NICE 
perspective FDQ EH UHJDUGHG DV D µ]HUR VXP JDPH¶ RYHU DOO 1+6 DFWLYLWLHV DQG technologies.  
However, it would change the mix and relative priority of particular technologies, tending to prioritise 
less effective technologies which offer greater net consumption benefits over more effective 
technologies which impose greater net consumption costs.   
 
If the type of new technologies considered by NICE are in general able to demonstrate that their net 
consumption benefits (costs) are greater (lower) than those that are displaced, then the share of NHS 
resources devoted to these technologies will tend to increase (even if prices are unaffected - see 
dynamic effects below).  This might be regarded as appropriate if a proper assessment of displaced 
external benefits has been made. However, if they tend to be underestimated or ignored then such 
reallocations would be wholly inappropriate, reducing health outcomes and consumption benefits to 
the wider economy. Equally, if new technologies tend to be associated with lower (higher) 
consumption benefits (costs) than existing NHS activities, then the share of NHS resources devoted 
to these types of technologies should properly fall.  
 
Identifying precisely which activities are displaced at a local level in the NHS and estimating their 
associated cost-effectiveness from an NHS perspective is notoriously difficult.50  It would be an even 
greater challenge to also try to estimate the associated wider costs and benefits.  However, at a more 
aggregate level evidence suggests that  the NHS is productive of health and that, on average across 
the NHS, a marginal reduction in budget (or equally imposing additional costs) is associated with 
reductions in health outcome.51  There is also a range of evidence which suggests that  improvements 
in health generally offer net consumption benefits to the wider economy.52,53,54  Therefore, it is 
reasonable to suppose that, on average across the NHS, both health will be forgone when other 
health care is displaced and that this will also be associated with forgone net consumption benefits.   
 
If, in general, net consumption benefits are associated with overall improvements in health, then those 
technologies which would already be regarded as cost-effective from an NHS perspective, and 
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therefore offer net health benefits to the NHS, will also tend to offer overall net consumption benefits 
as well.  Equally, those technologies not currently regarded as cost-effective from an NHS perspective 
would, if approved, reduce health benefits across the NHS and tend to impose overall consumption 
costs. In these circumstances appropriate decisions could be made based only on an NHS 
perspective.  Extending the NICE perspective would seem unnecessary in many circumstances as it 
should in principle make no difference to the guidance issued if it could be properly implemented.  
Extending the perspective for all technologies appraised by NICE would also impose additional costs 
on the appraisal process and introduce the possibility of a biased assessment if the wider 
consumption benefits which might be displaced are more difficult to identify but any wider benefits 
associated with a new technology are assiduously searched for, researched and presented.   
 
However, an NHS perspective is only OLNHO\WREHVXIILFLHQWµRQDYHUDJH¶and there will be exceptions: 
where the external benefits associated with the health gains are likely to be substantially greater or 
substantially less than the external benefits associated with health forgone elsewhere as other NHS 
activities are displaced. One approach to this problem would be to restrict consideration of wider 
effects to exceptional cases where an NHS perspective is more likely to be inadequate, i.e., where the 
external benefits are likely to be substantially greater or less than current NHS activities which may be 
displaced. A more selective approach would require explicit criteria for when an exceptional case 
could be made, possibly based on the nature of the technology (whether it affects quantity or quality 
of life), the type of disease (acute or chronic) and the type of patient population (age, employment 
status etc).   It should be noted, however, that as well as identifying exceptions which are likely to 
offer overall net external benefits it will also be necessary to identify exceptions which are likely to 
impose overall net consumption costs.   
 
It seems clear that whenever consideration is given to external effects this will need to be matched by 
a better understanding of the external effects of health care in general and those aspects of health 
care that are most likely to be displaced.  Such assessment appear significantly more difficult in scope 
than estimating a cost-effectiveness threshold (the effect on health due to changes in expenditure)28 
based on national data reporting local variations in expenditure and outcomes.  This is because, the 
effect on net consumption benefits will depend critically on which particular types of health care are 
invested or disinvested and which patient groups forgo health; a level of detail that is not currently 
available . Attempting to detect the wider economic effects of relatively small variations in local NHS 
expenditure based on aggregate economic data seems obviously hopeless.  One possibility would be 
to match any proposed investment, where external effects are to be considered, with the specific 
disinvestment(s) that would be required.  The external effects of both could then be estimated and 
compared.  However, the difficulties remain but now become; how to establish criteria to identify 
suitable disinvestmentVZKLFKDUHµPDUJLQDO¶ZLWKUHVSHFWWRKHDOWKDQGwider effects?  If the criteria do 
QRW LGHQWLI\ µPDUJLQDO¶DFWLYLWLHV WKHUHZLOOEHDGDQJHURIDFFHSWDQFHZKHQERWKWKH LQYHVWPHQWDQG
disinvestment should be rejected or rejecting an investment when it should be accepted and the 
proposed disinvestment also retained.  
 
Finally, it should be noted that although there are circumstances when consideration of wider effects 
may be unnecessary when considering allocation within a fixed budget (because the opportunity costs 
fall on health and therefore wider effects elsewhere), consideration of the wider economic benefits of 
improving health is always necessary and appropriate when considering how much resource should 
be devoted to health care (because the opportunity costs of an increase in the budget falls on 
consumption in the wider economy rather than on health). 
 
Dynamic effects  
 
Pricing incentives 
Adopting a more formal consideration of external effects will change the incentives faced by 
manufacturers.  The incentives at work, when making a submission and providing estimates of cc , 
have already been discussed.  However, it would also change incentives for the pricing of new 
technologies.  Current NICE appraisal offers manufacturer the opportunity to price their technology to 
the point where the net health benefits to the health care system are zero.  In doing so they are able 
to appropriate all the value of an innovation, at least during the period of patent protection.55-57  If 
external effects are more formally considered using the type of decision rule (5) described in Section 
2.1 then there would be an incentive to price technologies (increase hc ) to the point at which the 
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overall net health benefits, including the health equivalent of any net consumption benefits, will be 
zero:   
0h cc ch
k v
 
 
This has a number of important implications.  At least during the period of patent protection any net 
consumption benefits offered to the wider economy will be appropriated by the manufacturer by 
extracting rent from the health care system through higher prices.  In essence, the health care system 
becomes a means of making transfers between different sectors of the wider economy, i.e., from 
those sectors which receive the consumption benefits to the pharmaceutical or devices sector which 
owns the patent.  However, if transfers are not made from the beneficiaries in the wider economy to 
compensate the health care system for paying for the benefits they still receive, then the non marginal 
long term consequences seem obvious.  The incentives to price to appropriate all aspects of benefit 
turns what were external benefits ( cc v ) into higher internal health care costs ( h cc c v ).  
Without either transfers from beneficiaries in the wider economy or compensating increases in the 
budget for health care through general taxation, an increasing proportion of the NHS budget will be 
devoted to payment of rent for benefits which fall outside health.  Consequently a smaller proportion 
of the budget will be available to offer health care which improves health outcomes.  Of course, if a 
technology is shown to impose overall net consumption costs on the wider economy then the 
incentive will be to either reduce price or accept that technology may not be approved. However, if on 
average those technologies appraised by NICE do indeed offer overall benefits to the wider economy 
(or equally if displaced consumption benefits are not properly assessed) then, on average, NHS costs 
will tend to rise.   
 
Investment incentives 
In the longer run, one would expect that these incentives will tend to influence investment decisions 
so that the type of technologies developed will be licensed in diseases and patient groups which are 
more likely to demonstrate overall net consumption benefits and command higher prices. Therefore, 
in the longer run, a formal consideration of external effects will tend to lead to technologies offering 
greater consumption benefits but which are fully appropriated during the period of patent protection, 
leading to higher NHS costs with more significant non marginal impacts on the NHS budget.  Although 
the NHS and the wider economy will receive a share of these benefits following patient expiry, other 
newly patiently technologies will be launched, also commanding higher prices than would have 
otherwise been the case.  Therefore, even in the long run NHS costs will be higher.  In return more 
benefits will accrue to the wider economy.  Whether or not this is regarded as desirable turns on 
whether the welfare function presupposed by specifying v  is regarded as legitimate and complete. If 
it is, then prices will indeed align incentives for investment with this definition of social value and the 
change in the mix of technologies towards those that will tend to be less effective but offer greater 
wider benefits would be regarded as socially desirable. However, even in these circumstances the 
desirability of these dynamic effects depends on a number of consideration: i) unless either transfers 
are made or the NHS budget is continually increased to compensate for higher NHS costs (e.g., such 
that k v ) then welfare will not necessarily be improved; ii) although the relative rewards might be 
aligned, whether the increased share of value appropriated by the private sector is necessary and 
appropriate will depend on consideration of the public sector contribution to innovation and 
comparisons with returns to capital in other sectors of the economy.  Of course, if the welfare function 
is incomplete and other social arguments are at play, or if displaced consumption benefits are not 
properly assessed then such dynamic effects might be regarded as wholly undesirable.      
 
Social consensus considerations  
 
Unless some broad consensus about the type of social welfare function which ought to inform social 
choice in health can be established, then formalising the trade-offs may lead to prescriptions which 
conflict with other legitimate objectives of social policy and widely held notions of justice and social 
solidarity.  Indeed it may be perceived as conflicting with widely held notions of the underlying social 
principles of the NHS. Such conflict and potential divisiveness might make particularly unpopular 
decisions unsustainable, which in the longer run might undermine the credibility of NICE. 
 
This is particularly the case when wider considerations will inevitably lead some technologies, which 
would have been accepted as cost-effective from the perspective of the health care system, to be 
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rejected.  These will tend to be technologies in older populations or which offer life extension in 
chronic diseases where a return to productive activity is not possible. Such decisions might be very 
difficult to sustain if they rest on measurement and valuation of consumption benefits which are not 
widely accepted or if they conflict with other objectives of social policy or widely held social value 
judgements. 
 
It is important to recognise that consideration of external effects would only reallocate existing NHS 
resources, not add to them.  It would change the mix and relative priority of particular technologies; at 
the margin it would prioritise less effective technologies which offer net consumption benefits over 
more effective technologies which impose net consumption costs.  Therefore, in the short run it would 
reduce the overall health gains from the NHS budget. If the welfare function adopted is complete then 
this should be regarded as wholly desirable.  However, if it is not complete, i.e., there are other social 
objectives and arguments that are relevant but not included, then there will necessarily be conflict at 
some point.   For example it will conflict with particular equity objectives in health care provision, 
tending to benefit economically active populations.  In the longer run any net consumption benefit will 
be appropriated in high prices.  This will tend to amplify both these effects: i) the change in investment 
incentives will tend to favour those technologies, diseases and populations where net consumption 
benefits can be demonstrated, adding to an adverse effect on certain equity objectives; and ii) a 
greater proportion of the NHS budget will be devoted to paying for the external benefits through 
higher prices, so the health gained from the NHS budget will be reduced even further. 
 
A simple policy of health maximisation within existing budgets is obviously not, nor does it claim to be, 
a complete specification of social welfare.  Any consideration of cost-effectiveness from a health care 
system perspective necessarily conflicts with other relevant social arguments.  This might explain why 
NICE has not adopted a formal prescriptions but a deliberative approach, informed by instructions 
from the Secretary of State and the NICE social value judgments document58;  a necessarily imperfect 
attempt to guide deliberation through the many and various conflicts  with other social argument and 
objectives.  In combination with the description of how considerations are undertaken during the 
appraisal process59 and the opportunities for scrutiny, consultation and redress, provide a means of 
negotiating and balancing the often mutually conflicting issues that arise.  
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4.  Illustrative examples  
 
A conceptual framework, which examines how the cost-effectiveness of health care technologies 
might be assessed under a wider perspective, was presented in Chapter 2. This Chapter considers 
how costs and benefits external to the healthcare system could be measured and valued, and 
demonstrates how they might be incorporated into the type of appraisals and decisions made by 
NICE. To this end four case studies are presented each of which is based on previous cost-
effectiveness evaluations originally conducted for the NICE appraisal process.  In each case the 
original perspective of the analysis was restricted to the NHS. The reanalysis under a wider 
perspective is conducted based on reported results and other readily available data.  The four case 
studies were selected to cover a range of circumstances which will determine whether a technology is 
likely to offer wider benefits or impose costs.  These include: the type of the technology (e.g., primarily 
affects mortality or quality of life), the nature of the disease (e.g., acute or chronic) and the type of 
patient population (e.g., age, gender etc).  
 
 
4.1  Valuing net consumption costs or benefits 
 
There are well established methods for costing NHS resources for the purpose of the economic 
evaluation of healthcare technologies.32 However, the measurement and valuation of costs which fall 
outside the health care sector is less well established, particularly within the UK where the emphasis 
has been restricted to the inclusion of NHS costs. In addition, how to measure and value different 
elements of external costs often turns on difficult to resolve questions of value and fact that were 
discussed in Sections 3.1 and 3.2.  The external costs fall into two main areas: costs of care not 
borne by the NHS ( ccc ) and the indirect effects on the wider economy that are external to the 
patient and their family ( ecc ).  
 
Costs of care not borne by the NHS 
Costs of care not borne by the NHS include the costs of treatment which do not fall on the health care 
budget. The major non health care inputs into care outside of the healthcare sector are volunteer or 
carer time and patient time.32 While the measurement of time itself is not controversial, there remain 
unresolved questions about how this time should be priced and hence valued in monetary terms. For 
volunteer or carer time it may be possible to use the market net wage rate, since in undistorted 
PDUNHWV WKLVVKRXOG UHYHDODQ LQGLYLGXDO¶V marginal valuation of their time. However, this is likely to 
overestimate opportunity costs of most carer time.  In addition, if carers gain some reward and 
reassurance from proving care themselves rather than employing others then market rates may over 
value the true opportunity costs. Similarly net wage might not represent the marginal value of a 
SDWLHQW¶VOHLVXUHWLPHDVFKRLFHRIZRUNLQJKRXUVLVRIWHQUHVWULFWHGDQGSURSRVHGYDOXHVUDQJHIURP
zero to the overtime wage rate. Others suggest it should depend on what time is being sacrificed to 
reflect the value of the different types of activities that are forgone.60 Much is unresolved, but for the 
purposes of the following case studies net wage rate is used. There are also other costs of care not 
borne by the NHS, for example transport costs and out of pocket costs which might include the costs 
of paid carer time.  These are commonly valued at market prices. 
 
Indirect external effects on the rest of the economy 
The indirect external effect on the wider economy are effects external to patients and their carers but 
are valued by the rest of society (effects on patients and carers should have already been captured in 
measures of health related quality of life and ccc ).  For example, returning a patient to active 
participation in the labour market will, in many circumstances, add to production in the economy.  This 
will be a net benefit to the rest of society if the value of the additional production exceeds the 
LQGLYLGXDO¶VDGGLWLRQDOFRQVXPSWLRQRYHUWKHLUUHPDLQLQJOLIHH[SHFWDQF\+RZWRYDOXHLPSURYHPHQWV
in productivity due to reduced mortality or earlier return to participation in the labour market due to 
improved quality of life is a matter of debate.  
 
There are two main approaches supported in the literature: the human capital approach and the 
friction cost method. The human capital approach suggests that any productivity gained or lost will 
extend over time and should be valued based on the gross earnings of employment. Gross wages are 
often recommended on the basis that the gross wage in an undistorted competitive market will be 
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equal to the social (market) value of the production (the marginal revenue product).  However, some 
key assumptions are required: that the labour and associated product markets are competitive and 
undistorted; and that there is no involuntary unemployment due to structural problems in sectors of 
the economy. Therefore, the gross wage will  overestimate the value of productivity (a shadow wage 
rate would be lower) if there is unemployment in the relevant sector or if there are distortions in labour 
and product markets.15 46  
 
Others have proposed a friction cost approach to valuing productivity losses from ill health, which is 
based on the amount of production lost during the time it takes companies or organizations to restore 
the initial production levels.61  The total friction cost will include the lost production (over a more 
limited time frame than human capital estimates) as well as the direct costs it must incur to restore 
these initial production levels (e.g., recruitment costs, training costs etc). The use of the friction cost 
approach results in much lower estimates of the value of production losses from ill health than those 
from the human capital approach. One study found that losses accounted for 2.1% of national income 
based on friction costs while the human capital approach estimated them at 18%.62   
 
Although, returning a patient to the labour market will (in the absence of involuntary unemployment) 
add to production in the economy, some of this additional production will be consumed by the 
individual and, therefore, not benefit the rest of society (a different but important question is whether 
the consumption enjoyed by the individual is captured in estimates of health related quality of life or 
not - see below).  Therefore, estimates of the external benefits to the rest of society must take 
individual productivity net of individual consumption or, if expressed as a net consumption cost (as in 
e
cc ), it is individual consumption net of individual production.2 The literature on extra consumption 
as a result of improvements in health is limited. Clearly, increases in life expectancy result in 
additional consumption and some national aggregate data are available. However, whether there is 
any significant effect on consumption as a result of changes in the quality of life is unclear.  
 
However, using only market valuations of productive activity will neglect the external value to the rest 
of society of the non market activities that improved health allows. Although such external non market 
effect exist, how to identify and value them while avoiding double counting is less clear.   It should be 
evident that these considerations may also conflict with other social objectives and widely held social 
values.  For example, if individual rather than population averages are used then technologies which 
reduce mortality in diseases which tend to be associated with low income or deprived communities 
will also tend to impose indirect external costs.  Equally, a mortality reduction in diseases associated 
with economically active and more privileged groups will tend to offer indirect external benefits.  Even 
if population averages are used, a mortality reduction in elderly populations will tend to impose costs 
whereas the same effect in younger and economically active populations will offer benefits.  In 
addition to the assumptions of competitive and undistorted markets, simply using the gross wage to 
provide a social value of productive activity will tend to neglect the external value of other non 
marketed activities. For example it would assign no external social value to those not participating in 
the labour market who nevertheless may be engaged in socially valuable non market employment 
such as child care etc.  The questions of social value and potential implications were more fully 
discussed in Chapter 3.   
 
Financial impact on the patient 
An important question is whether the consumption enjoyed by an individual as a consequence of 
improved length or quality of life is captured in estimates of health related quality of life (HRQL).  If, 
when valuing health states, respondents take account of the impact that the health state would have 
on their ability to work and consume, then the financial effects on the patient will already be 
accounted for in estimates of QALYs gained.  In these circumstances adding in the additional 
consumption enjoyed by the patients would double count these benefits.  This is the position taken by 
the Washington panel24  and others.2, 43   ,WVKRXOGEHQRWHGWKDW1,&(¶VSUHIHUUHGPHDVXUHRI+54/
WKH(4'LQFOXGHVLQLWVGHVFULSWLRQRIKHDOWKVWDWHVWKHDELOLW\WRSHUIRUPµXVXDOVRFLDOUROH¶ZKLFKZLOO
include participation in the labour market and it financial implications.  Other measures of HRQL do 
not include social role specifically in their health sate descriptions so might be less likely to capture 
these effects in their health state valuations. 
 
This is consistent with an alternate view, that the consumption or income effects are not currently 
captured within measures of HRQL,63, 64 or at least they should not be. In these circumstances the 
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additional consumption enjoyed by the patient would need to be included as a benefit and set against 
any indirect external costs (consumption net of production).  It should be clear that adding 
consumption as a benefit to the patient and also as a cost to the rest of society will cancel, leaving 
just the value of any production as a positive benefit.  However, there are two additional 
considerations. In the UK there is a system of social insurance and employment rights which protects 
income and consumption against the most extreme consequences of ill health. Therefore, in 
responding to the EQ5D questionnaire one would expect UK respondents to take account of this.  
Secondly, if the consumption enjoyed by the patient is to be added as a benefit alongside 
improvement in HRQL, then any of the additional consumption  which is based on transfer payments 
(e.g., benefit payments) must also be entered as a cost and cancel.  This is because transfer 
payments allow consumption by the patient but at the expense of reduced consumption elsewhere.  
Of course, if there is a wish to take account of distributional issues then transfers will not cancel.  
However, this will pose the problem of specifying a desired distribution of income which will also have 
implications for all valuations not just benefit payments.  
 
Estimating cost-effectiveness 
As has been shown earlier in (5) in Section 2.1,  the cost-effectiveness of a treatment can be 
expressed in terms of health when it has impact both inside and outside the health care system. As 
discussed above, the external net consumption costs (previously cc in (5)) can be split into two main 
components, costs of care not borne by the NHS ( ccc ) and the effects on the wider economy that 
are external to the patient and their family (consumption less productivity, 
typroductivinconsumptioc ec ). Therefore (5) can be extended to allow for these two 
components of net consumption cost, 
 
v
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Similarly, the ICER decision rule expressed in (6) can also be extended, 
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However, it has also been suggested that QALYs may not capture the consumption or income 
benefits to patients. In this case excluding them as a benefit will underestimate the cost-effectiveness 
when there are consumption or income benefits from improve health. However, (26) can be easily 
extended to include additional consumption as an extra direct benefit of health care, 
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Similarly, the ICER decision rule (27) can be extended to give: 
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Therefore, there are two main ways to estimate cost-effectiveness from a societal perspective, each 
of which requires a judgement of whether the HRQL measure used does or does not capture 
consumption effects (QALY inc Con and QALY excl Con respectively in the tables in Section 4.2). 
These are demonstrated in the case studies reported below.  It should be noted that the proportion of 
any additional consumption contributed by benefit payments and other transfers has not be estimated 
and entered as a cost.  Therefore, estimates of cost-effectiveness based on the assumption that 
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HRQL does not capture income effects will tend to be overestimated if some additional consumption 
is based on transfers.  
 
 
4.2  Case studies 
 
Four case studies are presented below to illustrate how cost-effectiveness from a societal perspective 
can be estimated based on existing analyses and readily available data. They demonstrate how a 
wider perspective might be incorporated into the type of appraisals and decisions made by NICE and 
highlight what would be required during appraisal to provide sufficiently robust estimates. Each of the 
four case studies are based on previous cost-effectiveness evaluations, three of which were originally 
conducted for NICE technology appraisal.  The reanalysis is based on the reported results and use of 
readily available additional evidence.  Changes in productivity have been valued using the human 
capital approach and carer time has been valued at average net market wage rate. Each analysis 
reports estimates by type of patient group where separate estimate were available and estimates 
when the QALYs is judged to include or exclude consumption effects for the patient. 
 
Laparoscopic assisted hysterectomy versus abdominal hysterectomy 
 
The EVALUATE study was a study of two parallel, unblended, multicentre randomised trials that 
compared laparoscopic hysterectomy (LH) with abdominal hysterectomy (AH) and vaginal 
hysterectomy (VH).65 The study was funded as part of the Health Technology Assessment 
Programme. Below the comparison of LH with AH is explored further. 
 
The original study included an economic evaluation which was a cost-effectiveness analysis 
conducted over a 1 year time horizon. The costs were estimated from an NHS cost perspective. 
Compared with AH, LH had a higher mean cost per patient of £186 and a higher mean QALYs of 
0.007. This resulted in an incremental cost per QALY gained of £26,507. Below a value of £20,000 
per QALY, NICE generally will approve the introduction of technologies based solely on the cost-
effectiveness estimate. Between a value of £20,000 per QALY and £30,000 per QALY a strong case 
relating to the degree of certainty in the estimate, the health related quality of life is inadequately 
captured or the innovative nature of the technology is required for NICE to recommend its use.66 
Current NICE guidance recommends the use of laparoscopic hysterectomy as an alternative to 
abdominal hysterectomy.66   
 
The economic evaluation has been extended to take account of costs falling outside of the NHS. This 
was done using evidence from Table VII below and several assumptions. Firstly, it was assumed that 
the difference in the effects of the intervention are purely in terms of HRQoL and not mortality; 
therefore, patients will live for the same time and there are no differences in consumption between the 
two arms. Information on the number of days off work in both arms was available from the 
EVALUATE trial as well as the rate of employment of the patients, so these have been combined with 
evidence on wages to calculate the differential productivity costs between the two arms. It was 
assumed that the difference in the number of days to return to work would also be mirrored in the 
number of days the women would need to be cared for by a relative or friend. This information was 
combined with the average wage rate and the unemployment rate to calculate the difference in care 
costs between the two arms that does not fall upon the NHS. 
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Table VII. Evidence for laparoscopic assisted vs. abdominal hysterectomy 
 Statistic Source of Data 
Age 41 Mean age at start of trial 
Laparoscopic-assisted 
hysterectomy NHS cost 
£1750.72 EVALUATE trial65 
Abdominal hysterectomy NHS 
cost 
£1519.64 EVALUATE trial65 
Differential mean cost £186 EVALUATE trial65 
Laparoscopic-assisted 
hysterectomy QALYs 
0.870 EVALUATE trial65 
Abdominal hysterectomy 
QALYs 
0.862 EVALUATE trial65 
Differential mean QALYs 0.007 EVALUATE trial65 
Average wage per day £76.90 ASHE (for 40-49 year old women)67 
Days lost from Laparoscopic 
arm 
77.8 EVALUATE trial65 
Days lost from work Abdominal 
arm 
94.8 EVALUATE trial65 
Differential days off work 17 EVALUATE trial65 
Percentage of patients working 69.8% EVALUATE trial65 
Differential days of care 17  Assumes is equivalent to differential days of work 
Average wage per day £69.46 ASHE (for all working adults)67 and unemployment rate 
 
Using the data in the Table VII and the assumptions described previously, the following parameters to 
be used in the estimation of the cost-effectiveness of LH compared to AH have been calculated.  
 
Table VIII. Parameters for cost-effectiveness analyses 
Parameter Value 
h
 
0.007 
hc  
£186 
c
cc  
-£1180.88 
nconsumptio  £0 
typroductivi  £912.50 
e
cc  
-£912.50 
 
As can be seen from Table VIII above, the care costs falling outside of the NHS have been estimated 
as £1180.88 less in the LH arm than in the AH arm. Similarly the productivity benefits have been 
estimated to be £912.50 more in the LH arm than the AH arm. Both of these are driven by the shorter 
recuperation time with LH (patients on average returned to work 17 days earlier). The above 
information can be combined using the formulae provided in the previous section to give estimates of 
the cost-effectiveness of LH compared to AH. Table IX below contains the net health benefit (NHB) 
and ICERs when QALYs are assumed to include consumption effects and also when they exclude 
them. These results have been calculated assuming the NICE threshold is £20,000 per QALY while 
the consumption value of health is £60,000. These are also compared to the estimates under the 
current NICE reference case. 
 
Table IX. Results for laparoscopic vs abdominal hysterectomy 
NHB 
(NICE) 
NHB (QALY inc 
Con) 
NHB (QALY 
excl Con) 
ICER (NICE) ICER (QALY 
inc Con) 
ICER (QALY excl Con) 
-0.0023 0.3259 0.3259 £26,571 per QALY Dominates Dominates 
 
The savings outside of the NHS (in terms of both increased productivity and reduced non NHS care 
costs) result in the estimates for cost-effectiveness from a societal perspective appearing more 
favourable than under the NICE case. The cost savings are so large that they outweigh the positive 
costs in the NHS resulting in LH dominating AH (having increased health but cost savings). As noted 
previously, LH is recommended by NICE but the results provided in the table above show that the 
decision is marginal, with the NHB being negative when a threshold of £20,000 is used in the NICE 
case. However, taking a wider perspective makes LH more desirable as a treatment and would still be 
approved at much higher cost. It should be noted that the estimates of cost-effectiveness when 
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QALYs include consumption effects and when they exclude them are the same, as it has been 
assumed that there is no difference in mortality between the arms and therefore there is no difference 
in consumption between the arms.  
 
The previous analysis has been based on the assumption that the introduction of LH would have only 
marginal effects on the NHS (i.e. that the extra costs would not result in a change of the threshold k ). 
However, it is possible that the introduction of LH could result in very large costs falling on the NHS 
or, alternatively, that as part of a series of new technologies being introduced that the threshold could 
change. A previous study found that of the 72,629 hysterectomies performed in England and Wales in 
1992-3 81% of them were abdominal hysterectomies.68 If all of these were switched to laparoscopic 
hysterectomies, at an additional cost to the NHS of £186 per patients, then the total increased NHS 
cost per year would be £10.9 million.  
 
It is also possible to calculate the amount that the threshold would have to change as a consequence 
of the non marginal impact (see Section 2.3 and a discussion of k and *k ) so that the technology 
would be on the margin of being cost-effective or not (i.e. at a k  where NICE would indifferent 
between introducing the technology or not). In this case the NICE threshold would have to be reduced 
to £4,440 per QALY before LH no longer appeared to be a cost-effective use of resources from a 
societal perspective. This is very far from the current threshold and it would appear unlikely that the 
increase in NHS costs of £10.0 million per year could result in the threshold falling to this level, 
although in combination with the introduction of other new treatments which increase NHS costs there 
is a possibility the threshold could fall so low. However, more information on the NHS production 
function would be required to make any definitive statements on this.  
 
Table X. Non marginal changes for laparoscopic vs abdominal hysterectomy 
Parameter Value Source 
Number of patients per year 58,830 Department of Health. Hospital 
episode statistics68 
NHS budget impact £10,942,285  
k for treatment to be on the margin of cost-
effectiveness (QALY inc Con) 
£4,440  
k for treatment to be on the margin of cost-
effectiveness (QALY excl Con) 
£4,440  
 
Zanavamir or oseltamivir compared to usual care for patients with flu 
 
A recently conducted multiple technology appraisal for NICE considered the cost-effectiveness of 
antivirals (oseltvamir and zanamivir) for the treatment of naturally acquired influenza.69 
 
The study, conducted with an NHS cost perspective, used a decision-analytic model to assess the 
cost-effectiveness of oseltvamir or zanamivir compared to standard care without antiviral treatment in 
5 patient groups: (i) otherwise healthy children aged 1-\HDUVLLµDW-ULVN¶FKLOGUHQDJHG-14 years; 
(iii) otherwise health adults aged 15- \HDUV LY µDW-ULVN¶ DGXOWVDJHG-64 years; and (v) elderly 
aged 65 years or over. A patient is considered at risk if they have one or more of the following 
conditions: chronic respiratory disease, chronic heart disease, chronic renal diseases, chronic liver 
disease, chronic neurological conditions or diabetes mellitus. For the two healthy groups ((i) and (iii)) 
the comparison was between oseltvamir aand standard care, while for the other three groups the 
comparison was between zanamivir and standard care.  
 
In the base case analysis for the report the ICERs for the 5 patient groups were as follows: (i) 
£7,322.22 per QALY, (ii) £1,733.33 per QALY, (iii) £5,534.62 per QALY, (iv) £2,280.00 per QALY, and 
(v) £562.26 per QALY. However, despite the low cost per QALY in all sub groups the NICE Appraisal 
Committee only recommended the use of the two antivirals in the at-risk populations and in subgroups 
of the elderly population (i.e. those who might be immunosuppressed). The Appraisal Committee felt 
that the base case ICERs in the healthy groups were unlikely to reflect the true ICERs in these 
groups.70 However, for the purposes of this report, the base case will be taken as the basis for the 
extension of the analyses to a societal perspective. 
 
The economic evaluation has been extended to take account of costs falling outside of the health care 
sector using data from Table XI and the following assumptions. The antivirals have short term HRQoL 
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effects, as a result of which patients are able to return to work earlier. Information on the difference in 
the time of returning to normal activities was available from the HTA report and was transformed into 
productivity benefits using information on average gross wages. In all populations except healthy 
children the antivirals were found to have small effects on mortality, therefore the treatments also 
have long term effects on consumption and productivity. Patients who did not die from flu were 
assumed to live to average life expectancy, therefore the difference in the productivity and 
consumption between the treatment alternatives could be calculated by multiplying the difference in 
probability of mortality by the discounted streams of wages and consumption for a patient, based on 
the average age in the subgroup and their life-expectancy. There were assumed to be no differences 
in care costs not falling upon the NHS in both alternatives. 
 
Table XIa.  Evidence for cost-effectiveness of Zanavamir and Oseltamivir 
 
1
 Incremental costs / health effects and ICER given for oseltamivir vs usual care (zanimivir dominated by oseltamivir) 
2
 Incremental costs / health effects and ICER given for zanamivir vs usual care (oseltamivir extendedly dominated by 
zanamivir) 
 
Table XIb. Other evidence for Zanavamir and Oseltamivir 
 
 
Using the data in Table XIa and b and the assumptions mentioned previously, the parameters to be  
used in the cost-effectiveness analyses were calculated. These are presented in Table XII below. For 
healthy children there were no external effects as they do not currently earn a wage and, therefore, 
short term effects can be disregarded. As the difference in mortality between the alternatives was 
  Healthy children1 At-risk children2 Healthy adults1 At-risk adults2 Elderly2 Source of data 
Incremental 
health effects 
(QALYs) 0.0018 
 
 
0.0066 
 
 
0.0026 0.0055 0.0159 
Burch et al 
(2009)69 
Incremental 
costs within 
NHS/PSS £13.18 £11.44 £14.39 £12.54 £8.94 
Burch et al 
(2009)69 
Average age 4.75 4.75 53.66 53.66 86.76 
 
 
Burch et al 
(2009)69 
Average 
undiscounted 
life 
expectancy 75.02 75.02 28.01 28.01 5.29 
 
 
Burch et al 
(2009)69 
Absolute 
difference in 
probability of 
mortality 
between 
alternatives 0 0.00008795 0.00010129 0.00021505 0.003018 
 
 
Burch et al 
(2009)69 
Difference in 
time to return 
to normal 
activities 1.28 3.45 2.25 3.45 3.45 
Burch et al 
(2009)69 
Employment rate 73.6% National Statistics71 
Weekly consumption £193.80 Family spending and family expenditure survey72 
Gross wage per week- all employees by age 
16-17b £78.80 ASHE67 
18-21 £180.70 ASHE67 
22-29 £359.90 ASHE67 
30-39 £411.40 ASHE67 
40-49 £384.50 ASHE67 
50-59 £373.30 ASHE67 
60+ £251.30 ASHE67 
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found to be zero there are also no long term external effects in terms of differences in productivity or 
consumption. At-risk children had no short run productivity effects as they were too young too work, 
but the differing mortality did lead to long term differences in the alternatives in terms of productivity 
and consumption. However, because of their age, the consumption effects outweighed the 
productivity effects resulting in positive external costs (i.e. they still have several years until they enter 
the workforce during which they are still consuming).   The healthy and at-risk adults have large 
savings in external costs mainly as a result of large short term productivity gains because they are 
able to return to work early. The elderly population have large external costs as they were considered 
to be outside of the workforce and thus receive no productivity gains from reduced mortality and 
instead only increased consumption costs. 
 
Table XII. Parameters for cost-effectiveness analyses 
Parameter Healthy 
children 
At-risk 
children Healthy adults At-risk adults Elderly 
h  0.0018 0.0066 0.0026 0.0055 0.0159 
hc  
£13.18 £11.44 £14.39 £12.54 £8.94 
c
cc  
£0 £0 £0 £0 £0 
nconsumptio  £0 £24.22 £18.66 £39.62 £142.15 
typroductivi  
(short run) 
£0 £0 £228.29 £350.04 £0 
typroductivi  
(long run) 
£0 £21.88 £17.82 £37.84 £0 
typroductivi  
(overall) 
£0 £21.88 £246.20 £387.87 £0 
e
cc  
£0 £2.34 -£227.44 -£348.25 £142.15 
 
Table XIII presents the cost-effectiveness results for the 5 patient groups in terms of NHB and ICERs 
for societal perspectives where QALYs include and exclude consumption effects, and for comparison 
also the NICE NHS perspective. As a result of there being no external effects for healthy children the 
three approaches all result in the same estimates of NHB and ICER. For all other groups there are 
positive consumption costs (as a result of the reduction in mortality from flu).  Therefore, the results 
from the societal perspective, where QALYs are not considered to include consumption effects, are 
more cost-effective than those where QALYs are considered to include consumption effects. The 
large short term productivity benefits result in the societal perspective estimates for both the healthy 
and at risk adult populations being more favourable than the results under the NICE perspective, with 
the external cost savings being so large that the antivirals were found to dominate usual care (i.e. 
they have lower costs and positive health benefits). However, for the elderly group, the results 
suggest the treatment appeared less cost-effective with a societal approach when it is assumed that 
QALYs do include consumption effects because the increased consumption as a result of the 
reduction in mortality is not offset by any productivity effects. Similarly, for the at-risk children group 
the societal approach, with QALYs considered to include consumption effects, results in less 
favourable estimates of cost-effectiveness as their discounted increased lifetime consumption is not 
fully offset by their discounted increased lifetime productivity. However, in terms of ICERs, treatment 
with antivirals for all the patient populations would appear to be a cost-effective use of resources 
when a societal perspective is taken. 
 
Table XIII. Results for Zanavamir and Oseltamivir 
 NHB 
(NICE) 
NHB(QALY 
inc Con) 
NHB(QALY 
excl Con) 
ICER (NICE) ICER(QALY 
inc Con) 
ICER(QALY 
excl Con) 
Healthy children 0.001141 0.001141 0.001141 £7,322.22 £7,322.22 £7,322.22 
At-risk children 0.006028 0.005989 0.006393 £1,733.33 £1,851.69 £628.25 
Healthy adults 0.001881 0.005671 0.005982 £5,534.62 Dominates Dominates 
At-risk adults 0.004873 0.010677 0.011338 £2,280.00 Dominates Dominates 
Elderly 0.015453 0.013084 0.015453 £562.26 £3,542.34 £562.26 
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These analyses have assumed that any changes will only have marginal effects on the NHS budget. 
However, it is possible that this is not the case. In Table XIV below estimates of the NHS budget 
impact per year are presented. It should be noted that these represent the discounted impact on the 
1+6 RI WKH WUHDWPHQW RYHU WKH SDWLHQWV¶ OLIHWLPHV JLYHQ WKDW WKH\ ZHUH WUHDWHG LQ WKDW \HDU These 
range from £3,014,727 for the treatment of healthy children to only £97,573 for the treatment of at-risk 
adults. The table also contains sensitivity analyses showing how low the NICE threshold would have 
to fall for the NHS to be indifferent about the use of antivirals (i.e. where if the threshold is above this 
k  it is cost-effective and when it is below this k  the treatment is not cost-effective). For example, for 
healthy children the NICE threshold would have to fall to £7,322.22 per QALY before the treatment is 
on the margin of being cost-effective or not. However, for the elderly, where QALYs do not capture 
consumption benefits, the threshold would have to fall as low as £562.26 per QALY for the treatment 
to be on the margin of being cost-effective or not. 
 
Table XIV. Non marginal changes for zanavamir and oseltamivir 
 Patient 
population 
per year 
NHS budget 
impact per 
year 
k for treatment to be on 
the margin of cost-
effectiveness (QALY inc 
Con) 
k for treatment to be on 
the margin of cost-
effectiveness (QALY excl 
Con) 
Healthy children 228,735 £3,014,727 £7,322.22 £7,322.22 
At-risk children 20482 £234,314 £1,743.65 £1,642.57 
Healthy adults 88,536 £1,274,033 £2,251.70 £2,147.18 
At-risk adults 7781 £97,573 £1,109.32 £1,048.09 
Elderly 11027 £98,581 £660.71 £562.26 
 
Beta interferon for treatment of multiple sclerosis 
 
In 2001 NICE commissioned a consortium based at the University of Sheffield to assess the cost-
effectiveness of beta-interferon therapies for the treatment of multiple sclerosis.73 They considered 6 
possible treatment strategies as well as a no treatment strategy. Using a Markov model with an NHS 
perspective and a 20 year time horizon, none of the beta-interferon strategies were considered to be 
cost-effective with ICER estimates ranging from £40,685 per QALY to £97,690 per QALY when 
compared to no treatment. However, a complex risk sharing scheme was agreed to allow the 
provision of the treatments on the NHS. 
 
The most cost-effective of the beta-interferon strategies (Beta Interferon 1-b 8MIU treating both 
secondary progressive MS and relapsing remitting MS) has been extended below to incorporate a 
societal perspective. The evidence in Table XV below was combined with various assumptions to 
allow the estimation of external effects. It has been assumed that the effects of the treatment are 
purely in terms of HRQoL and not in terms of mortality. Estimates for the annual cost of care falling 
outside the NHS and of productivity losses as a result of MS per patient were available from an 
external source.74  It has been assumed that there is an equal reduction in carer cost and lost wages 
as a result of HRQoL improvements as there was a quality gain from treatment, where the quality gain 
has been estimated as the ratio of the QALY estimates for the two treatment alternatives. It has been 
assumed that these differences will be constant over the 20 year time horizon and, therefore, the 
difference in the discounted external care costs and productivity costs have been calculated over this 
period. As the effects of the treatment are assumed to be only in terms of HRQoL and not quantity of 
life there are also assumed to be no consumption differences between the alternatives. 
 
Table XV. Evidence for estimation of cost-effectiveness of Beta Interferon  
   Statistic Source 
Incremental QALYs 1.02 Tappenden et al73 
Incremental NHS cost £41,644 Tappenden et alt73 
Proportional increase in quality of life 11.42% Tappenden et al73 and assumptions 
Informal care costs per year £4373 Kobelt et al74 
Short term and long term sickness absence costs £7695 Kobelt et al74 
 
The information in Table XV and the assumptions above have been combined to estimate the 
parameters for the assessment of cost-effectiveness from a societal perspective. These are 
presented in Table XVI. As can be seen there are large savings in care costs not falling on the NHS 
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as a result of the improved HRQoL. Similarly, the increased productivity due to treatment and the 
absence of consumption effects has resulted in large external cost savings.  
 
Table XVI. Parameters for cost-effectiveness analyses 
Parameter Value 
h  1.02 
hc  
£41,644 
c
cc  
-£7347.44 
nconsumptio  £0 
typroductivi  £12929.01 
e
cc  
-£12929.01 
 
Table XVII presents the NHBs and ICERs for the NICE perspective, the societal perspective where 
QALYs are assumed to include consumption effects and the societal perspective when QALYs are 
assumed to exclude consumption effects. As can be seen from the table, Beta Interferon treatment 
appears more cost-effective when a societal approach is taken as a result of the large cost-savings in 
the wider economy from increased productivity and reduced non NHS care costs. 
 
Table XVII. Results for Beta Interferon 
NHB (NICE) NHB (QALY inc 
Con) 
NHB (QALY excl 
Con) 
ICER 
(NICE) 
ICER (QALY inc 
Con) 
ICER (QALY excl 
Con) 
-1.0622 -0.72426 -0.72426 £40,827 £34,201 £34,201 
 
As with the earlier case studies the previous analyses have assumed only marginal effects. However, 
Table XVIII contains information on the NHS budget impact. The table also shows that the NICE 
threshold would have to increase to £30,667 per QALY for the treatment to be on the margin of being 
a cost-effective use of resources. However, given the treatment involves large NHS costs, ceteris 
paribus it is more likely to reduce the cost-effectiveness threshold below £20,000 per QALY, and 
would certainly not result in the threshold increasing. Therefore, without either a large expansion in 
the NHS budget, or extensive cost savings elsewhere in the NHS, treatment with Beta Interferon for 
MS is still unlikely to be cost-effective. There are currently estimated to be around 2,600 newly 
diagnosed MS sufferers with relapsing/remitting MS in England and Wales each year; if all of these 
patients started Beta Interferon therapy the cost to the NHS over their life times would be £108.274 
million.  
 
Table XVIII. Non marginal changes for Beta Interferon  
Patient 
population  
NHS budget impact  k for treatment to be on the 
margin of cost-effectiveness 
(QALY inc Con) 
k for treatment to be on the 
margin of cost-effectiveness 
(QALY excl Con) 
2,600 £108,274,400 £30,667 £30,667 
 
Statins for secondary prevention of coronary heart disease 
 
A systematic review and economic evaluation of statins for the prevention of coronary events was 
commissioned by the HTA programme on behalf of NICE.75 Below the results of this report with 
regards to secondary prevention of coronary heart disease (CHD) in men are considered. The report 
found ICER estimates of £10.24 per QALY, £10.02 per QALY and £10.54 per QALY in men with CHD 
aged 45 years, 55 years and 65 years respectively. These estimates are well below the NICE 
threshold of £20,000 per QALY and, therefore, the treatment of such patients with statins was 
recommended by NICE.76 
 
These analyses have been extended with the use of the data in Table XIX and various assumptions 
to allow for a societal perspective. Information on life expectancy without treatment was not available 
from the report; however information was available in Johanneson et al (1997)77 and a regression 
analysis has been used to extrapolate life expectancy by age. The incremental QALYs from the report 
were then converted into increased life expectancy by dividing through by the average quality of life 
score (as it has been assumed that the benefits of the treatment are purely through the impact on 
mortality). This was then added to the life expectancy without treatment to calculate life expectancy of 
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those receiving statin therapy. It has been assumed that the benefits of the treatment in terms of life 
H[SHFWDQF\DUHVSUHDGHYHQO\RYHUDQDYHUDJHSDWLHQW¶VOLIHWLPH7KHUHIRUHWKHGLIIHULQJSURGXFWLYLW\
and consumption between the two alternatives in any year is equal to the increase in life expectancy 
divided by the total life expectancy, and multiplied through by the relevant age specific productivity 
and consumption levels. These incremental productivity and consumption estimates for each year are 
WKHQGLVFRXQWHGDSSURSULDWHO\DQGVXPPHGRYHUWKHSDWLHQW¶VOLIHWLPHWRJLYHHVWLPDtes of incremental 
productivity and consumption as a result of statin therapy. 
 
Table XIX. Evidence for statins in secondary prevention 
  
45 year old 
man 
55 year 
old man 
65 year 
old man Source of data 
Incremental 
QALYs 0.462 0.41 0.314 HTA report75 
Incremental NHS 
costs £4.73 £4.11 £3.31 HTA report75 
Life expectancy 
without statins 24.09 years 
18.57 
years 
13.06 
years 
Johannesson et al (1997)77 plus 
assumptions 
Increase in life 
expectancy as a 
result of taking 
statins 0.9325 0.7456 0.5286 HTA report plus assumptions 
Consumption per 
week £193.80 
Family spending and family 
expenditure survey7 
Income per week   
40-49 £706.30  
50-59 £648.00  
60+ £475.30  
 
Using the information available in Table XIX and the assumptions described previously the 
parameters for the estimation of cost-effectiveness were calculated. These are reported in Table XX 
below. As can be seen from the table the 45 year old men and 55 year old men have large 
productivity gains as a result of the reduced mortality, which outweigh the increased consumption 
which also results. In contrast, 65 year olds have been assumed to have left the workforce and 
therefore they have no productivity gains as a result of the mortality improvements and instead only 
the costs of increased consumption. 
 
Table XX. Parameters for cost-effectiveness analyses 
 45 year old men 55 year old men 65 year old men 
h
 0.462 0.41 0.314 
hc  £4.73 £4.11 £3.31 
c
cc  
£0 £0 £0 
nconsumptio  £6,409.77 £5,583.55 £4,194.88 
typroductivi   £18,066.65 £9,830.20 £0.00 
e
cc  
-£11,656.88 -£4,246.65 £4,194.88 
 
The parameters in Table XX have been combined to calculate the ICERs and NHBs associated with a 
societal perspective both assuming that QALYs include and exclude consumption effects. Table XXI 
also contains the results of the ICER and NHB for the current NICE perspective for comparison. As 
can be seen from the table the large productivity gains for 45 and 55 year olds result in statin therapy 
dominating the standard treatment arm when a societal perspective is considered (i.e. the treatment is 
both more effective and less costly). In contrast, the treatment of 65 year old men who gain no 
productivity from the reduced mortality but only the extra consumption appears less cost-effective with 
a societal approach. When it is assumed that QALYs do not take account of consumption effects the 
ICER for 65 year old men increases from £10.54 per QALY under the NICE approach to £4,463.70 
per QALY under the societal perspective as a result of the large consumption costs caused by the 
mortality effects of statins. 
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Table XXI. Results for statins in secondary prevention 
 NHB (NICE) NHB(QALY inc 
Con) 
NHB(QALY 
excl Con) 
ICER 
(NICE) 
ICER(QALY 
inc Con) 
ICER(QALY 
excl Con) 
45 year 
old men 0.461763 0.6560447 0.762874 £10.24 Dominates Dominates 
55 year 
old men 0.409795 0.480572 0.573631 £10.02 Dominates Dominates 
65 year 
old men 0.313835 0.2439199 0.313835 £10.54 £4,463.70 £10.54 
 
As with the previous case studies our analyses have assumed that any changes are only marginal 
and therefore do not effect the cost-effectiveness threshold. However, this may not be the case. Table 
XXII presents the NHS budget impacts for treating the various age groups. It should be noted that 
these figures relate only to patients aged the exact age, and thus does not reflect the whole picture for 
WKH1+6LHZHKDYHQ¶WDFFRXQWHGIRU6 year olds, 47 year olds etc). Table XXII also shows what 
the NICE threshold would have to be for the treatment to be on the margin of being cost-effective. If 
QALYs capture consumption benefits, then the NICE threshold would have to fall to £7.21 per QALY, 
£8.55 per QALY and £13.56 per QALY for 45, 55 and 65 year old men, respectively, for the 
treatments to be on the margin of cost-effectiveness (i.e. if the threshold was above this value the 
treatments would be cost-effective but if the threshold was below then the treatments would not be 
cost-effective). Similarly if QALYs do not capture consumption benefits then the NICE threshold would 
have to fall to £6.20 per QALY, £7.16 per QALY and £10.54 per QALY for 45, 55 and 65 year old men 
respectively for the treatments to be on the margin of cost-effectiveness. These are clearly very low 
values, and it would appear highly unlikely that the threshold would ever fall this low. 
 
Table XXII. Non marginal changes for statins in secondary prevention 
 Patient 
population 
per year1 
NHS budget 
impact 
k for treatment to be on 
the margin of cost-
effectiveness (QALY inc 
Con) 
k for treatment to be on 
the margin of cost-
effectiveness (QALY excl 
Con) 
45 year old men 1162.796 £5,500.03 £7.21 £6.20 
55 year old men 2442.187 £10,037.39 £8.55 £7.16 
65 year old men 2745.246 £9,086.76 £13.56 £10.54 
1. Based on data from HTA report and population statistics- QRWHWKLVLVVSHFLILFDOO\\HDUROGPHQZH¶YHH[FOXGHG
consideration of all 46 years olds etc so the figure is small. 
 
 
4.3 Summary  
 
Whether net consumption costs are positive or negative depends on the nature of the technology (i.e. 
whether it affects quantity or quality of life), the type of disease (acute or chronic) and the patient 
population (age, gender, employment status etc). As has been demonstrated in the case studies, age 
can have a significant effect on whether net consumption costs are positive or negative.  For example, 
in the statins case study, those still participating in the workforce (45 and 55 year olds) have large net 
consumption benefits whilst older populations (65 year olds) have large net consumption costs.  
 
The case studies have attempted to estimate net consumption costs by reanalysing  published UK 
economic evaluations which were conducted to inform current NICE decision making. It should be 
noted that the estimates provided have required the use of aggregate external data and also some 
often strong assumptions which may not necessarily be accurate. For example, the estimates of 
changes in consumption are based on an estimate of the average consumption level for an individual 
in the UK (based on the average household consumption divided by the average household size). 
However, this level may differ by age, but this has not been taken into account in these examples. 
The estimates of productivity are based on gross wages, which may also underestimate the true 
productivity gains or losses, as they are based on the ASHE survey which only takes account of 
salaried staff and not those who are self employed or contract based who, on average, tend to have 
higher earnings. The only costs of care not borne by the NHS considered are carer costs which were 
valued at average net wage rates.  This is likely to be an overestimate for two reasons: carers my not 
achieve average wage rates if participating in the labour market; and they may get other benefits from 
caring as discussed above.  Clearly there are also other costs of care not borne by the NHS, for 
example travel costs. How such costs are linked to the quantity and quality of life in these case 
studies is unclear and no evidence was available for such costs to be estimated. Therefore, they have 
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been excluded from the above analyses.  In addition no account was taken of consumption based on 
transfer or benefit payments.   
 
Finally and most importantly, no attempt was made to assess the wider benefits that may have been 
displaced by these technologies, all of which impose additional costs on the NHS budget.  Without an 
estimate of the consumption benefits that might be displaced elsewhere or comparing these proposed 
investments with specific disinvestments there will be a danger of µdoubly¶ false positive decisions, 
i.e., a technology may be approved when in fact the health forgone exceeds the health gained and the 
net consumption benefits forgone also exceed those gained.  As discussed in Section 3.3, if 
consideration is given to external effects this must be matched by a better understanding of the 
external effects of health care in general and those aspects of health care that are most likely to be 
displaced 
 
For these reasons the results of these case studies should only be regarded as indicative rather than 
robust and definitive estimates of the net consumption costs and benefits associated with these 
treatments. The analyses have also taken a very specific view on how to value these costs, e.g. the 
use of an average gross wage as the social value of productivity (i.e. a human capital approach 
instead of a friction cost approach), which is not the only approach that can be taken depending on 
the questions of value and fact outlined in Chapter 3. 
 
To provide more robust estimates so that formal account could be taken of net consumption costs 
would require additional analyses as an integral part of the NICE appraisal process. Clear guidance 
on how this ought to be done would be required to allow a consistent approach across economic 
evaluations. The incentive will always be there for manufacturers to overestimate the value of 
consumption benefits and to underestimate, or neglect, any consumption costs. Therefore any 
amendments to the guide to the Methods of Appraisal would need to require analysis that was 
sufficiently robust to make inappropriate estimates detectable. The process of review of submissions 
would be need to be sufficiently rigorous to detect false or biased claims.  
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5. Summary of considerations   
 
In most circumstances a technology will have effects outside the health sector including the direct 
costs of care that do not fall on the health care budget and the indirect external effects on the rest of 
the economy. The problem for policy is that, in the face of budgets set by a government, it is not clear 
how or whether a broader social perspective, which would include all these effects on all sectors 
should be implemented; particularly if transfers between sectors are not possible. It poses the 
question of how the trade offs between health, consumption and other social arguments, as well as 
the valuation of market and non market activities, ought to be done.  Importantly, there is also the 
question of whether this should be formalised and codified or included in a more deliberative process. 
 
The following key issues which have been examined in some detail in preceding sections need to be 
borne in mind when considering the possible policy responses to the problem of appropriate 
perspective.  Key issues to consider include: 
 
i) Whether a formalisation and prescription of the necessary trade offs based on a particular 
social welfare function is desirable and sustainable. This is particularly acute when there 
is no consensus on how to prescribe social choice, each alternate view generating 
potential conflicts with other agreed social objectives. 
ii) The importance of accounting for the likely non marginal effects of individual decisions or 
a series of decisions. 
iii) Whether transfers are regarded a feasible policy option.  Even when they are not, 
whether some record of the net transfers or compensation required between sectors 
could usefully inform subsequent reviews of public expenditure and its allocation.    
iv) The importance of making a proper assessment of any wider consumption benefits which 
maybe forgone as a consequence of the additional costs of a new technology displacing 
other health care activities. 
v) The likely dynamic effects of more formally taking account of external consumption 
benefits, including incentives to appropriate external benefits though higher prices and 
the desirability of changes in the mix of technologies as a result of the investment 
incentives. 
vi) Potential conflicts with other objectives of social policy as well as widely accepted 
principles of justice and social solidarity embodied in the NHS. 
vii) The difficulty of resolving a series of questions of fact (see Section 3), including a range 
of unresolved questions about how best to measure and then value external effects. 
viii) The additional costs that the assessments required would place on the NICE appraisal 
process if properly implemented with sufficiently robust methodological guidance.    
 
Current NICE policy  
 
NICE policy, following the 2008 revisions to the Methods Guide, restricted the perspective to the 
health care system (characterised as Policy A in section 2).  In essence any wider effects outside the 
health care system are ignored, although any impact on the burden borne by carers is captured 
insofar as it affects measures of their HRQoL. Although, initially, this policy appeared difficult to 
sustain, in the light of further examination of the other considerations including the difficulty of robust 
measurement and the additional costs of appraisal, the potential biases associated with other feasible 
policies as well as their likely dynamic effects, it may well be a reasonable policy response to this 
problem.   
 
This is particularly so once the difficulty of properly assessing the consumption benefits that may be 
forgone elsewhere is fully considered.  If, in general, net consumption benefits are associated with 
overall improvements in health, then those technologies which would already be regarded as cost-
effective from an NHS perspective and offer net health benefits to the NHS will also, in general, offer 
overall net consumption benefits as well.  Equally, those technologies not currently regarded as cost-
effective from and NHS perspective would, if approved, reduce health benefits across the NHS and 
tend to impose overall consumption costs. In these circumstances appropriate decisions can be made 
based only on an NHS perspective.  Extending the NICE perspective would seem unnecessary in 
many circumstances as it should in principle make no difference to the guidance issued if it could be 
properly implemented.  In addition, extending the perspective for all technologies appraised by NICE 
would impose additional costs on the appraisal process and introduce the possibility of a biased 
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assessment if the wider consumption benefits which might be forgone are more difficult to identify but 
any wider benefits associated with a new technology are assiduously searched for, researched and 
presented.   
 
Although in general the health care system perspective is likely to be sufficient there will be 
exceptions: where the external benefits associated with the health gains are likely to be substantially 
greater or substantially less than the external benefits associated with health forgone elsewhere in the 
NHS. Current policy does allow consideration of limited external effects in exceptional circumstances, 
identified by the Department of Health before referral of the topic to NICE.  If the criteria for 
exceptional circumstances were based on an assessment of whether the external benefits are likely 
to be substantially greater or substantially less than existing NHS activities this would signal to NICE 
when they might be considered as SDUW RI WKH $SSUDLVDO &RPPLWWHH¶V GHOLEHUDtions.  It should be 
noted, however, that as well as identifying exceptions which are likely to offer overall net external 
benefits it will also be necessary to identify exceptions which are likely to impose overall net 
consumption costs.   
 
Previous NICE policy  
 
Prior to the 2008 Methods Guide NICE policy was more permissive. Although wider costs were not 
part of the reference case in the 2004 guidance, it was suggested that a non reference case analysis 
which included them would be taken into account in the deliberative process. 
 
This could be interpreted as an implicit recognition of the more general approach to marginal changes 
(characterised as Policy D in 2.3 and first outlined in (5), Section 2.1) where wider effects are given 
some but not full weight (a weight equal to the ratio of the cost-effectiveness threshold to the 
consumption value of health).  Under previous NICE policy, ZLGHUHIIHFWVZKHUHµWDNHQ LQWRDFFRXQW¶
as an additional consideration, i.e., they were not given the same weight as costs falling on the NHS 
budget but neither were they given zero weight and ignored.  The approach could be thought of as 
placing policy between the two extremes of attaching weights of zero or one to net consumption 
benefits or costs. 
 
A more deliberative approach to this problem rather than adopting formal and explicit analytical rules 
might reflect the fact that that the cost impact on the NHS of these considerations will ultimately be 
non marginal and therefore might properly be disregarded in some circumstances (see Section 2.3).  
It might also reflect the fact that there is generally no broad consensus or obvious social legitimacy for 
any particular welfare function and the consumption value of health derived from it.  Finally, even if a 
consumption value of health was regarded as acceptable, the welfare function it presupposes is 
unlikely to capture everything of social value.  Again this general difficulty is reflected in the way NICE 
attempts to deal with a range of other social arguments described in its social value judgements 
document - that is, through deliberation. 
 
However, a return to previous NICE policy would need to make the basis of any deliberation more 
explicit.  For example, some further guidance on measurement and valuation of the various elements 
of wider effects would be needed.  Some indication of the weight that might be attached (requiring 
some assessment of the consumption value of health) would be needed as well as a clear description 
of how this assessment might be modified by non marginal effects and potential conflicts with other 
objectives of social policy and social value judgements.  The critical question of what wider benefits 
are likely to be forgone as a consequence of positive NICE guidance would also need to be 
addressed.  Again it should be recognised that extending the perspective for all technologies 
appraised by NICE would impose additional costs on the appraisal process and introduce the 
possibility of a biased assessment if the consumption benefits which might be forgone are more 
difficult to identify. The problem may be more manageable if the consideration of wider effects was 
restricted to those exceptional cases where a health care system perspective is more likely to be 
inadequate, i.e., where the external benefits are likely to be substantially greater or less than current 
NHS activities which may be displaced and where the impact of approval is likely to be marginal. This 
more focused deliberative approach would require explicit criteria for when an exceptional case could 
be made, possibly based on the nature of the technology, the type of disease and the patient 
population. 
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Since, understandably, NICE is required to be increasingly transparent in its deliberations as well as 
its analysis, a return to previous guidance would require much more detail and pose the range of 
questions of fact and value (see Section 3) which are not easily resolved.  If such deliberations are 
made more transparent and predictable then one would expect to see the type of dynamic effects on 
prices, NHS costs and the types of new technologies that were discussed in Section 3.3.   
 
Other possible policy responses 
 
The general approach to marginal changes (characterised as Policy D) which was outlined in Section 
2.1 and applied in Sections 2.2 and 2.3 can be regarded as a formalisation of NICE guidance prior to 
2008.  A formal rather than deliberative approach could be adopted as NICE policy and would need to 
be included in the reference case for the methods of appraisal.  However, this type of prescription 
would pose a number of difficulties and dangers.  Such a formalisation would require a particular 
social welfare function to be specified with an associated estimate of the consumption value of health 
and explicit guidance on the measurement and valuation of the elements of external effects.  Even if 
this was possible and desirable, three primary dangers remain: i) the repeated application of this 
policy will lead to non marginal changes, which, as demonstrated in Section 2.3, will introduce a 
positive bias in favour of new technologies; ii) the dynamic effects described in Section 3.3 will tend to 
increase prices and may not be desirable if either transfers or budget increases do not compensate 
for increased NHS costs; and iii)  the difficulty of identifying the wider benefits which may be displaced 
will remain with the danger that any gains from new technologies will be more easily and readily 
identified than losses elsewhere. 
 
It is possible to recognise the impact of the non marginal effects of a single decision or series of 
decisions by applying other decision rules when the non marginal effects are believed to be large 
relative to the external effects.  In Section 2.3 the conditions under which a combination of polices 
might perform better than the general marginal decision rule were identified. For example, when a 
technology offers net consumption benefits but would lead to non marginal changes (more valuable 
health care would be displaced) it might be better to ignore the wider benefits if they are small relative 
to the likely non marginal effect (the negative bias from ignoring the benefits will tend to offset the 
positive bias from the non marginal effect).  Equally, if the technology imposes wider costs then it 
might be better to treat these costs as if they fall on the NHS budget if the external effects are small 
relative to the non marginal effects. In this case the negative bias from treating the wider costs as if 
they fall on the NHS will tend to offset the positive bias from the non marginal effects. 
 
This combination of policies would mitigate the dangers of non marginal impacts on the NHS.  
However, their implementation by NICE and the criteria for when each should be applied would 
require some knowledge of the likely impact of non marginal changes on the NHS, i.e., how the cost-
effectiveness threshold changes with budget impact. Without some empirically based assessment, 
such a combination of policies may not be sustainable because NICE would be open to challenge if it 
decided to apply the more restrictive rules when non marginal effects where believed to be large 
relative external effects.  Of course, this combination of polices does not overcome the other 
difficulties described above, including the explicit specification of a welfare function with potential 
conflicts with other social objectives, the likely dynamic effects, and the difficulty of adequately 
estimating displaced consumption benefits. 
 
Simply ignoring the budget constraint was also examined as a possible policy option (characterised 
as Policy C).  Although this represents the greater part of literature on evaluation outside health it fails 
to acknowledge or deal analytically with the salient feature of a collectively funded healthcare system 
like the NHS; namely, that the budget of such a system is properly allocated by a socially legitimate 
higher authority (e.g., the institutional arrangements of a social democratic process) and must be 
taken as fixed by decision making bodies such as NICE.  The implication is that costs falling on the 
budget constraint displace health elsewhere, where as costs falling outside the budget on the wider 
economy displace private consumption.   
 
For marginal changes, ignoring the budget constraint would be acceptable only if it could be 
established that the cost-effectiveness threshold was equal to the consumption value of health. 
However, there seems little reason to suppose that a social democratic process will deliver budget 
allocations which precisely match individual preferences.  Aside from empirical observations there are 
good reasons why the threshold, which can be taken to represent a legitimate but partial expression 
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of how much society wishes to pay for improvements in health delivered by collectively funded health 
care, will differ from how much of their own consumption individuals are willing to give up to improve 
their own health. Even if a case could be made that this type of decision rule might be appropriate for 
a single marginal change, unless the non marginal impact of every decision was compensated by 
increases in the NHS budget it would quickly become inappropriate. Therefore, of all the policies 
examined, ignoring the fact of fixed NHS budgets has little to commend it. 
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Appendix A.   
 
The relative ranking of biases associated with 4 possible policies (A, B, C, and D) are summarised in 
Table VI.  The ranking reported in the table assume that the difference between v  and k  is not trivial 
( 2v k ) and this difference is more significant than the impact of non marginal changes, i.e.,  
* *
2 k k
v k
. The ranking in parentheses requires in addition that the external effects are relatively 
large compared to health care costs and their non marginal impact on the budget. If these additional 
conditions do not hold the ranking in parentheses is reversed.  Below the conditions relevant in each 
possible circumstance (represented by the ranking in each row of table IV) are outlined in more detail.  
Whether or not the technology is effective or not has no effect on the extent of bias. Therefore, the 
ranking of policies when 0h  in the upper half of the table is identical to when 0h in the lower 
half.   
 
 
Net consumption costs ( 0cc ) 
 
Additional health care costs ( 0hc and 0cc ) 
 
D<A D is always less biased than A. No extra conditions are required because A always 
gives an additional positive bias when cc  is positive. 
  
(D<B)  D is less biased than B but only if an additional condition holds;  
if 
*
2 h h c cc c c c
k k v k
 
This condition will be more likely to hold when cc  is large relative to hc  and its non 
marginal impact ( *k similar to k ).  If the non marginal effects are large relative to the external 
costs then the ranking is reversed and B will be less biased than D. 
 
D<C D is always less biased than C. No extra conditions are required because v k . 
 
(A<B) A is less biased than B but only if an additional condition holds;  
 if 
*
2 2h h c cc c c c
k k k v
 
The left hand side is always positive but since 2v k  the right hand side is also positive. 
Therefore, this condition will be more likely to hold when cc  is large relative to hc  and its 
non marginal impact ( *k similar to k ).  If the non marginal effects are large relative to the 
external costs then the ranking is reversed and B will be less biased than A. 
Summary (when 0hc and 0cc ) 
If net consumption costs are expected to be large relative to positive health care costs and 
their non marginal impact, then policy D will offer the least bias because D<A, (D<B), D<C 
and (A<B). Since D always less biased than A, then when D<B, A must also be less biased 
than B by transitivity.  However, if the positive health care costs and their non marginal impact 
are large relative to net consumption costs, then policy B would be least biased because 
D<A, (B<D), D<C and (B<A).  Since D always less biased than A; when B<D, B must also be 
less biased than A by transitivity.   
 
Reduced health care costs ( 0hc and 0cc ) 
 
D<A D is always less biased than A. No extra conditions are required because A always 
gives an additional positive bias when 0cc . 
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(D<B)  D is less biased than B but only if an additional condition holds;  
if 
*
2 h h c cc c c c
k k v k
 
This condition will be more likely to hold when cc  is large relative to hc  and its non 
marginal impact ( *k similar to k ).  If the non marginal effects are large relative to the external 
costs then the ranking is reversed and B will be less biased than D. 
 
D<C D is less biased than C. No extra conditions are required because it is assumed that 
the difference between v  and k is non trivial ( 2v k ) and is more significant than the impact 
of non marginal changes, i.e.,  
* *
2 k k
v k
 
 
(A<B) A is less biased than B but only if an additional condition holds;  
 if 
*
2 2h h c cc c c c
k k k v
 
The left hand side is always positive but since 2v k the right hand side is also positive. 
Therefore, this condition will be more likely to hold when cc  is large relative to hc  and its 
non marginal impact ( *k similar to k ).  If the non marginal effects are large relative to the 
external costs then the ranking is reversed and B will be less biased than A. 
 
Summary (when 0hc and 0cc ) 
If net consumption costs are expected to be large relative to health care cost saving and their non 
marginal impact, then policy D will offer the least bias because D<A, (D<B), D<C and (A<B). Since D 
always less biased than A, when D<B, A must also be less biased than B by transitivity.  However, if 
the health care cost savings and their non marginal impact are large relative to net consumption 
costs, then policy B would be least biased because D<A, (B<D), D<C and (B<A).  Since D always 
less biased than A, when B<D, B must also be less biased than A by transitivity.   
 
Net consumption benefits ( 0cc ) 
 
Additional health care costs ( 0hc and 0cc ) 
 
(D<A) D is less biased than A but only if an additional condition holds;  
if 
*
2 h h cc c c
k k v
 
This condition will be more likely to hold when the absolute value of cc  is large relative to 
hc  and its non marginal impact ( *k similar to k ).  If the non marginal effects are large 
relative to the external benefits then the ranking is reversed and A will be less biased than D. 
 
D<B D is always less biased than B. No extra conditions are required because B always 
gives an additional positive bias when cc  is positive because the common terms 
*
h hc c
k k
are positive and equal so the additional bias of B also positive c c
c c
v k
. 
 
D<C D is always less biased than C. No extra conditions are required because v k . 
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A<B A is always less biased than B. No extra conditions are required because the 
common terms 
*
h hc c
k k
cancel and the additional bias of B c
c
k
 is positive when 
0cc . 
 
Summary (when 0hc and 0cc ) 
If net consumption benefits are expected to be large relative to the additional health care cost and 
their non marginal impact, then policy D will offer the least bias because (D<A), D<B, D<C and A<B.  
However, if positive health care costs and their non marginal impact are large relative to net 
consumption costs, then policy A would be least biased because (A<D), D<B, D<C and A<B.  Since D 
always less biased than C then when A<D, A must also be less biased than C by transitivity.   
 
Reduced health care costs ( 0hc and 0cc ) 
 
(D<A) D is less biased than A but only if an additional condition holds;  
if 
*
2 h h cc c c
k k v
 
This condition will be more likely to hold when the absolute value of cc  is large relative to 
hc  and its non marginal impact ( *k similar to k ).  If the non marginal effects are large 
relative to the external benefits then the ranking is reversed and A will be less biased than D. 
 
D<B D is always less biased than B. No extra conditions are required because B always 
gives an additional positive bias when cc  is positive because the common terms 
*
h hc c
k k
are positive and equal so the additional bias of B also positive c c
c c
v k
. 
 
D<C D is less biased than C. No extra conditions are required because it is assumed that 
the difference between v  and k is non trivial ( 2v k ) and is more significant than the impact 
of non marginal changes, i.e.,  
* *
2 k k
v k
 
 
A<B A is always less biased than B. No extra conditions are required because the 
common terms 
*
h hc c
k k
cancel and the additional bias of B c
c
k
 is positive when 
0cc . 
 
Summary (when 0hc and 0cc ) 
If net consumption benefits are expected to be large relative to the health care cost savings and their 
non marginal impact, then policy D will offer the least bias because (D<A), D<B, D<C and A<B.  
However, if health care costs savings and their non marginal impact are large relative to net 
consumption costs, then policy A would be least biased because (A<D), D<B, D<C and A<B.  Since D 
always less biased than C then when A<D, A must also be less biased than C by transitivity.   
 
 
